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ABSTRACT
In response to the emergence of sustainable development as the dominant environmental
and economic paradigm, a number of mechanisms have been developed to assist in the
implementation of these principles. Examples of these bbsupery'instruments abound

-

market measures, eco-covenants, joint implementation and voluntary compliance.
Appreciably less enthusiasm has been dedicated to capacity building for other more
traditional tools prescribed by international laws. Counted among the disregarded tools is
the widely maligned and misunderstood role of enforcement.

This thesis argues that the potential for effecting innovative reforms may be significantly
threatened by an underlying misunderstanding and failed appreciation of the critical role
that enforcement can and must play in achieving sustainable development. Al1 too often
arguments for alternative tools are premised on such unfounded and unsuppcrted
arguments as "since enforcement doesn't work", "enforcement is too costly" or
"enforcement is too rigid". In the vast majonty of cases these arguments mask an
underlying lack of cornmitment to achial implementation of established standards or
processes. In others it reflects a basic ignorance of the enforcement process itself and the
wide array of alternative measures available to achieve compliance as wcll as an overdl
lack of understanding of the role enforcement plays in the implementation of alternative
strategies for protecting the environment.

Without a better understanding of the potential contribution of enforcernent and the

minimum M e w o r k necessary to ensure compliance, it will be difficult to Mly
comprehend the underlying barriers to implementing sustainable development. A lack of
political will coupled with an under-cornmitment of resources, will inevitably result in
failed capacity to achieve any measurable results.
This thesis presents a comprehensive examination of the role of effective enforcement in
achieving specific compliance and a more general adherence to the idea of the " d e of

vii

law". It provides a detailed strategy for the effective enforcement of domestic
environmental laws. Based on the author's and others' expenences in lesser developed
economies, the thesis then considers particular constraints which may be faced by lesser
developed nations in thek efforts to irnplernent an effective enforcement reçime and to
ultimately achieve sustainable development.
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A concerted effort has been witnessed at the international level to translate such widely

eschewed p ~ c i p l e s as sustainable development, intergenerational equity, the
precautionary principle, "polluter pays" and participatoq democracy fkom international
obligations into domestic law and practice. These principles are now wel1 articulated in
the Rio ~ecluration'and Agenda 212, intemational documents understood to reflect a
cornmitment (at least by their signatories) to a global agenda for change. In still other
instances, this bundle of principles has been M e r translated into regional and
presumably by virtue of their signators, domestic c o d t m e n t s to reform, for example
the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).'

The substance of these principles continues to be the focus in a plethora of fora among
Environmental Non-govemmental Organization (ENGOS), governments, industry and
other "experts" in the ongoing dissection of treaty obligations, and in mer instances, their
domestic implementation. Similar fervour cm be evidenced in the debate over perhaps

' Rio Declaration on Environrnent and Development, 13 June 1992,3 1 I.L.M.874.
United Nations Conference on Environrnent and Developrnent, Agenda 2 1, U.N. Doc.
NConf. 15 1/26/Rev. 1 (1993).
Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Cari.-Ma., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force on January 1, 1994).

more substantively related subjects as exploitation of dwindling resources, desertification,

global warmhg and the search for clean technologies. The concerted lobby for these
reforms has triggered exploration of more efficient, less intrusive instruments in response
to pressure for significant environmental hprovements. Examples of these "niper"
instruments abound

-

market measures, eco-covenants, joint implementation and

voluutary cornpliance. Appreciably less enthusiasm appears to have been dedicated to
capacity building for other more traditional tools prescribed by international laws.
Counted among the disregarded tools is the widely maligned and misunderstood role of
enforcement.4

4

By way of example the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) have yet to agree to establish a subcomrnittee on enforcement. More
encouraging progress in support for enforcement include the dialogues amongst domestic
environmental enforcernent agencies, the proceedings of which are documented in the
Proceedings of the International Enforcement Workshop, Volume I and II, May 8- 10,
1990, Utrecht, ï h e Netberlands, United States Environmental Protection Agency and
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment (VROM), The Netherlands;
Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmenta&Enforcement, Vol urne 1 and
II, September 22-25, 1992, Budapest Hungary, United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Commission of the European Communities, Ministry of Housing, Physical
Planning and the Environment (VROM)The Netherlands; Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Environmentai Enjlorcernent, Volume 1 and II, A pril25-28,
1994, Oaxaca Mexico, United States Environmental Protection Agency, World Wildlife
Fund, United Nations Environmental Program, Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (Sedosol)
Mexico, Ministry of Housing, Spatiai Pianning and the Environment (VROM)The
Netherlands; Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Environmental
Compiiunce und Enforcement, Volumes 1 and 2, April22-26, 1996, Chaing Mai, Thailand,
United States Environmental Protection Agency, United Nations Environmental Program,
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)The Netherlands,
Environmenta1 Law Institute, European Commission, Environment Canada, Pollution
Control Department of Thailand; the creation in 1996 of the International Network of
Environmental Enforcement Agencies (INECE); and, the North American Working Group
on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation established by the Council of
Ministers for the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Resolution
$96-06).

It is rny thesis that the potential for effecting innovative refoms may be significantly
threatened by an underlying misunderstanding and failed appreciation of the critical role
that enforcernent can and must play in achieving sustainable deve~o~ment.~
Ail too ofien
arguments for alternative tools are premised on such unfounded and unsupported

arguments as "since enforcement doesn't work", "enforcement is too costly" or
"enforcement is too rigidY6 In the vast majority of cases these arguments mask an
underlying lack of cornmitment to actual implementation of established standards or
processes. In others it reflects a basic ignorance of the enforcement process itself and the

wide array of alternative measures available to achieve cornpliance as well as an overall
lack of understanding of the role enforcement plays in the implementation of alternative
strategies for protecting the environment.

Without a better understanding of the potential contribution of enforcement and the

minimum framework necessary to ensure cornpliance, it will be dificult to fully
comprehend the underlying barriers to irnplementing sustainable development. A lack of

5

A prime example is the recent reaiization by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol of the
need to consider enforcement measures who during the COP-8 in November 1996, being
confionted with the spectrurn of losing gains made in further restricting the use of ozonedepleting substances (ODS) through illegaI trade in chlorofluorcarbons, issued a decision
urging industrialized nations to instali verification prograrns to curb illegal trade in ODS.
As summed up by Under Secretary for the Montreal Protocol Secretariat Elizabeth
Dowdeswell, International Environme~ztalReporter, 0 1 49-873 8/96 at p. 1087 "illegal trade
in ODS and lack of enforcement would Iead to an increase in their consumption and the
nullification of the entire global endeavour to phase out the ODS quantities in recent
y ears".
6

There have been few empirical studies on environmental enforcement, inclusive of the
effects of newly touted voluntary approaches.

political will coupled with an under-commitrnent of resources, will inevitably resdt in
failed capacity to achieve any measurable results.

It may be trite to acknowledge that those most concemed with enforcement are the

enforcers and those directiy affected by the acts of enforcement (violators) and non
enforcernent (adjacent comrnunities and cornpetitors). It is not surprising that few people
share the field inspectors' enthusiasm for exchanging pointers on effluent samph g ,
assessing exigent circumstances or the technical drafting of a control order. Such is the
case with the technical aspects of almost every field.

Minimal attention has been given to official or scholarly empirical work to analyze
environmental enforcement.' But perhaps most troubling is the lack of attention to and
awareness of broader enforcement issues such as environmentai justice in enforcement
policies, the direct fuiancial costs of non enforcement', inclusive of crown ( govenunent )
liability for non enforcement. It is similarly noteworthy that while industry has expressed
broad support for more non-coercive means of enswing compliance, few companies
actually seize oppomuiities for implernenting "voluntary compliance" strategies even

7

Supported by D. Saxe in Environmental e en ses, Corpurate ResponsibiIities and
Executive Liability (Ontario: Canada Law Book Inc., 1990) at p. 45-55 in which she reports
the results of her empirical study conducted to identiQ the factors triggering corporations
directors to cornpIy with environmental laws8

For example, the direct emergency-response, evacuation and clean up costs and potential
related heaIth costs arising fiom the 1997 fire at the Ontario Plastirnet Inc. recycling
facility. It has been suggested that the incident and assoçiated costs couId have been
avoided by enforcement of existing laws.

where govemments have expressed openness to alternatives to traditional enforcement

Environrnental enforcement involves these and many more similarly complex issues.
How do we judge whether a nation state is abiding by the " d e of law" in the
management and exploitation of its natural resources if no laws are enacted or any
process instituted to verifi compliance? What are the implications of failing to effectively
enforce environmental laws, p e r d s or processes? What are the implications for the "rule
of law" and public accountability with the adoption of private or "voluntary" compliance
approaches ? What are the underlying reasons for the failure to achieve compliance with
protection standards? The answers to these questions lie in fully understanding the factors
that rnotivate compliance and the pragmatics of implementing an effective enforcement
regime. As stated by a former Canadian Minister of the Environrnent in tabling his new
federal law, "A good law, however, is not enough. It must be enforced

- mthlessly if

need be. Io

9

A 1996 report documenting North Amencan experience with voluntary cornpliance found
that while a wide array of "voluntary" mechanisms have been introduced to allow regulated
parties to either opt out of enforceable standards or to renegotiate binding conditions
surprisingly few companies have actuaHy taken advantage of these alternate routes.
Voluntary Cornphce: A Survey of North American Experience (Montreal: Commission
for Environrnental Cooperation, 1997) [unpublished draft].
10

Tom McMillan, then federal Minister of the Environrnent, in his speech to the Canadian
Parliament during the tabling of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. Notes for a
Statement, December 18, 1986, Ottawa, as cited in D. Chappell, From Sawdmt to Toxic
Blobs: A Consideration of Sanctioning Strategies to Combat Pollution in Canada, Shrdies
in Replation and Cornpliance (Ottawa: Justice Canada, 1989) at p. 24.

role of regulation, cornplaints are made about the heavy-handed nature of the usual
responses, such as prosecution.

To be able to deliberate on a more effective regime for improving environmental
performance with operating standards, it is therefore important to distinguish these two
processes of standard setting and enforcement. A plethora of alternatives are evolving to
replace or supplement regulation, and debate abounds on the merits of these purported
miracle instruments.

But useful analysis of these innovations requires that the two

processes be differentiated. In other words, regardless of the ultimate mechanism chosen
to control or direct environmental performance, a separate, equally necessary process
must be undertaken. That process is a determination of how best to eEect compliance and

the appropriate response to free-nders (îhose who do not comply with minimum

standards particularly in the context of voluntary compliance). This is the dialogue on
enforcement.

In setting a context for this thesis about the inherent value of effective environmental
enforcement it is important to begin with an understanding of enforcement terminology
and presumptions. Definitions are put fonvard for essential concepts and terminology

including environmental law, enforcement and compliance. As the thesis rnakes a case
for the inextricable role of enforcement in achieving sustainable development, 1 begin
with a definition of that concept.

Sustainable development has been widely understood to mean " development that m e t s the

needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs"."

Obviously consistent with this recognition of the inappropnateness of

deflecting costs and impacts to later generations is the need for timely response to prevent
unnecessary h m €rom known sources or actions. That is the essence of enforcement.
Sustainable development is also recognized to represent more than an end objective. The
concept has evolved to embody certain basic process principles including the precautionary
principle, polluter pays principle, participatory democracy (including access to information,
due process and access to administrative processes and courts) and the principle of
intergenerational equity.''

It sllnilarly follows that these principles should be incorporated into the environmental
decision-making processes inclusive of policy making, project approval and assessment,

Il

World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Cornmon Fume, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987) at p. 43.
12

For a more detailed reiteration of these concepts see "Sustainable Development: The
Challenge to International Law" (Report of a Consultation convened by Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development, (FIELD; Windsor, 1993). See also
I U î N / U N E P W , Cming for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (Gland,
Switzerland, i991). In this report the authors present an agenda for implementation of
sustainable development which includes the establishment of a comprehensive system of
environmental law and its implementation and effective enforcement at p. 68-69. See also D.
Vandemaag, CEPA and the Precmtionary Prmciple Approach (Reviewing CEPA: the
Issues #18) (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1994) and T. OYRiordan and J. Cameron,
Interpreting the Precmtionary Principle (London: Cameron May, 1994).

standard setting and enforcemend3 From this perspective, enforcement and cornpliance
çtrategies may be seen as an integral part of the process of reforming institutions to achieve
sustainable development The fkst step is understanding the fidl scope and context of
enforcement and the role it plays in the broader equation.

Environmental law is generally understood to constitute the wide array of legal
instruments enacted by governrnents to regdate behavior or activities affecthg the
environment. Legal mechanisms are chosen with the intent and effect of imposing the
"Rule of Law" on decision making. These mechanisms commonly include statutes.
regulations, licenses and permits, contracts, agreements and other related means. Less
fiequently recognized mechanisms include legally binding procedures for project review
and assessment, approvals and d e s for the creation and management of emissions
trading systems and negotiated sealements. Environmental law also includes legislation

according rights of participation in decision-making processes, granting legal standing
before courts and tribunals, and ensuring access to idormation and to due process.
Substantive environmental law includes achial performance standards prescribed for
pollution control, allocation and management of resources, protection of species and

l 3 FTELD, ibid at p. 8-1 1 . Reforms to the development review and regdatory processes
reflects this cal1 for more rnultidiscliplinary and transparent processes, for exampIe
requirements for socio-economic analysis of draft regulations, public hearings and dispute
resolution in environmentai assessment, negotiated rule-making for standard setting and
regulation drafiing.

safeguarding human health. References to environmental law as one of the cornerstones

of environmental protection are common in most international agreements relating to
environment or sustainable development. l4

For the purposes of this thesis the discussion of environmental enforcernent will focus on
pollution control laws, although the arguments made regarding the inherent value of a
basic hmework for effective enforcement apply equally to al1 environmental laws. The
dtimate effectiveness of laws in effecting sustainable development is both a question of
their design and the cornmitment of resources to ensure their observance. As will be
posited, it is necessary in developing effective environmental laws to consider both the
substantive environmental objectives and the sîrategies to ensure their implementation or
enforcement.

It is critical to start with a clear understanding of the tems "enforcernent " and
"cornpliance" and their proper usage. Enforcement is d l to kequently equated with one
available response to non-compliance, namely the prosecution and incarceration of

worth noting that al1 of these latter categories of environmental law are
recognized under both Agenda 21 and the NAAEC among other international laws. The
NAAEC provides that "...each Party shalI ensure that its laws and regulations provide for
high levels of environmental protection and shalI strive to continue to improve those laws
and regulations" and makes specific reference to the Parties ''tradition of environmental
cooperation7' and "desire to support and build on international environmental agreements
and existing policies and laws...", supra. note 3, Preamble and article 3.
l4

It may be

offenders. However this is a fdse and extremely dated view of the breadth and variety of
now commody available and exercised enforcement responses. It is this extrernely narrow
characterization of enforcement, and its purported limitations, which is popularly referenced
to support claims for the need for alternatives to traditional enforcement, derogatonly
dubbed the "command and control" system. Consequently, a definition of enforcement is
later provided more reflective of its full scope and purport.

The term "cornpliance" has similarly been abused and misconstnied. Both regulaton and
regulated industry alike share the blarne for the confusion. Many environmental agencies
have adopted a practice of measuring and reporting environmental cornpliance using vague
guidelines outside the constructs of the law.15 This practice has been fomented by widespread acceptance of the argument that most non-cornpliance is a rnere technicai blip and
theregore more appropriately addressed through technical adjustments that the intmive acts

of enforcement. Acquiescence by govenunent to this interpretation. and deferral or waiver
of enforcement actions has contributed to the blurring of the tem!

The effect is viewed

''For example, prbr to the adoption by Environment Canada of the Cmadian Environmenfol
Proteclion Act (CEPA) Enforcement and Cornpliance Poficy: see also B. S r n a Beyond
Cornpliance: A New Indwtry View of the Environment (Washington; World Resources
Institute, 1992).
16

See for example, E. Kupchanko, " A Case for Cornpliance through Administration of
Licenses and Pemits", in Environmental Enforcement. Proceedings of the National
Conference on the Enforcernent of EnvironmenfafLaw. ed. L. Duncan (Edmonton:
Environmental Law Center, 1985). For example, pursuant to Part Five of the NAAEC, any
party thereto may initiate consultations and ultimately formal arbitration and imposition of
monetary penalties on trade sanctions against other parties and the agreement where there
has been a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law, supra,
note 3; Clifford Lincoln. "The Lie of Cornpliance: Environmental Bill is Better", (Montreal
Gazette, Feb. 19, 1996).

by some as constructive deregdation by Whie of a persistent pattern of non-enforcement.

Of late the definition of environmental compliance had been M e r muddied by the

introduction of private, non-regdatory systems for establishing and v e r i w g "standards" of
practice. " Of particular interest and import is the ISO 14000 environmental management
systern which introduces a global systern of industry-negotiated, self-imposeci, non-binding
guidelines for industry management under the shroud of regdatory terminology

(%tandards", "certification",

"c~rn~liance").'~
These private systems may import

enforcement regimes where governrnents choose to retract fiom enforcement responses or
strategies as a direct result of a policy shift towards reliance on these non-regdatory
processes.

Interestingly it is these actual and contemplated s h i h away fiom traditional regulation and
enforcement which are fostering increased appreciation both for the need for a more
consistent, stnictured approach to measuring and ensuring compliance with enwonmental

17

For example, Responsible Care, ARET. See Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, supra, note 7; Fourth Progress Reportfrom the Task Force on the Cunadian
Automotive Mmufactwing Pollution Prevention Project MVUA Project, Env ironment
Canada, Chrysler Canada, Ford, General Motors, Motors, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing
Association and Government of Ontario (June 1996); B. Smart, supra, note 15.
18

Benchmark Environmental Convention ISO Id001: An Uncornmon Perspective, Five
Public Policy Questions for Proponents of the ISO 1400 Series (The European
Environmental Bureau, Revised November 1995); Darlene Pearson, "ISO t 400:
Opportunities and Programs", a background paper prepared for the August 22-23. 1996
meeting of North Amencan Environment Enforcement Officiais, Mexico City, sponsored
by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (unpublished); Pierre Hauselmann,
"ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental Management", A World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWf), International Discussion Paper, Lausanne, August 1996.

standards and the need to institute a wider array of enforcement tools. The follawing

definitions are rdective of the intensive discourse, in parîicuiar amongst environmental
enforcement agencies, on altemative, more effective environmental enforcement regime~.'~
Among the most cornmon issues identifïed in these discussions is the need to clarifi the
t e m enforcement and compliance. The definitions drawn from this discourse are intended
to provide a context for the thesis.

Enforcement is any action or intervention2' taken to determine or respond to noncompliance. While enforcement is cornmonly equated with criminal prosechon, this is
neither an accurate nor complete portraya1 of environmental law enforcement. For many
jurisdictions, environmental enforcement now characteristically involves a wide array of
administrative, criminal and mediative tools to effect compliance, and to mitigate or prevent

environmental damage.

For example, enforcement includes procedures to screen new or existing laws or pemiits to
ensure compliance in the most cost efficient manner. Enforcement includes policies and

19

See for exarnple, the Proceedings of the 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996 Intemational
Confrences on Environmentai Luw Enforcement, supra, note 4; Chapter 8 of Agenda 21,
supra note 2. See also Technical Report No. 36, Industry Environmenlal Cornpliance
Training Manual, United Nations Environment Programme, Industry and Environment
(Paris: UNEP, 1996) at p. 0.6.
20

This include actions or interventions by govemment or private parties.

programs to encourage or recognize voluntary efforts towards compliance (e-g., audit
privilege, seIf-reporting), govemment surveillance and pnvate enforcement action. Some
have suggested enforcement also includes the means to establish liability or responsibility
for harm."

Enforcement is more than punishment after the fact. It includes the process of creating

binding standards or imposing Iiability. It hcludes accountability for ensuring compliance,
inclusive of the obligation to comply, and the duty to enforce. It includes the rights and
responsibilities associated with exercising enforcement powers.

Cornpliance is the achievement of a prescribed process or standard. For those governments
operating within a system premised on the "Rule of Law", cornpliance is understood to

mean observation of the law." Some enforcement and compliance policies have specifically
endorsed this direct connection to adherence to law. For exarnple, the Canadiun
Environmental Protection Act

Enforcemeni and Compliance Policy States that

21

C. Wasserman, Proceedings of the Third Intemational Conference on Environmental
Enjimement, supra, note 4 at p. 16.
Those who decry the inflexibility of law enforcers fail to comprehend that the tirne for
negotiation is during the setting of standards through regulatory review processes or project
assessments. Once the standards are agreed ta and imposed it is only logical within a system
structured on the "Rule of Law" to expect that those standards will be observed, and where
vioiations occur that those persons be made accountable.

"[c]ompliance means a state of conforming with the law".*

While such statements may appear axiomatic, stating the obvious rnay indeed be necessary
to reverse any history of basing compliance ratings on imprecise guidehes or shifting
technical objectives.'* II is now widely accepted that a more accurate and consistent
measurement of compliance is adherence to a legdly imposed and consistent standard?
Cornpliance objectives may be made binding through statute, regdation, license or p e h t
compliance agreement (where provided for by law) or through administrative or court
directives or orders. The various altematives are reviewed in greater detail Ui chapter 3.

A determination of cornpliance is aiso not limited to the measurement of adherence to

specified pollution standards. It is equally significant to regulations which implement
alternative implementation strategies such as economic or market instrument^.'^ For

" Supra. note 15 at p. S.
24

For example, ptior to introduction of the CEPA Enforcernent and Comptiance Poiicy
Environment Canada published compliance reports using technicai guidelines for the purpose
of measuring compliance.
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See L.F. Duncan, T h e Rule of Law and Sustainable Development" in Susfainable
Development in Canada :Opfionsfor Law Refom (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association,
1990) at p. 285; L.F. Duncan, "Trends in Enforcement: 1s Environment Canada Serious
About Enforcing its Laws?", ed. D.Tingley, lnto the Future: Environmental Law ancl Poticy
for the 1990s (Edmonton: Al berta Environmental Law Centre, 1990); CEPA Enforcement
and Compiiunce Policy, supra, note 15. Note that the development of an enforcernent and
compliance policy is not sufficient if there is no cornmitment to implementing and observing.
The USEPA adopts a similarly narrow or law-based definition of compliance. See USEPA
Principtes of Enforcement (USEPA,Ofice of Enforcement, February 1992).
26

L.F. Duncan, "Why You Can't Take the Regulation out of Pollution Control or the

Necessary (albeit) Uncornfortable Interplay between Lawyers and Economists in the Quest
for Sustainable Developrnent", Dalhousie Law School, December 1990 [unpublished]. See
also discussion in Chapter Ill on Market Measures.

example, when ixnplementing a system of poilution control through trading effluent rights
or opportunities, govemment must first estabiish minimum effluent standards and then
estabiish a system for trading pemiits or marketing surplus, and maintain a monitoring
system for both the poilution levels and an audit of the trading. There is a growing
appreciation for the complexity of compliance assessments for market approaches?

Cornpliance d s o relates to procedural d e s . By way of example, compliance is achieved if
a government agency responsibie for overseeing the conduct of an environmencal
assessrnent of a proposed project ensures that the procedures dictated by law are observed,
such as appointment of an unbiased and qualified panel, opportunities accorded to affected

public to participate and recommended conditions are implemented."

Accountability for compliance with prescribed codes of conduct is also recognised as a
cnticai determinant for liability and compensation. Clear evidence of this can be f o n d in

uW~rkihopon Econornic Instmrnents" (Report), Third I'afionaf Conference on
Environmentaf Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 193
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See for example the decisions of the Canadian Federal COU^ and Suprerne Court and
Indonesian courts and the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
regarding failure of respective government agencies to ensure environmentai assessrnent laws
were complied with in the process of approving major developments. Frienh of the Ofd Mm
River W. Canada (Min. of Transport) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; The Indonesian Environmentai
Fom
v. the State of the Republic of Indonesia (q.q.). The Central Investment
Coordination Board and The Department of Interna1 Affairs, The Ministry of Industry, The
Minister of Population and Environment, The Minister of Forestry and P.T.Inti Indorayon
Utarna, Central Jakarta District Court, December 30, 1988, No. 820/PDT.G/1988
PN.JKT.PST; Final Facrual Record of the Cnrise Ship Pier Project in Cornnael. Quintana
Roo, prepared in accordance with Article 15, NAAEC, Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (Montreal: CEC, 1997) http://www.cec.org.
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judicial decisions on director liability for environmentai damages including deteminations
on such factors as due diligen~e.'~
Sirnilarly, the courts have held that with the decision to
impose standards cornes the duty to ensure compliance, that is to inspect and enforce.'O

It is similady important to understand that the meanirement of an effective enforcement
response or compliance strategy refiects more than the tdly of enforcement actions or
compliance statistics (commonly referred to as "ban counting"). It also includes less
tangible and more complex concepts such as environmental results and deterrence. As
noted by one experienced United States Environmental Protection Agency enforcement
official:
The primary goal of environmental enforcement is to ensure compliance in order to
protect the environment and public health. However, despite the central importance
of compliance rates and the aggregate level of enforcement activity, they are not, by
themselves, the only indicatoa of a heaithy enforcement program. Other measures
may indicate whether or not the overall environmental benefits of laws and
regdations are being achieved. While a lot has been analyzed and written about the
US environmentai protection effort, we are still learning about the efficacy of our
programs and our concept of environmental "success" continues to be b o t . dynarnic
and evolving. As EPA's environmental enforcernent program has mahirrd, the
concept of "success" itself has become more cornplex and multi-faceted. It
encompasses not only the concept of high rates of compliance and aggregate
numbers of enforcement actions, but aiso the important, albeit more difficult to
measure, concept of environmental results and deterrence-JI

'9

See for example R v. Bota IndiLFnies ( 1992) 70 C.C.C (3d) 394 (Ont. Prov. CL).
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See for example Swanson Estate v. Cancrda (1990), 19 A C . W.S. (3d) 8 10 (F.CT.D.);
Kamloops (MunicipaIiv) v. Niefson [ 19841 2 S.C.R. 2; Tock Y. St. John 's Metropolitan Area
Board [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1 18 1; it may be noted that nirther support for this connection is
evidenced in the NAAEC which imposes the obligation on its Parties to effectively enforce
their respective environmental laws (article S), supra, note 3.
31 R. van Heuvelen "Successful Cornpliance and Enforcernent Approaches", Pmceedings of
the Kbird hternationui Conference on Emironmental Enfarcement, supra note 4 at p. 1 63.

Enfiorcement, then, is a means to achieve that end. Compiiance is the end objective or result.

The process of putting in place the various components of the enforcement regime must be
recognized as one of the steps to actualizing sustaioable development. Failme to understand
the signifïcance of enforcement in the environment and development equation will, it is

argueci, relegate sustainable development to a theoretical constmct.

In Chapter II concrete arguments are presented for the indispensable role of enforcement to
irnplementing the previously mentioned principles intrimic to Nstainable development.
Chapter III then makes the case for establishing a consistent framework for effective
enforcement, and provides a detailed analysis of the components of the fiamework drawn
fiom the direct expenence of the writer and research conducted. Chapter IV surveys support
expressed for the posited framework for effective environmental enforcement and provides
elaboration of particular constraints which may be faced by Iesser developed nations in their
effort to implement an enforcement regime. Chapter IV provides conclusions and some

fial observations.

II.

WHYENFORCEMENT
ISNECESSARY
TO IMPLEMENT
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT

While considerable energy continues to be directed to achieving sustainable development

through the processes of developing indicators, assessing potential impacts and establishing
standards to mitigate environmental impacts of development, far less attention has b e n

given to the other side of the equation, that is, preventing or deterring impacts through
effective enforcernerd2

Yet while there appears to be growing recognition of the value of incorporating
environmentai objectives into binding Iaw and more generally to the application of " d e of
law" to environmental protection, what is too ofien forgotten in the process of enacting the
standards is the importance of addressing the means of achieving cornpliance. While much
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In his anaIysis of the barriers to sustainable developrnent Barry B. Boyer, "Building Legal
and Institutional Frameworks for Sustainability", (1993) 63 BgaIo Env. Law JomaI 71
appears to share this concem with the proclivity to stall at the front end of the process,
"Experience provides some grounds for skepticism that these refonns, if enacted. would
accomplish the desired results. Zero discharge of persistent toxic chemicals and universal
achievement of fishable, swimmable waters have been gods of the U.S.CIean Water Act
since 1972. Authority to ban or require pre-market testing of dangerous chemicals has been in
place nearly as long, but only a handful of substances have been regulated under the American
Toxic Substances Control Act. Thus, statutory regulation of harmfûl substances has developed
far ahead of the political will for enforcement. In this field of pollution conbol, there is a need
for a workable theory explaining the relatiowhip between the law on the books and the lads
inaction. C.S. Diver "A Theory of Regdatory Enforcement", (1980) 28 Public Policy 257
reiterates this concern that critics of regulation have tended to dwell on the policy making
phase of regulation to the neglect of strategies for enhancing enforcement effectiveness.
Another common example of the failure to move beyond the impact assessment or indicators
process is the persistence of govemments in resourcing environmental assessment processes
without simulates attention to institution of mechanisms to rnake the mitigating provisions
binding in regulation or license.

attention has been given to irnproving adherence to international ~aws;~l e s support has
been given to the importance of domestic enforcement to achieving sustainable
deve~o~ment?~
In this Chapter, a senes of arguments are made for recognition of the

inherent value and contribution of this process.

ENFORCEMENT
IS INTRINSIC TO THE "RULE
OF LAW"

A.

in the process of ensuring sustainable development it will be important to recognize that
enforcement is intrinsic to the law. If governments are to actuaily operate within the

"Rule of Law", thereby being made accountable for developrnent decisions and
establishing a level playing field, there must be equal recognition of the intnnsic role of

'' See for example, L.

K. Caldwell, "Law and Environment in an Era of Transition:
Reconciling Domestic and International Law",(1 99 1) 2 Colorado Journal of International
Environrnental Law und Policy, P. Birnie, "International Environrnental Law: Its Adequacy
for Present and Future Needs", The International Politics of the Environment Acturs.
Interests and Zmtituîions, A. Hwrell and B. Kingsbury eds. (Mord: Clarendon Press, 1992);
S. Bilderbeek, ed. Biodiversity and International Law: The Eflectiveness of Environrnental
Law, (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for the IUCN, IOS Press, 1992); L. CI. Susskind,
Environmental DipIomacy. Negotiating More Efectnle Global Agreements, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
34

IncIuded among those few exceptions are for example the report by the Experts Group on
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environrnent and Development,
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and
Recommendations, (London: Graham & TrotmanlMartinus, 1986); Proceedings of the First,
Second, Third and Fozath International Environmentai Law Enforcement Conferences, supra,
note 4; L. F. Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra,, note 25; E.
Barr, Positive Cornpliance Program: Their Potential as Zns~rranents
for Regdatory Reform,
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1991); K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement.
Regdation and the Social Definition of Pollution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); UNEP
Industry and Environrnent Programme Activity Center, From Replations to Indmty
Cornpliance: Building lnstitutional Capabilities, Technical Report No. 1 1 ( 1992) Paris,
France; supra, note 5; and, a bnef mention in Agenda 21, Chapter 8, supra. note 2.

eaforcement? While most progressive industrializing nations espouse support for the
principle of the "Rule of Law", in practice many have failed in their responsibilities to
effectively enforce or in other cases, to comply with their own environmental laws. 36

To fail to understand the significance of enforcement is to fail to understand the essential
purpose and workings of the law. The "Rule of Law" includes not only the "black letter
law" but also the practise of law. Put simply, it prescnbes conducting the &airs of a

- -

--
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"Rule of Law" is intended here to be defined in a much broader sense than that traditionally
posited by Dicey, that is. any rule enforced by the courts. It is suggested that at least for the
purposes of environmental regdation the principle should be understood as encompassing the
process of enacting standards of conduct in law and the wide m y of rnechanisms for
achieving and imposing compliance inclusive of administrative, criminal and mediative
measures. Support for this more expansive appmach can be found in H.W. Arthurs.
"Rethinking Adminimative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17, Osgoode Hall Law
Journal. p. 1.
36

The Republic of Indonesia, for exarnple, while making fiequent reference to the fact that ifs

founding Constitution espouses this principle, in practice has extended m inimal financial
support or delegated any substantive powers for the enforcement of its environmental laws. L.
F. Duncan and M. A. Santosâ, BAPEDAL Development Plan. Appendu: 1-1, Regufatory and
Cornpliance Program, Book 3. Govemment of the Republic of Indonesia, Environmental
Impact Control Management Agency (BAPEDAL), prepared under the Japanese Trust Fund
of the World Bank, Jakarta, December 1991. Canada while issuing a policy prescribing
criteria for enforcement responses and dictating that "environment oficials will use rules,
sanctions and processes securely founded in law", can similarly be faulted for enacting strong
environmental laws, with significant penalties but under resourcing enforcement. See L.
Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra, note 25; L. F. Duncan,
"Trends in Enforcement: 1s Environment Canada Serious about Enforcing its Laws?", supra,
note 25; Frienak of the QZd M m River. supra, note 28. In Argentins, one judge became so
fi-ustrated by the Iack of enforcement activity by govemment, he intervened to bring
environmental cases before his court, "Law is a project of social harmony that does not work
automaticalIy. It is necessary to have action by the administrative officer demanding the
function of the law... and lately, judicial action, as a suppressive body for punishing the
offender and also the indolent fbnctionary who does nor fûlfil hisher public obligation and
enables the transgression of the law". Judge Daniel Hugo Llermanos, "Environmental Agony:
My Expenence as an Argentinian Judge". in Proceedings of the Third International
Conference on Environmental Law, mpra, note 4 at p. 247.

nation through observation of the law. And yet, when one examines the conduct of
nations in making decisions about the balance of development and the environment
interests, it is not musual to observe the practice to be pointedly at variance with the
stated policy or legal obligations?'

To establish laws without sirnultaneous attention to the ways and means for seeking or
achieving cornpliance is to create law in a vacuum.'* Yet this practice continues despite
espoused support for enforcement. The later 1980s evidenced some improved political
recognition of the need to address this dichotomy. In Canada, the dual tabling in 1988 of

an enforcement and compliance policy with a consolidated federai environment act was
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Boyer, supraTnote 32, at p.74, suggests that one of the reasons for failure to actually effect
the "rule of law" may be partly attributed to the propensity of the bureaucracy to impose their
own interpretations of the legislator's intent in implementing the provisions. "If these policies
and programs [for decontamination of the Great Lakes] have k e n incorporated into federal
statutes for twenty years, why do they remain unfulfilIed promises? The short answer is that
insiders in the field of polIution control did not support stringent requirements Iike the zero
discharge goal, and did not believe that Congress really meant them to be implemented as
written". Yet another example is that while international aid has concentrated on building
capacity for environment assessment of proposed developments, minimal attention has been
given to the mechanisms necessary to make recommended conditions legally enforceable
such as regdations or permits. See L. F. Duncan, "Beyond international Standards for
Environmental Impact Assessment: Requinng Legally Enforceable Operating Standards", a
paper presented at the Intemtional Confirenece on Environmental Law, sponsored by the
Asian Environmental Law Association, Bangkok, April 1990.

P. Finkle and D. Cameron, "Equal Protection in Enforcement: Towards More Structured
Discretion" (1989) 12 Dalhousie Law Journal 34. The authors pinpoint this problem of
construing the law as only what is written on the books; The Law Reforrn Commission of
Canada also identified this propensity of administrators to exercise discretion not to enforce
the law regardiess of prescribed commands and penalties where they "feel that, although
transgressions are taking place, private action seems to be improving or coming into
compliance, and thus enforcement action is not necessary so far as, in the mind of the
administrator, the policy objective is met." Law Reform Commission of Canada, Poficy
Implementation, Compfiance and Administrative Law, (Working Paper 5 1) (Ottawa: LRCC,
1986).
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intended to send a message about enhanced political cornmitment to enforcement :
A good law, however, is not itself enough. It must be enforced - ruthiessly if need
be. Accordingly, the new Environmental Protection Act will be accompanied by a
plan to reverse the country's appding record of enforcernent and ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~
~,
Parallel transformations in attitude where observed in the European ~ o n t i n e n t ~for
example, and in the United e ta tes.^'

This perspective about the place for enforcement in defining and instituthg " d e of law"
for environmental protection has been echoed by legal scholars:

How often has it been said by administrators, politicians and members of the
general public that a law is good, the problem is that it is not enforced? The very
form of the question expresses the fact that for the general public and politicians
alike, not to mention the legal profession, the law is usually thought of as that
which is in the books. In reality, however, that written law is only part of a much
broader legal process which includes the decisions of those charged with the
responsibility of enforcement and, indeed, the activities of judges and juries as
well.
39

The Honorable Tom McMillan, supra, note 10. It may be noted that while the Policy did
serve as a catalyst for more active enforcement at the provincial level, actual comrnitrnent of
resources to federal enforcement agencies was slower in coming.
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As observed by Floris Plate, Director of Law Division, Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, The Hague, Netherlands in "Enforcement
of the 'Pollution of Surface Water Act' in Netherlands 1970-199411, Third International
Environmental Law Enforcement Conference, supra, note 4 at p. 239, round 1980 sorne
critical pollution scandals got nation-wide attention. Suddenly every pol itician and
administrator in the country realized that prohibition and Iicensing alone could not stop illegal
discharges and that enforcement was the indispensable crowning piece of any effective
policy. So both money and manpower became available for inspection, and, if necessary,
enfor~ernent.'~

" C. Wasserman, Chief of Compliance, Policy and Planning Branch, USEPA Office of
Enforcement stated in her address to the Third International Conference on Environmental
Enforcemenf : "Growing interest in environmental enforcernent stems fiom a desire to ensure
that environmental requirements Iead to real improvements in environrnental quality.
Environmental enforcement-broadly defined as the range of actions govenunent and others
may take to encourage and compel cornpliance with environmental requirements-is critical to
achieving this objective,", supra, note 4 at p. 3.

A serious, even critical, problem ensues when the law is considered to be only
that which is written in the statutes and case books, and is severed fiom the
enforcernent decisions of prosecutors and administrators. The fact is that the
decisions made by these individuals breathe Iife into the law. Whether it is
acknowledged or not, the de facto n o m is of central concem to those who are
subjected to the law. Indeed, it may be argued that the de facto n o m is, in fact,
the reai

These observations illustrate clearly how the law as written ("black letter law") can be
significantly altered by the way in which it is enforced, or not, as the case may be.

Throughout the world there has been a history of regulating pollution while tuniing a
blind eye to ongoing violations of those standards, failure to adequately monitor
compliance and worse, where violations are known, to re-negotiate compliance outside of

the dictates of the prescribed law. In other words. the legislated standards are altered
through the act of non-enforcement.
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Put another way, deregulation can be effected

either inadvertently or intentionally thr~ughnon-enforcement."

" P. Finkle, supra. note 38.

While the focus of the article is on the Canadian C h e r of
Righrs ami F r e e d m (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982. being schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.),1982, c. 1 1) and the implications of unequal legal treatrnent, it provides a
clear articulation of the Iinkage between the letter of the law and the de facto nom.
See J. Swaigen, Regufatory mences in Canada: Liability and Defences (Scarborough:
Carswell, 1992).

"3

" B. M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulatiion: Creating, Designing and Removing
Regulaory Fonns, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) at p. 42 1-422 argues that
deregulation may be effected through quite insidious means including cuts to resources,
expertise, facilities necessary to monitor and enforce: "A form of deregulation through nonenforcement can occur if a regulatory unit's budgetary or other support is cut, so that the unit
is simply unable to enforce the regdation ... such a tactic couId successfully elude the
dificulties of getting deregulation through the Iegislative process. Selective cuts in support,
with consequently consecutive nonenforcement, or shift in enforcement priority, can therefore
be a way to control regulatory performance and, possibly, to avoid major attacks fiom the

Increasingly more effective lobbies have evolved for legd regimes for sustain-dble
development laws to prohibit the -de

in endangered species, to create parks or special

protected areas, to prohibit export of toxic wastes or to require environmental assessment
of foreign investment or aid. Yet al1 too often while adequate standards are instituted, no
effective process is provided to enforce them. Where the powers and responses are
provided there is failure, intentional or not, to exercise those powers, or in the case of
govemment projects, a failure to observe the law. For many emerging nations,
environmental law appears well advanced; what they sorely lack is the training and
resources to enforce4'. In short, what is missing is not the law but its enforcement.

Sirnilarly unappreciated is the potential domino effect of non-enforcement of one law on
the implementation of other affiliated responsibilities. One obvious exarnple is the
immediate negative impact of lax enforcement of laws regulating the front end of the
regdatory process, for exarnple environmental impact assessment procedures on later
associated processes such as Iicensing of emissions or mitigation requirements. Where a
proponent provides incomplete or falsified information about the environmental impacts

regulation's supportive clientele."
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See for example, L. Maslavova, "Legislative Changes for Irnproved Cornpliance and
Enforcement: The Case of Bulgaria", Third International Conference on Environmental
Enjorcemenrt, supra note 4 at 97; 2. Kamienski, "Process of Upgrading the Polish
Environmental Enforcement Procedures", Proceedings of The Third International Conference
on Environmental Enforcement, qpra, note 4 at p. 55; G. Bendi, "Some MethodoIogical
Aspects of Designing Regulation and Setting Priorities in Economies under Transition,
Proceedings of the Thihd International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra.
note 4 at p. 1 15; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra, note 36.

of its project, the result may be technicdly unsound and ultimately unenforceable
standatds.

Al1 too often enforcement has been discounted on the basis that "it just doesn't ~ o r k " . ~ ~
Yet there is surpnsingly little empirical research or constructive analyses of the success
or failure of various enforcernent responses or ~trate~ies.~'
Some legai thinken provide a
more blunt rationale:
Theorists of regulatory failure have paid much less attention to the enforcement of
reguiation than to its promulgation. This relative neglect may reflect an unspoken
belief that one cannot construct a theory of regulatory enforcement without fint
having a theory of reguiation. But this argument contains a logical flaw that has
not escaped the attention of astute observers: any usefd theory of regdation must
reflect the realities of partial enforcement. What is needed is a theory of
enforcement that explains not simply why enforcement is incomplete, but what, if
any, systematic patterns it follows.
The reai reason for comparative neglect of enforcement rnay be quite simple:
enforcernent is difficult to s t ~ d ~ . ~ ~

One noteworthy exception is a study conducted on the effects of prosecution or the threat
of prosecution on the decisions of corporate directon and officers in complying with
pollution control ~ a w s The
. ~ ~ study results indicate that prosecution has "a strong,

M. Rankin and R. Brown. "Persuasion, Penalties and Prosecution: Administrative versus
Criminal Sanctions", in S e w i t y Cornpliance: Seven Case Siudks. ed. M.L. Friedland,
(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1990) at p. 325.
46
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For example D. Saxe, supra, note 7. Even in the study by Rankin which identifies certain
failings in criminal enforcement, a strong case is made for the value of enforcement, ibid.

48 C. S. Diver, supro. note 32 at p. 259. While Diver's analysis is rather dated his premise
hoIds tme.
49

D. Saxe, supra note 7.

statistically signifïcant impact on the environmerital behaviour of c~r~orations".'~
The
author concludes that regardless of the enforcement measure chosen, prosecution, civil

action or market instrument, " there is an indisputable need for enforcement", a view she
found, perhaps not surprisingly, supported by the courts:

if the regdations were not enforced by the use of sanctions, they would corne to
be perceived not as regdatory requirements but merely as statements of
aspiration. 5 1

As the popular phrase goes, you simply cannot have one without the other. The
deveiopment of policy or law without giving equal thought to how you will ensure
observance of the policy or cornpliance with the law is like a carriage without the horse.
Who is driving the cart? A law or policy which cannot or will not be implemented (by
political or administrative intent) remains hollow or without any real effect.j2
50

Ibid at p.46. A good example of this is found in the response of indu*
cornmunity to the case of R v. Bara, supra, note 29.
51

Ibid at p. 26 citing Re Industrial mene

and the legal

Decision No. 167 (1975), 2 W.C.R. 234 at p.

252.

'* F. Plate, supra, note 40 at p. 241, provides a succinct analysis of this interconnectedness;
"to this end it was emphasized that enforcement is no isolated activity, but that instead it is
part of a complete regulation chain. This chain has the following elements;
* policy making
* Iegislation and regulation
* setting of standards
* licensing
* execution
* enforcement
A11 parts of the chain should be in Iine with the others ... in other words, each element of the
chah depends on the others. Only when a11 are in accordance with the others satisfactory
results may be obtained. If one element fails, the whole chain fails and al1 efforts must be
hitless. Enforcement is ofien the last and therefore somewhat neglected part of the chain, but
without an effective and tailor-made enforcement no policy can be successfÙ1."

As will be outlined in Chapter III the process of law-making must of necessity aiso

consider whether and how the standard can actuaiiy be complied with, must incorporate
tirnelines for achieving complimce, specim responsibilities for monitoring cornpliance
and prescribe the result if the law is not obsewed. How a law will be enforced is intrinsic
to its value and ultimate effect. The capacity to enforce is as important as the action taken
to make laws in realizing the legislative or policy intent.

B.

EQUITY
AND FAIRNESS

- ENSURING A LEEL-PLA YING FfEW

The enforcement of laws is essential to ensure a level playing field for development. The
way in which the law is enforced shapes the reality of the law for those who are both the
nibject" and the intended benefactors (including non-human species). Failure to enforce

environmental standards c m have the perverse effect of pwshing both the victim (polluted
environment or resource depletion) and those who have voluntarily complied.
Where regulatees are allowed to violate agreed standards with no recourse, those
who have expended resources on complying with the standards may be prejudicially
afTected. Those who violate the laws gain an d a i r market advantage. The practical
effect is subversion of the legal intent."
53

P. Finkle, supra, note 38 at p. 4 1.

54 C. Wasseman, supra note 4, daims a consistent and effective enforcement program helps
ensure that companies a f k t e d by environmental requirements are treated fairly. Facilities
will be more likely to cornply if they perceive that they will not be economically
disadvantaged by doing so. See also USEPA Principles of Environmental Enforcement,
supra, note 25 at p. 14. See also UNEP, supra, note 19 at p. 1.2. As Finkle et al supra, note
38 point out:
"IN]ot everyone may be aware that a lesser level of cornpliance is required, ~sultingin
unequal application of the law. Indeed, the fact that a fesser standard is required is somethes
deliberately concealed From the general public. Hence, the less knowledgeabIe or more naive

Legal equity then requins not only that the letter of the law apply equally to al1 parties but
that the law be consistently applied or enforced. For exarnple, recogninng that enforcement
agencies may be subject to challenges of arbitrary, unjust or hequitable enforcement
actions:5

the Canadian fideral govemment amended environmental statutes to prescribe

appropriate and consistent inspection, investigation and enforcement procedures. The
govemment also issued a guide for the preparation of compliance strategies and policies
with the suggestion that officids give greater attention to how laws are implementea j6

The govemment has recognized that it needs to change the way it does business. Its
Regulatory Reform Policy calls for departments and agencies that have justified the
need for regdation to show that compliance and enforcement policies have been
aaiculated and resources have k e n approved and are adequate to discharge
enforcernent responsibilities effectively and to ensure ~orn~liance.~'

Most Canadian regdatory agencies have subsequently revised their enforcement policies

and practices to at a minimum reflect these Charter requirernents.58 By way of example,
may adhere to the black letter law with the result that they are penalized compared with those
who follow the 'de factor' nom as compliance with the black letter law will require a greater
expenditure of effort and resources."

'' The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees q u a i protection and treaünent
before the law (section 7) and fundamental faimess in application of the law (section 15).
Supra, note 42.
56

A Strategic Approuch to Developing Compliance Policies: A Guide, (Regulatory Affain
Series Nurnber 2) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992).

58

For exarnple the CEPA Enforcement and Complirce Policy, supra. note 15; Enfrcement
and Compliance Policy for the Environment Act, (Govemment of the Yukon, 1993); nie
Review P d on Environmental Law Enjorcernent, An Action Plan for Environmental Law
Enforcement in Alberta (Edmonton: Govemment of Alberta, IWO); British C o h b i a Forest
fractices Code: Rules, (Victoria: November 1993).

Environment Canada has issued an enforcement and compliance policy which rnakes direct
reference to the significance fair, consistent enforcement,
Canadians expect their government to provide good laws and regdations, in order to
protect them and their society. Good legislation must be enforced. Enforcement
must be fair, nationally consistent and predictable.59

Still, the problem remains of ensuring adherence to such policies. Some have suggested the
need for judicial intervention to ensure fundamental fairness and equity in the exercise of
criminal and administrative powers in applying the lawe6' In the very least, greater

transparency in the exercise of administrative discretion by those persons with the power to

" breathe life into the law"

' may be necessary to instil a higher level of accountability for

enforcement or more pointedly, non-enforcement.

Further evidence of acceptance of the need to create a more level playing (or trading) field
through improved accountability for environment law enforcement is evidenced in recent
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. For exarnple, the NAAEC includes within its
objectives the enhancing of compliance with and enforcement of environmental laws and
regdations as a means of avoiding trade distortions or barrierd2 Under the NAAEC, the

59

CEPA Enforcement and Compiiance Policy, ibid, p. 1.

60

P. Finkle, supra, note 38 at p. 42.

Ibid at p. 34. It may be noted that punuant to N M C the Parties commit to the legal
enactment of environmental procedures which provide greater transparency and participation
in enforcement proceedings, supra, note 3, articles 4,5,7, lO(5) and 12.
62

fiid article I .

Parties undertake to enforce their domestic environmental laws and to ensure that their
respective environmental law enforcement practices are fair, open and equîtable.63 The
Agreement M e r provides for sanctions or punitive measures to be taken against any Party
for failure to effectively enforce its own environmental laws? One of the undedying
rationdes for irnplementing the NAAEC was to ensure a level playing field for trade by
requiruig the Parties to eEectively enforce their respective environmentai laws. Evidence of
contin~edcornmitment to this principle is the establishment by the CEC Councii of the
Enforcement Cooperation Program and creation of the North American Working Group on
Environmentai Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation to guide the Parties towards
effective enforcement of the respective environmental lawd5

The EEC has adopted similar processes to ennire the accountability of its member states to
enact and enforce Community environmental laws?

-

-

fiid, article 7. This provision is intended to give effect to obligations irnposed under article
1114 (2) of the NAFïA which prohibits any of the three Parties from waiving or derogating
from their respective environmental laws so as to attract or maintain investment. For a more
detailed review of the implications of this agreement see H. Mann, "The North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Implications for the Enforcement of
Environmental Law", Report submitted to the Office of Enforcement, Environment Canada,
1994.
63

64

Supra, note 3, Part Five.

65

See CEC Council ResoIution #96-01 and CEC 1995, 1996, and 1997 Workplans and
Budgets.

L. Kramer, "The Implernentation of Environmental laws by the European Economic
Communities" in the Proceedings of the IntemationaI Conference on Environmental
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 183.

66

There is support, and some limited empincai evidence,6' for the position that enforcement
provides a significant trigger for voluntary compliance. 68 Enforcement action sends a clear
message that environmental standards are to be taken seriously, thereby building credibility
for both environmentai protection institutions and their re@ernent~.6~
Once credibility has been established, continued enforcement is essential to the
maintenance of that credibility. Credibility means that society perceives its
environmentai requirements and the institutions that implement them as strong and
effective. Credibility encourages compliance by facilities that will be unlikely to
comply if environmentai requirements and institutions are perceived as weak. The
more credible the law, the greater the likelihood of compliance and the likelihood
that other govemments efforts to protect the environment will be taken seriously.

In other words, enforcement has a domino effect, lending often under-recognized benefits to
less coercive programs. Where the govemment earns a reputation of taking cornpliance with
its laws senously, it also attracts greater interest in the process of standard setting and a

68

C. Wasserman supra, note 4, in her address to the n i r d International W e r e n c e on
Environmental Larv Enforcemeni stated that the USEPA premises its enforcement strategy on
the basis that while 20% of regulatees will comply voluntarily, the agency focuses its
enforcement strategy on the 75% who are watching what they do to the 5% who never
comply. She suggested that an effective enforcement strategy plays on this equation. A 1994
survey of Canadian industry reports that for 95% of respondents, compliance with regulations
is the most important motivating factor for instituting effective environmental management
practices, followed by 69% due to directordofficer liability. The survey shows minimal effect
of voluntary government programs (16%) or trade consideration (10%) as triggers for giving
more attention to environmental practices. Canadian Environmentaf Management S w e y
(Toronto: KPMG, 1994)
69

UNEP,Technicd Report, supra, note 32 at p. iv.

concomitant cornmitment to voluntary compliance and technological innovation.'*
Voluntaiy "standards" (i.e. guidelines) may provide a niendly alternative where everyone
abides by the agreed parameters. A problem arises when one or more of the parties fails or
refuses to 'bcomply" leaving no recourse for govemment intervention against these "free

There is similar evidence that certainty of detection and response are equally as important, if
not more important, than the severity of the potential penalty.

It would be fair to presume

.'~
then
that it is the intent of legislators when enacting laws that the law will be ~ b e ~ e d It

logically follows that the regulatory objective will be best served by ensuring that an
effective surveillance and enforcement program is put in place to ensure compliance, if for

70

The USEPA in its 1992 Report The Principles of Enforcement, in anaIyzing the relative
impacts of the market and regulatory measures for the lead phase down program discovered
that, "Although the emissions reductions tiom direct enforcement were large, the sharp
decline in new violations afker 1986 suggests that enforcement had an even Iarger impact
through deterrence." Cited by G. Bendi, supra, note 45.
" See "Voluntary

Cornpliance", A Background Paper prepared for the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation Joint Public Advisory Cornmittee sponsored North American
Consultations. Montreal, 1997, supra note 9.

D. Saxe, supra, note 7 at p. 45-54; D. Chappell, supra, note 10 at p. 24; J. Gnisec,"
Sanctions and Rewards: The Approach of Psychology" in Sanctions and R e w d in the Legai
Svstem: A Mulridkciplinary Approach, ed. M.L.Friedland (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 19891, at p. 121.
72

73

As D. Chappe11supra, note 10 at p. 23, states : "[A] belief in the effectiveness of deterrence
lies at the very core of sanctioning strategies applied to polluting behaviour. This belief is to
be found in environmental statutes; in judicial statements when sentencing polluters; in
political speeches about the environmenc in comment. by those involved in regulating
pollution; in the outpouring of environmental scholars; in the utterances of indiv idual citizens
about pollution; and even in the confessions of polluters themselves."

no other reason than maintainhg credibility of the regulatory initiative.74 Consequently, the
need for effective enforcement.

More laws do not automatically necessitate more enforcement. Many agencies have found
that they c m achieve greater deterrent value kom a more strategic use of sanctioning
powers. In such cases agencies have refocused their enforcernent and cornpliance strategies
to place less emphasis on the number of enforcement actions and more emphasis on
targetuig enforcement action to gain greater leverage for added deterrence and improved
environmental result~.~~
In this way enforcement action can be utilised for prevention or
deterrence and if strategically directe& as a catalyst for voluntary initiati~e.'~

74

See C. Diver, supra. note 32 at p. 297 where he concludes. "Enforcement, happily, is not
the sole means of assuring cornpliance with regulatory directives. Businesses obey
regulations for a host of reasons- moral, intellechial cornmitment to underlying regulatory
objectives, belief in the fairness of the procedures that produced the regulations, pressure
fiom peers, competitors, costomers, or ernployees, conformity with a law-abiding self imagein addition to fear of detection and punishment. it is a common place that no regulatory
command will succeed without substantial voluntary compliance. But the distinction can be
distracting. Enforcement is necessary not only to control the abhorrent lawbreaker but also to
defend the legitimacy of govemrnent intervention that sustains voluntary cornpliance."

''

R van Heuvelen, supra, note 3 1 at p. 163; E. Devaney, "The Evolution of Environmental
Crimes: Enforcement at the United States Environmental Protection Agency" in the
Proceedings of the mird Conférence on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 457;
L. Peterson, "The Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy: Using Enforcement Resources to
Maximize Risk Reduction and Environmental Restoration in the Great Lakes Basin", in the
Proceedings of the Third Inlemational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra.
note 4 at p. 181.
76 North

Arnerican experience with voluntary compliance suggests that threat of regulatory
intervention may be the most significant triggen for bbvoluntary''action by regulated
industry. See Clifford Lincoln, supra, note 16.

As valuable as economic instruments may prove to be in controlling pollution and

environmental damage, they will not and cannot operate without regulatory and
enforcement meanires. Market measures are in fact reliant on a working regulatory and
cornpliance regime for their very implementation and operation.

By way of exarnple, a market regime such as emissions trading is premised on
establishment and maintenance of base level standards. In addition, market instruments each
require their own specialized systems for monitoring, one system to meanire ambient and
point source emission levels, and the other, to audit systems of trading or charges.

Experience to date indicates that some types of economic instruments, especially the
more complex ones such as tradable perrnits, c m requùe at least as much
enforcement and monitoring as do the more traditional command and control
regulations. Economic approaches in fact require good information and monitoring
systerns which can also raise costs for regulated e n t i t i e ~ . ~ ~
It must be kept in mind that the effectiveness of economic measures as instruments for
environmental protection is directly dependent on the maintenance of base pollution control
levels. The maintenance of a fair trading system or effective rates for emission charges will
require surveillance of the impacts on the environment and an audit of accounts. Regdatory
supervision and intervention will be necessary to guarantee fair operation of the market
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S. Hennan and

P. Verkerk, "Closing Remarks for the Third Intenarional Conference on

Environmental Enjorcement",supra note 4 at p. 256.

systerns such as penalties for fdse reporting, for failure to pay discharge fies or to ennire

accurate set 0~s.'~This view appears to be endoned by the signatories to Agenda 21 which
provides:
8.13 Laws and regdations suited to country-specific conditions are arnong the most
important instruments for M o r m i n g environment and development polices into
action, not only through 'command and control' methods, but also as a normative
fkmework for economic planning and market rneasure~.'~

Monitoring systems are also necessary to instil accountability and fairness in govemment
incentive and subsidy programs. Audit provisions, including the right to inspect, m u t be
enacted to monitor cornpliance with the ternis and conditions of grants or subsidies. While
some responsibility for reporting on tax relief or subsidy programs can be transferred to the
polluter, dtirnately the govemment remains accountable. Consequentiy systerns must be
instituted to detect and punish abuses.80
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G. Bendi, supra. note 45 at p. 1 1 7 suggests that wh ile in principle there may be a difference
in the regulatory and market approaches, in practice, they cannot be dissociated as "No
market economy can Iive without regdation, and an absolute fiee market does not exist. The
regulatory element is even greater in the field of environmental protection than any other
regulatory area. It is obvious that the use of strong market incentives cannot live without an
existing enforcement system": See also D. R. Stewart and S. B. Weiner, "Environmenta1
Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-Based Approaches", December
1991 (as cited in Bendi, supra, note 45).
79

As cited in Bendi, supra note 45. See also J. Rees "PoIlution Control Objectives and the

Regulatory Framework", in Sustainable Environmental Monogement Principles and
Practice, R. Keny Turner ed. (Boulder: Bellhaven PresdWestview Press, 1988).
80

See K. Webb, "The Legal Framework for Financial Incentives as Regulatory Instruments",
background paper prepared for the Symposium on "The Power of the Purse : Financial
Incentives as Regulatory Instruments", Administrative Law Project, Law Reform
Commission of Canada and Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, (October 1990, Calgary)
at p.48; R Howse, " Shifiing to Incentive-oriented Instruments: Myths and Symbols,
Dilemmas and Opportunities" ,id.

It serves no valid purpose to deny the necessity of regdation and compliance. "Smart
regdation" does not mean no regdation. This may be al1 the more important for the process

of impiernenting sustainable development in developing or emerging nations who have not
yet had the opportunity to put in place effective regdatory and compliance regimes8'

There are numerous reasons for improving the capacity to irnplement international laws
through domestic regdation and enforcement. One important reason is the challenge of
enforcing international law, including the Iack of sutficient powers in existing international
bodies to secure compliance.

82

Another is the difficulty in instituthg consistent compliance

measures among parties to bilateral or multilaterai agreements due to inherent technical
complexities, variances in capacity to monitor and enforce and unreliable country reporting

'' R Howse, ibid at p. 36-37; S. Herman et al, supra. note 75; J . Rees, supra note 79.
The FIELD R e p o ~for example, points out that the Rio principles while laudatory have at
moa a "mixed legal status1' and admits that international standards for sustainable
development will ultimately be implemented at the local level. Supra, note 12, at p. Il. L.
Susskind shares this realization where he points out that while the Hague Declmation called
for more effective international enforcement mechanisms, it appears to have faded from view
and received almost no attention at the Rio Summit (at p. 107). He seriously questions the
credibility of the deterrent effect of international sanctions: "Deterrence theory, as explained
by Schelling and othen, requires that a threat have credibility. Given the experience of the
past several decades, especially as it relates to noncornpliance with global environmental
treaties, such credibility would be hard to muster. So, even if the scope of international law is
expanded and nongovemmental organizations are given standing to sue noncornpliers in the
World Court, it is not clear who would apply the requisite sanctions." (at p. 1 10) L. Susskind,
EnvironmentaZ Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, supra note 33 at
p. 99- 121. See also Law-MaAttg and Lmu-Enforcement in Intenational Environmental Law
u j k the 1992 Rio Conference, Research Project no. 10106072, Beyerlin Marauhn.
(Heidelberg, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law)
(Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1997).
82

partly due to sovereignty considerations? Consequently, support appears to be momting
for effecting cornpliance by translation of international obligations for sustainable
development into state laws thereby allowing for implementation through domestic
enforcement action." A cogent case has been expressed for the expanded use of domestic
courts and tribunals to enforce the principles in international environmental laws for, among
other reasons, that it is the domestic courts which focus on the major sources of pollution,
that is, individuals and corporations, as opposed to the inter-party focus of international
treaties, and the limitation of responses to counter measures.
Domestic courts already enforce a significant portion of international law. The idea
of expanding the use of domestic courts for international environmental law
enforcement against citizens and governments of other counûies is a more recent
and interesting concept. ...

The use of dornestic courts makes particular sense in the environmental area
because domestic courts tend to focus on the more comrnon poliuters - individuals
and corporations. The courts' clear authority over assets and persons is necessary
for successfd enforcement. Most courts c m issue injunctions which may prevent
environmental damage before it o c c ~ r s . ~ ~
83 L. Susskind shares the view that "[blecause international law enshrines the right of
sovereignty, al1 efforts to monitor performance, establish the accuracy of claims or
nonperformance, punish proven noncornplien, or impose remedial action must be accepted
voluntary by the parties to a treaty. It is little wonder that the global environmental treaties
signed thus far have such weak monitoring and enforcement provisions", supra note 33 at p.
101; see also M. E. OYConnelI,"Enforcement and Success of International Environmental
Law" (1 995) 3 Global Legal Studies Jotanul, at p. 47.
84

FIELD, Supra, note 12 at p. 1 3; S. Bilderbeek, BiodNersity and International Law: The
Emtiveness of Intemtional Environmental Lmu, supra note 33 at p. 96-99; P. Birnie,
"Intemationat Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs", supra note
33 at p. 70-72. A usefil discussion of the interface between obligations for enfornement of
international obligations and domestic enforcement regimes is provided in the discussion of
the impediments to effective enforcernent of the ocean dumping provisions of MARPOL V
and relationship to domestic enforcement strategies in "Coast Guard: Enforcement Under
MARPOL V: Convention on Pollution Expanded, Although Problems Remain",
GAO/RCED-95- 143.
85

M. E. OYConnell,supra. note 83 at p. 57.

A second raiionaie for domestic edorcement of international agreements or obligations is

the need to respect the rights of sovereign nations to establish their own tirnetables and
priorities for implernenting these common undertakings which best refiect their respective

This
needs and ~ a ~ a c i t ~
. * ~is consistent with Rio principles supportkg increased
oppominity for public involvement in the international legal order, including in the
development and enforcement of environmental laws. As an adjunct to this local
participatory process cornes a deeper commitment to ensuring adberence to the enacted
laws and the institution of a community based accountability.

If responsibility for ensuring cornpliance with international obligations is to remain with the
sovereign states, then, by necessity, rights and powers rnust be created at the state Ievel.

This includes the bundle of rights necessary to create transparency and public access

to

justice thereby making govemments accountable for implernenting these obligations."
Similarly it requires an exercise of political will to implement basic framework for
enforcement and commitment of the necessary resources .

For example, the NAAEC while prescnbing a common obligation and framework for
effective enforcement of the environmental laws of the respective Parties (Article S),
similarly specifically reaffirms the sovereign right of the Parties to enact their own
environmental standards and objectives and to enforce those provisions within their own
temtones (Prearnble, Article 37), supra, note 3.
87

See FIELD Report, supra note 12 at p. 1 1. These rights may be considered to include right
of standing for private enforcement and administrative or judicial review; access to
information; access to participate or scmtinise administrative bodies in standard setting,
project assessrnent enforcing and the Iaw.

The responsibility then Lies within the intemational community to provide support in
financial kind to assist developing or emerging nations to build their capacity for
environmentai enforcement and ~ o r n ~ l i a n cThis
e . ~ ~need identifid in the Rio Declmotion
and Agen& 21 has in part been effected through the recent efforts of govemments to
exchange expertise and approaches and redirecting of foreign aid.89

Clear acknowledgement that political conmitment to effective enforcement of
environmental laws is critical to sustainable development is found in a nurnber of recent
multilateral agreements on the environment, most notably the North Amencan Agreement
on Environmental ~ o o ~ e r a t i o nThe
. ~ ~stated objectives of the NAAEC include both
promoting sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive
environmental and economic policies and enhancing cornpliance with and enforcement of,
environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices.

91

Further evidence of

the weight placed on politicai accountability versus effective enforcement are the Parties

89

For example the support by USEPA, UNEP, the Netherlands, Canada, the European
Commission, and other govemments to the international conferences on environmental law
enforcement; enforcement training and capacity building programs of CIDA, World Bank and
üNEP. The North Arnerican Commission for Environmental Cooperation has committed
substantial resources to building partnerships for more effective domestic enforcement of
environmental laws in that region (1995, 1996, 1997 Prograrns and Budgets: Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal).
90

Supra. note 3; see also the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. August 14, 1983, US.-Mex., T.I.A.S.
No. 10,827 (La Paz Agreement); Agreement Concerning the T r m s b o m d q Movement of
Hazardozrs Wmte, October 28, 1986, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,099.
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NAAEC, supra,note 3, article 1.

obligations to report anndly on thei environrnental enforcement activities; 92 the creation
of an independent process for reviewing citizen aliegations of a Party's failure to effectively
enforce their environmental laws; 93 and, the introduction of ao inter-party c o d t a t i o n and
dispute resolution process regarding Party cornplaints of persistent pattern of failure to
enforce. 94

Finally, enforcement is necessary to maintain credibility in govemment policy and
initiatives? Before the public will support any shift from "command and control" to
voluntiiry or market measures, govemments must first establish credibility for the
commitment to an environrnental protection regime . This commitment c m be readily
illustrated by a solid record of enforcement. A reputation of non-enforcement will discredit
cornmitment to the "Rule of Law" and weaken support for other initiatives by
environmental agencies.

Lawyers and econornists have both devoted too littie attention to the importance of
restoring symbolic order and to enforcement techniques required to maintain it...
Forgiving non-cornpliance, employing insignificant sanctions and failing to enforce
payment of fines [or levies] are al1 acts which M e r undermine order, creating
moral outrage and demand for action which will nght the moral irnbalance.
Pt NAAEC,

ibid, article 12 ( 2 ) (c).
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NAAEC, ibid, articles 14 and 15.

94

NAAEC,ibid, Part Five.

95

See L. F. Duncan, supro, note 26.

Regdatory over control is likely to result as the pendulum swings b a ~ k . ~ ~
Public skepticism towards innovative initiatives can best be dissipated by first eaming
credibility t h u g h a record of conmitment to enforce cornpliance, regardless of whether
the system of control is a regdatory standard or payment of a charge or levy. Regardless of
the mechanism, the objective is a bdancing of interests which in many instances involves

the remedying of potential social harms. The tangible impact of govemment action or
inaction (nsk or harm to the environment or human health or Ise) demands solid
cornmitment.

"E. Barr, supra note 34, at p. 187.

A FRAMEWORK
FOR EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT

111.

In Chapter II arguments were presented for the constructive role enforcement can play in
achieving sustainable developrnent. Among the more repeated reasons given for the
purported fdure of enforcement action is that it simply does not work. The intent in this
chapta is to rebufY that misconception by presenting a h e w o r k through which
enforcement can be (and in many cases has k e n ) made workable and effective.

The hmework and illustrative cases are drawn fiom the writer's twenty plus years of
experience advising governments in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Jamaica and
hdonesia on the developrnent and delivery of their respective environmentai enforcernent
regimes. The material is also drawn extensiveiy fiom personal discussions with and written
documentation by enforcement officiais and thinken around the globe. Extensive insight
was also h m fiom participation in international conferences of environmental
enforcement officiais.
Recognition of the need to enforce the Iaw is not enough. There is a growing consensus that
efforts to achieve cornpliance will f ~unless
l
the minimum basic components of an effective
enforcement and cornpliance regime are recognized and implemented w i t b a carefully
developed strategy and fn~nework.~'
97

Evidence of broad international cornmitment to a basic fiamework of actions for
enforcement is made in Chapter 8, Agenda 21, " Integrating Environment and DeveIopment
in Decision Making" (United Nations, 1992). Agenda 21 specifies that each country should

[Wlhen developing a policy fiamework for environmental protection, govemments
have fkquently failed to devote nrfncient attention to providing practical
institutional means of ensurhg that its policies and standards are complied with?*
Most countries now have environmental Iaws and regdations in place to provide at
least minimum environmental standards to which industry is expected to adhere...
But to ensure the effectiveness and equity of environmental protection laws,
govemments need to take the necessary institutional measures, consistent with the
cultural, sociai and economic fabric of the country, to realize these standards and
ve*
that all companies equally comply with them... [wlhile there is no one
common" recipe for success"... seps can be taken even with minimai personnel and
resources when there is sufficient politicai w i ~ ?
While recognizing the inherent differences in countries' legai systerns, institutional
structures and environmental, sociai, cultural and economic contexts, it is regardless widely
accepted that they share the cornmon challenge of achieving compliance with their adopted
system.

While there may be no one " right way" to achieve compliance, there is considerable

develop a strategy for maximizing compliance with laws and regdations relating to
sustainable development including enforceabIe, effective laws, appropriate sanctions,
mechanisms to promote compliance, institutional capacity and mechanisms for public
involvement in the making and enforcing of laws on environment and development. Canada
Mexico and United States have restated cornmitment to a basic framework for effective
enforcement as Parties to the NAAEC, supra. note 3, article 5. For a more detailed review of
the perspectives of countries in Eastern and Western Europe, the Arnericas, Afnca, Caribbean
and Asia see Proceedings of the Internationai En$orcemenf Worhhop. and Praceedings
International Conferences an Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4; See also
iUCN/UNEP/WWF, Caringfor the Earth, A Strategy for Sustainable Living (Gland: 1991)supra note 12 at p. 67-69.
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UNEP From ReguZafions to Industry CompIiance: Building Institutional Capabilities

(Paris: 1992) at p. 15.
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UNEP,id at p. 7.

agreement on the need to evaluate the efT'ectiveness of a compliance regime against a basic
frsunework, without which enforcement actions will inevitably fail.'''

Enacting laws

without simultaneous and equai attention to the process of achieving compliance may be
compared to making a declmation of war without fkt identimg the enemy, developing a
strategy, critical targets, strengths or weaknesses of the enemy. or building a complement of

adequately armed and trained forces and outfitting command posts.

This is not to suggest that enfolcement is equitable only to tmditional "command and
controi" responses. Environmental enforcement involves far more than taking poiluters to
court or shutting down a facility. The rnechanisms for achieving environmental cornpiiance
are extremely complex and require thorough understanding and careful consideration early
on in the process of developing laws and policies for achieving sustainable development.
Incentives and coercive measures are closely linked and to be used effectively must be
integrated.'O1 Raiher than evaiuating the relative success of enforcernent responses based on
the number of coercive actions, agencies are shifting more towards a blending of coercive.
preventive and incentive rneasure~.[~'They are similarly exploring mechanisms which
provide alternative routes to compliance, focusing on performance or results.
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Even USEPA oficials who have expended considerable effort on devising a universally
workable framework admit that there is "no single enforcement 'modei' or strategy which
guarantees success". R. van Heuvelen, Proceedings of Third Intemationd Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163.
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See Section: Enforcement Responses/Sanctions.

R. van Heuvelen, Proceeclings of the Third International Conference on Environmental
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163.

Enforcement cannot be effective if it is considered only after the fact. The process of
achieving compliance begins with the making of laws. A Iaw developed through a process
of broad participation invariably increases the probability of v o l u n t ~
compliance. Without
the cornmitment of senior policy makers, administrators, and politicians, the will may be
lacking for adequate resources and powers for necessary enforcement action. Similarly,
fiont-end consultation with regulatees improves chances of a practicable standard and
enhances the cornmitment to cornpliance. This is al1 the more important where a significant
role in monitoring and reporthg is assigned to the regulatee. Finally, it has been the
experience of many agencies that the enforceability of laws can be strengthened by public
scrutiny in the development stage.

Equally critical are decisions about the choice of instrument to regulate pollution control.
Too often policies for protection of the environment are rnanifested in very general
statements of duty or broadly worded prohibitions.'03 For effective, econornical
enforcement, compliance objectives must be preciseiy stated, enabling h e l y detection and
response. Similarly, the definition of compliance must be readily understood by the
regulator, regulatee and target community if it is to be measured and reported. While there
I O3

For example the Canadian Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c. F-14 which has attracted
controversy because of its broad prohibition against any act which may cause harm to fish or
its habitat. Equally troubling for the Republic of Indonesia has k e n the broad prohibition in
their Law no. 4. 1982, Regmding Basic Provisions for the Management of the Environment,
wepublic of Indonesia] until recently considered unenforceable due to its vagueness. In
1997 Indonesia arnended their laws to provide greater clarity. [Interview with Mas Achrnad
Santosa, S.H.,Executive Director, Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL),
October, 19971.

is growing acceptance of the concept of flexibility in irnposing standards and compliance
schedules, the public expects accountability and m e a m b l e results.

An econornical compliance regime requires a concerted effort to promote compliance. A

direct correlation, it has k e n suggested, exists between the degree of understanding and
awareness of a law and the record of ~ o r n ~ l i a n c eA. ' compliance
~~
strategy must be tailored
to fit the special character of each law. The method chosen to promote compliance will
depend on the nature of the Iaw, the targeted parties and the beneficiaries of the control. In
those instances, for example, where the objective is general protection of public or workers
health (Le. safe use and handling of pesticides), the preferable method of prornoting and

measuhg compliance may be a targeted information program with intermittent spot checks
or user surveys to assess compliance. By way of cornparison. where the target of the law is
a more narrow category of regdated parties and the beneficiary a threatened public

resource, a more direct, coercive approach may be more appropnate. In such cases,
voluntary cornpliance may be efTected through cornmitment to standards through
consultation, technology transfer, tax incentives to incorporate new technologies, negotiated
compliance schedules, and timely enforcement responses, as the ultimate compliance

'

incentive. Os

-

-

B. Seigal, A Review of Compfimce - Relafed Issues in Reguhory Program Evahtion, (a
study for the CompIiance and Regulatory Remedies Project). (Ottawa: Department of Justice,
1990), Department of Fisheries and Oceans Appendix, at p. 1 1.
104
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See for example, the proceedings for the four InternutionaZ Conferences on
Environmenfa1 Enforcement, supra, note 4; Agenda 21, supra note 2; North Amencan
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra, note 3, article 5.

Decisions must be made about who will be responsible for the various processes of
enforcement

- setting the standards, monitoring compliance,

promoting compliance and

taking necessary enforcement action. Similady the issue wiIl be faced of who will pay

-

govemment agencies or the regulated party ? What is the role of the public and how directiy
should they be ùivolved in the enforcement process? What is the capacity and role of the
regulated party in compliance ? An effective enforcement strategy must address al1 of these
issues. The remainder of the chapter presents a framework for effective results.
8.

THECOMPONENTS
OF AN EFFECTNE
FRAMEWORK
FOR ENFORCEMENT
AND
COMPUA
NCE

There is broad consensus that any framework for effective enforcement and compliance
shouid address the following minimum components:
1. Political and institutional cornmitment to enforcement;

2. A compliance strategy;

3. Imposition of Iegdy binding standards providing a clear, consistent definition of
compliance;
4. Mechanisms to promote voluntary compliance, to deter violations and to prevent

environmental damage;
5. Mechanisms to determine compliance and to detect violations;

6. An alternative array of sanctions and penalties; and,

7. An evaluation process which enables review and revision of compliance strategies

premised on compliance and protection objectives.

Each of the components of the framework are mutually interdependent; consequently,
failure to give equal aîtention to each component may have the e f k t of decreasing the
chances of effective enforcement and ultimately compliance.

For example, the enactrnent of strict legal standards and appointment of a fully qualified
inspectorate will not be d c i e n t to achieve compliance if the officiais are not granted the
necessary powers to inspect and enforce. Similady, implementation or endorsement of
private voluntary compliance programs without p d e l effort to ensure verification and
response against violators, will ultimately effm the credibility and success of any voluntary
initiatives. Those companies who expend monies on compliance or performance beyond
compliance reasonably expect enforcement action will be taken against those who fail to

make the effort to comply.'O6

1.

POLITICAL
WILLA N D ~NSTITUTIONAL COMMITTMENT

First and foremost of the prerequisites is political will and institutional cornmitment to
environmental enforcement. Without political support for environmental enforcement, the

'O6 A Polish enforcement oficial advises that investors have expressed the need for clear and
consistent d e s and strong enforcement against these who do not comply. See P. Syryczynski,
"EnvironmentalCornpliance Issues During the Privatization Process in Poland", Proceedings
of the mird Intentational Conference on Environmentut Enforcement, supra, note 4, at p.
103.

best efforts by agencies to take successfid enforcement action will ultimately fai1.[07 Before
cornpliance can be anticipated, responsibility for environmental enforcement must be
clearly understood Most importantly, governments must understand and assert their
constitutional and legislative mandates for environmental protection.'oS

It makes litîie sense for national govemments to endorse international agreements for
sustainable development and protection of the environment unless those sarne govemments

are committed to taking the necessary domestic regdatory and enforcement action. To this
end, where environmental regulatory powers are shared between national and regional

govements, it may be necessary to give ptior consideration to how international
environmental obligations are going to be delivered (including shared hancing, legislahg

'

of standards and enforcement) before making political commitments to global initiatives. O9
'O7 In Poland for example, environmental laws rernain unenforced despite the creation of a
watch dog agency and enactment of criminal and administrative sanctions. J. Jendroska,
"Compliance Monitoring in Poland: Current State and Development", Proceedings of the
International Conference on Environmentta1 Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 352, of the
Research Group on Environmental law, institute of Law, Polish Academy of Sciences.
Wroclaw, advises that "Govemors were empowered to halt activity endangering the
environment and to impose non-compliance fines. Govemors, however being primarily
msponsible for the economic developrnent of their voivodship, were extremely reluctant to
halt any economic activity and limited themselves to imposing fines. Bearing in mind that
non-compliance fines were very low and oflered a cheaper option than cornpliance, there is
nothing surprishg that environmental Iaws were in practice unenforceable". See also R.
Greenspan Bell and S. E. Bromm, "Lessons Leanied in the Transfer of U.S. - Generated
Environmental Compliance Tools: Compliance Schedules for Poland", E.L.R. News &
Analysis, 27 E. L. R 10296- 10303, at p. 10303.

For a discussion of actions by the Govemment of Canada to assert its will. set L.F.
Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra note 25 at p. 286. See also
iUCNAJNEP/WWP, supra. note 12 at p.67; Friendr of the W M a n River, supra, note 28.
'O8
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For example Canadian provincial govemments concemed about the purported Iack of
reflection of provincial powers and interests in NAFTA, negotiated provisions in the side
agreement (NAAEC)which limit the effect of the obligations on provincial jurisdictions. See

Indicators of political commitment to enforcement are reflected not just in "bean-counting".

that is, the number of environmental prosecutions or directives. The measure of a
government commiûnent to effective enforcement Lie in the relative pnority given to
irnplementing environmental legislative or regdatory agendas, budgetary ailotments for
enforcernent programsl'O,support for policy directives which remove the potential for
political or senior policy interference in individual enforcement responses as well as
specifjmg circumstances in which Ministerial sanctions should be exercised"', and the
-

-

the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, signed by Alberta August 1995, Quebec in December 1996 and
Manitoba in December 1996. it is noteworthy that no consideration appears to have been
given to the ovemding obligations pursuant to multi-lateral agreements such as NAFTA,
NAAEC or the Biodiversity Convention during the federal-provincial negotiations on the
Harmonization Agreement, regardless of the effect of that agreement which transfers a
significant portion of responsibilities for standard setting. environmental impact assessment,
inspection and enforcement to the provinces, with no precise mechanism for oversight. See
CCME, "Statement of Interjurisdictional Cooperation on Environmentai Matters", CCME1C-26E.
110

An exarnple of threatened cred ibi 1ity assoc iated with under resourcing is the September
1994 media coverage of "pacific salmon reportedly inadequately monitored because of lack
of staff and resources at a critical time in the monitoring prograrn". "Fishery Controls Left
Gaping Holes; Fraser River Management Compromised Report says." Globe and Mail.
September 20, 1994.

' ''

As detennined in a Canadian Department of Justice review, B. Siegal, supro. note IO4 at
p. 7, "As some evaluation studies find, the lack of certainty about the balance of the program
activities or the priority of enforcement in the regulations ofien Ieads to compliance activities
which lack direction or are inconsistent. The evidence of this found in evaluation studies is a
jack of national policy direction for undertaking inspection, incomplete enforcement manuals,
the use of a narrow range of compliance activities, inadequate training for compliance and
enforcement staff and. a lack of adequate data for assessing effectiveness. The ultimate
evidence is the lack of political commitment to use Ministerial sanctions for non-cornpliance
which are currently available in the legislation. mhis lack of certainty of role and
cornmitment of prograrn management to enforcement activities is detrimental to the
effectiveness of the cornpliance and enforcement activities, and may undermine their
credibility with the regulated public." See also L. Muslavova, "Legislative Changes for
Improved Cornpliance and Enforcement: The Case of Bulgaria, supra note 4 at p. 97- 102.

degree of reticence to dekgate enforcement pwers.

'l2

' I2 Proposed criteria for the ranking of the relative propensity of nations to accept the concept
of delegation of authority is provided by Hofstede, Culme and Organizatiom: Sofiware of
rhe Mnd (London: McGraw Hill, 1991) cited in Lewicki and Litterer, et al, "lntemational
Negotiation", in Negotiation, (2nd ed) (Irwin: 1994) 407 at p. 4 17.

As a precondition to effective enforcement, it has been suggested that it is important that the

mandates and powers of individual govenunent departrnents and agencies and any other
relevant parties should be clearly defhed in law:
Without a stmight - fornard legislative mandate with a solid political base and clear
standards for the regulator or administrator, compliance policy is foredoomed.
Regulator - client negotiations will falter; political support and ministerial backing
will be evanescent. Judicial enforcement wi11 be haphazard, convictions difficult to
secure, and penalties seldom serious. Consistent expectations will not be generated,
and regulatory failure is the predictable outcorne. l 3

'

This includes detennining a policy on centraiization and decenûabtion prescribing in law
nghts, powers and procedures for inspection, investigation and enforcement actions

including powers of inspectors (search, seizure), dariQing roles of senior managers such as
the Director of Enforcement, the Regional Director and Ministers (closure or shutting down

of a site or plant, cost recovery), the judiciary (sentencing alternatives), and the public (right
to compel an investigation, or to litigate). This view is supported by the provisions of the
North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation which in prescribing the
obligations of the Parties (Govemments of Canada, Mexico and United States) to

'13

Law Reform Commission of Canada, Smctiom, CompIiance Policy und Administrative

Lao (Ottawa, August 198 1) at p. 15. As well in its 1988 drafl report Regulatov Compliance:
Implementing Policy Objectives Fair&, Effectivefy and. Eflciedy, (Ottawa: Compliance and
Regulation Remedies Project, 1988) at p. 23 the Law Reform Commission reiterated the need
for clear reference to an enforcement mandate in law and policy stahng that "an effective
compliance strategy begins with the regulatory legislation itself' and adding that "an
uncertain mandate can lead to imprecise policy objectives and unfocussed cornpliance
strategies". The Law Reform Commission suggested that this lack of clarity often arises
because those players making Iaw and policy rarely have direct experience with enforcement
or enforcement oficials are consulted only late in the process.

effectively enforce their respective environmental laws, also clearly enumerated the

necessary associated powers, measures and sanctions, as well as requiring the legislation of
private rïght of access to remedies.

1 14

Assuming that legislators enact laws ïntending that they should be observe4 it is important

that they be infiomed of the costs and benefits associated with alternatives modes of
achieviig compliance including the legal implications of failure to enforce' 15. If effective

laws are to be enacted, politicians must be competently briefed not only in the substantive

aspects of a proposed law (for example, redressing human health or environmental
impacts) but also on the necessary enforcement powers, sanctions and penalties, meanires
to knplement incentive programs, and other alternative pathways to compliance. As has
k e n suggested by one writer, a shift to "more goal-oriented legislation" as opposed to laws
which merely reference objectives in a preamble, may be required to improve the record of
compliance.116 Put simply, there is littie point in enacting new laws without p d l e l
cornmitment to ensuring compliance. This includes providing sufficient personnel and
financial resources to the enforcement agency or department.

Il4

Supra, note 2, article 5 , 6 and 7.

'

IS There is ample Canadian legal precedent for irnpoçing civil liability on the governrnent for
faiIure to take reasonable action to enforce the law. See Swanson, supra note 30; Tock supra,
note 30; J . Z. Swaigen, supra, note 43.
'16 Prof. E. Reuben, "Legislatingfor Cornpliance: Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State" as cited in the Law Refonn Commission of Canada Repoc Regulutory Campliiznce:
Iwementing Policy Objectives Fair&, Effeiveiy, Efiientfy, supra note 1 13 at p. 24.
Reuben furiher suggests that the actual orga&itional structures which facilitate or promote
cornpliance should be legislated.

Before any effective enforcement action can be anticipated, inter-jurisdictional, interagency

and hh-agency roles and responsibilities must be clarified. Similarly, where jurisdiction is
shared among central, regional and local levels of govemment and among the various
institutions within the respective govement bureaucraties it will be important to delineate
clear lines of responsibility. Finaily, classification of roles may be necessary within
agencies to both foster tirnely enforcement responses and to avoid unnecessary conflicting
policies or actions. Where enforcement requires transboundary response, it may be
necessary to also =lari@ the roles and responsibilities arnoog nations."'

i)

INTERJURISDICTIONAL
RESPONSIBILIW
- NATIONALVERSUSLOCALDELIVERY

A decision to centralize enforcement authority or to delegate it to regional or local

authorities is dictated both by constitutional division of powers and prevailing political
philosophies. For example, the fact that a constitutional power is vested in a central or
national government to regulate the environment, does not automatically mean that in al1

i 17

The need for promoting transborder cooperation is clearly recognized in the North
Ametican Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, article 10 (1 0) prescribing that the
Council [of North American Environment Ministers] "shall encourage (a) effective
enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws and regulations; (b) cornpliance with
those Iaws and regulations; and (c) technical cooperation between Parties". In furtherance
of this obligation the Council in 1996 fonnally established the North American Working
Group on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation to advise the
Commission on these matters and to serve as the regional forum for exchange of expertise,
joint training and cooperation in enforcement action. See CEC Annual Reports 1995, 1996,
Montreal, Quebec.

cases national agencies will choose to assert those powers. in practice each nation has
adopted its own unique politid repime for enacting and enforcing to enforce
environmentai laws. In some instances the powers for environmental regulation are reserved
to the national govemment and in other instances the powes are diverted to other
govemment levels, on in still other instances, shared. Regardless of where the legislative
powers is vested, a myriad of alternatives exist for delineating responsibility for
enforcement.

As discussed earlier in Chapter II, it is important to clariQ responsibility for enforcement to
ensure public accountability and to avoid potential liability for failure to initiate tirnely
responses. Any enforcement and cornpliance strategy must reflect these basic constitutional
divisions of powers and political realities. The existence of a power of paramountcy or
oversight does not necessady mean that centralized delivery of an enforcement program is
necessary or appropriate.

For a variety of reasons, many countries have adopted

decentralized or deconcentrated approaches to program delivery.

Depending on the

constitutional division of powers, the following are some of the choices which may be
available:
national laws and centrdized enforcement (centralized);
centraiized legislative enforcement policy with delegated responsibility for enforcement
of regional offices of centrai agencies (deconcentrated);
centralized legislation and development coupled with delegation of enforcement powers

and responsibilities to regional or local governments (decentralized);

legislation by centrai and regional or local govemments, with or without consistent
national policy (shared responsibility).
state or provincial legislation with local enforcement (local)

In negotiating agreements arnong govemment levels for the delivery of enforcement
responsibilities, care should be taken to consider ultirnate liability. Where the law imposes
a duty on government to enforce, some agencies have decided it wise to retain a power of
oversight with necessary review and intervention rnechanisms, in those instances where
enf'orcement hctions have been delegated to other levels of govemment.' l8

Nonetheless, within the confines of these jurisdictional boundaries govemments have found
avenues for cooperative resolve of potential overlaps and conflicts and for imposing
measures for accountability for enforcement. In the United States, for example, regadess
of parallel responsibilities held by national and state govemments, the majonty of
environmental enforcement actions are assigned to and exercised by state agencies.l l9 The

USEPA has estabiished national implementation standards where responsibility for
enforcement of national Iaws are delegated to the states. The USEPA has additionally
retained the power to intervene to enforce where the national standards are not met. Clear
118

For a discussion of oversight responsibilities see L.F. Duncan, "Trendsin Enforcement: 1s
Environment Canada Serious about Enforcing its Laws", supra note 25 at p. 54-56; C.
Wasserman, "The Principles of Environmental Enforcement", in Proceedings of the
international Conference on Environmental EnfoTcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 12.
119

C. Wasserman, Chief Cornpliance Policy and Planning, USEPA advises that since 1991
about 70-90% daily inspections and 70% formal enforcements actions were by state agencies,
ibidatp. 1 1 1 .

criteria have been established to guide the exercise of the oversight power. in some limited
cases the national govemment has reserved the power to directly implement universai
prograrns with cnteria established for dictating these circumstances warranting national
intervention, such as cases having national significance, evidence of inadequate state action

or impacthg multiple

tat tes.'^'

In Canada, powers to regulate the environment are divided between federai and provincial
' ~ ' no
governrnents with potentid duplication or conflict in enforcernent r e ~ ~ o n s e s . While
broad power of oversight exists, the federal govemment does have a paramountcy power
where Iegisiative responsibility is shared. For the rnost part, federal officiais have exercised
thek national mandate through national objectives and through influen~e.'~
In practice each
order of govemment has developed their own distinct approaches to achieving
environmentai cornpliance. This has left both orders of governrnent open to public crïticisrn.
Efforts taken to avoid unnecessary conflict or duplication have hcluded development of
minor legislation,'* consultations towards harmonization of

120

standard^,'^" equivalency

fiid at p. 1 12. See also Commission for Environmental Cooperation supra, note 9.

A succinct review of Canadian constitutional division of responsibilities over the
environment is provided by the Supreme Court of Canada Friendr of the Old M m River
Society, supra. note 28. See also A. Lucas 'Naturd Resource and Environmental
Management: A lurisdictional Primer", Environmental Protection and the Canadian
Constitution, Proceedings of the Cmiodun Symposium on Jwisdiction and Respomibility for
the Environment, (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1987) at p. 3 1-43.
12'

" For example, to claim equivalency, Canadian provinces must prepare "equivalent"
enforcement and cornpliance policies and enact "equivalent" citizen rights. Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, R.S .C. (1985) c. A- 12.

'"

See discussion in Environrneni~lProtection and the Cmradan Constitution, supra. note
1 13 at p. 57-70.

agreements where only "equivaient" provincial laws are enfor~ed'~*
or administrative
agreements for the enforcement of federd laws by provincial agencies 126.

A third approach can be evidenced in the Netherlands. While legislative authority rests with

the national govemment, responsibility for implementation (licensing and enforcement) has,
to a large part, k e n delegated to provincial and municipal authorities. As the regional and
municipal roles are sigrilficant, intermunicipal cooperative associations and Regional
Environmental Fonuns represent the core of enforcement activity. Al1 three orders of
govemment contribute to the national cornpliance strategy with financing of

124

This initiative by the Canadian Council of Environment Ministers (CCME)is purportedly
directed at reducing unnecessary intejurisdictional conflicts through harmonized standards
and administrative arrangements by one of the levels to enforce. See report of the CCMT
Hamonization Workshop, January 2 1-22, Toronto 1996, Summary Report prepared for the
CCME; "Statement of tnterjurisdictional Cooperation on Environmental Matters, CCME.
CCME-IC-26E, Winnipeg.
125

Equivalency agreements may be created pursuant to S. 34 of the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, supra, note 114; To date no agreement has k e n signed for among other
reasons a reluctance by provinces to recognize federal jurisdiction over environmental
impacts of provincial econornic developrnent or to subject themselves to federal scmtiny of
provincial enforcement actions. For a discussion of this issue see A. Lucas, iiJurisdictionaI
Disputes: 1s Equivalency a Workable SoIution?", in Into the Future: EnvironmentaZ Law and
Policy for the 1990's (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1990).
126

For example, a number of federal - provincial agreements facilitate provincial
administration and enforcement of the federal Fisheries Act, supra note 103, notably the
"Canada-Alberta Deleterious Substances Agreement", in efiect since September 1, 1994. For
a discussion of the effectiveness of intergovernmental agreements see Environmental
Protection unci the Canadian Comtiiution, Supra, note 2 1 at p. 7 1-98 and A. Lucas, "Federal
Concerns and Regional Resources: Harmonization of federal and provincial Environmental
Polices: The Changing Legal and Policy Frarnework", Canadm EmrironmentaZ L m , A.
Lucas ed. (Scatborough: Butterworths, 1978); F. Gertler, "Interjunsdictional Processes in
Canada: Lost in (Intergovernmental) Space: Cooperative Federalism in Environmental
Protection, in Law and Process in Environmental Management, (Calgary: Canadian Institute
of Resources Law, 1993).

irnplementation cost-shared by dl three orders. Supplemental funk h m the national
government are contingent on adherence to the national strategy, annual progress reports
and on implementation deadlines.'21

In deciding which order of govemment will be made accountable for enforcement,
consideration should be given to matching a goal of national consistency with asnirance of
financial and institutional capacity to actuaily deliver programs. A popular response has
been to retain central responsibility for standard setting, development of enforcement and
cornpliance policy and assistance and direction in training and to assign local and regional
governments responsibility for permitting, inspection and enforcement a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
Experience has shown, however, that delegation of authority may in some cases be more
reflective of a desire to download responsibilities without adequate transfer of the necessary
resources to enable local enforce~nent.'~~
Any strategy for local delivery rnust ensure actual
empowerment of local officiais through adequate training and resources, if enforcement is

1 27

J.A. Peters "The Relationship between Central Govemrnent and ProvinciaVMunicipal
Authorities with Regard to Enforcement", Proceedings of the Third International Confrence
on Environmental ENorcement Vol 1, supra, note 4 at p. 269-275.
178

For cornparisons of approaches taken to resolve intejun'sdictional division of powen see
A. Adegoroye, "The Challenges of Environmental Enforcement in Afnca: The Nigeria
Experience", at p. 43 and O. Kaae, "A Decentralized Approach to Inspection and
Enforcement Done by Communities and Municipalities in Denmark" in Proceedings of the
Third international Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 73; C.
Wasserman, "Principles of Environmental Enforcement", Proceedings of the International
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 1 1 1- L 15.
1 29

See World Bank, World Development Report 1992: Developrnent and the Environment,
(The World Bank, 1992) at p. 93. The Report provides exceptions to this rule including China
and Columbia whose laws assign a portion of hydro power sales to local govemments for
training and implementation and in some instances an apportionment of emission fees.

in the initial developmental stages of a compliance program some centrai intervention rnay

also be necessary until local government agencies have tirne to buiid skills and experience.
in some cases national intervention is made necessary due to the propensity of regional

govemrnents to defer environmental objectives to economic development priorities. A
second problem is the tendency to sacrifice environmental enforcement obligations to the
maintenance of relations between central and regionai or local govemme~ts.To buttress
against such pervasive influences it may be necessary in the early phases of development of
an enforcement program to reserve an oversight power to a central govemment authority

clearly mandated and resourced to push the environmental compliance agenda While
ultimately the exercise of enforcement power is subject to the influence of prevailing
politics. This pervasive influence can be deflected to an extent

through legislation,

transparency and accountability mechani~rns.'~~

Regardless of the division of powen arnong ordes of government, benefits will corne from

efforts to reach consensus on the best approach to exercise of their respective powen for
enforcement. Mechanisms which have been used to institutionalize this division of powers

For example the legislative enactment of rïght of standing for private civil and criminal
action, the right to petition on enforcement response, the right to trigger a parIiamentary or
other public review of enforcement action. Examples of these accountability provisions are
found in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, supra, note 1 14, sections 108, 109 and
136; the Yukon Environment Act, S.U. (1991) CS,Part 1; and in the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 2, articles 6, 7, 14 and 15.
''O

include intergovemmental agreements, couperative standard setting and review procedures

''

(harmonization), intenninisterial commimications, and interagency consultations.

AVOIDINGINTERAGENCY
CONFLICTS

ii)

Experience has s h o w that, it is equally important to clari@ roles and responsibilities within
govemment bureaucraties. inevitably the issue will arise whether enforcement programs
shouid be cenûaiized or decentralized. This involves not only division of responsibilities
among national, provinciaVregional and local govemments but also arnongst government
agencies. In the process of establishing environmental control programs, attention must be
given to existing related programs and authorities and the need for redistribution of
fünctions for the most effective and economical delivery. Control through the "Rule of
Law" requires close working relationships among legislators, administrative officiais and
the judiciary.

An important process in developing an environmental cornpliance regime is the

identification and resolution of overlapping mandates and the need to consolidate or
coordinate laws and programs to avoid unnecessary conflict or duplication in enforcement
action. Mandates impacting the successfd delivery of an enforcement program include
powers:
to impose standards by reguiation, permit or agreement;

13'

A. Lucas, supra, note 121.

to regdate activities through incentives, grants or economic measures;
to monitor and inspect regdated facilities;
to investigate or othenivise respond to cornplaints or incidents; and

to take enforcement sanction non-cornpliance through administrative or criminal action.

Most agencies have suffered the occasional embarrasment of enforcement action stymied
by the contrary actions of their coileag~es~
redting in at a minimum regdatory confusion,
and at worst, failed enforcement action.'32 The best preventative response, is advance
consideration of this potential problem and adoption of institutionai mechanisms to avoid
unnecessary conflicts.

Once a decision is made on the distribution of enforcement responsibilities, agencies must
be granted necessary legal authority. For example, where the decision is made to assign
responsibility for inspection and administrative enforcement response to regional agencies,
the necessary powers of intervention and the available responses must be similarly specified
in law. Where a decision is reached to assign national enforcement policy direction to the
central office or headquarters of an environmental agency, laws and policies must be
revised to authorize policy preparation and to require observance by irnplernenting officiais.

132 In Canadian law, evidence of official endonement of the offending activity has resulted in
an acquitta1 based on the defence of officially induced or government induced error. See,
Regina v. CmcoiZ Z%ermaZ Corporation and Parkinson ( 1 %6), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont.
C.A.).

in the absence of consolidation of enforcement responsibilities, measures must be taken to
coordinate legislative drattUig, hold joint training programs, and build team work to ensure
enforcement policies and strategies are fully comprehended by al1 hvolved 0fficia1s.l~~
Overlapping responsibilities shouid be identified and clarified through legislative
arnendments or administrative arrangements.

Experience has shown that clarification of enforcement roles is also important to ensure

public accountability and to facilitate voluntary cornpliance. Regulated industry is often the

fim to cornplain of costs of multiple reporting requirements and can be depended on to
raise the issue of codicting standards of operation when faced with enforcement action.

Practically speaking, if the public is to be expected to provide a monitoring and reporthg
role they need to know who to contact. Nothing can more effectively discourage public
involvement than "buck-passing"on responsibility to take enforcement action.

As with any law, voluntaq compiiance with environmental laws can be fostered by clear
. ' ~ ~ the
communication of enfimement and compliance objectives and e ~ ~ e c t a t i o n sAmong

'"

D. Bryson and D.A. Ullrich, "Legal and Technical Cooperation for Effective
Environmental Enforcemen~",Proceedings of the Internufiortuf Enforcement Workrhop,
supro. note 4 a t p. 141-149.
134

For exarnple, the CEPA Enforcement and Cornpliance Poiiq supra, note 15, states in its
introduction that the purpose of the policy is to "let everyone know what to expect from
Environment Canada and the officiais who enforce the [Act and its regulations]. It also
clearly states that " compliance means the state of conformity with the law" and that

more effective and concise instniments found for communicating expectations to dl
affected parties is an enforcement and cornpliance policy.135

An enforcement and compliance policy sets out the manner in which a government intends
to enforce its laws. It provides a useful accountability mechanism for the concemed public
to measure political cornmitment to require compliance with environmental standards. It
sen& a clear message to regulated sectors about anticipated official responses to a violation.

It provides a policy fiamework for the various departments responsible for enforcement
action to ensure fair, consistent and officially sanctioaed responses. Enforcement and
cornpliance policies generally tend to include:
a statement of the intent to enforce;
clarifkation of powers to enforce ( inspection, search, seinire);
description of the players and their respective enforcement roles( inspectors, prosecutoa,
Minister);
prescribed cntena for exercise of enforcement responses;
rneasures taken to prornote voluntary compliance.'36

compliance is "mandatory".
13' For a more detailed review of the value of using enforcement and cornpliance policies and
explanation of the different roles of a policy and strategy see, A Strategic Approach to
Developing Cornpliance Policies: A Guide,supra note 56 at p. 1-3. See also B. Siegal, supra,
note 104 at p. 1 8.
136

Examples of enforcement and cornpliance policies include the CEPA Enforcement and
Cornpliance Policy, supra note 15; British Columbia's Environment, Plunningfor the Future:
Ensuring Effective Enforcement, B.C. Ministry of the Environment; British Columbia Forest
Pracrices Code, Changing the Wuy We Manage Uur Forest. Tough Enforcement, Discussion
paper, November 1993, supra note 58; Enforcement Princbles, Alberta Environmenta1
Protection Departmeni, 1994.

Public c o d t m e n t to an enforcement policy can be fiirther increased by ensuring
As stated earlier it
participation by concemed and affiected parties in its de~elo~rnent.'~'

may be equdly important to confer with responsible officials in parallel agencies, for
example justice or custorns, to ensure that their respective roles are also agreed to and
accurately conveyed.

Political statements of cofnrnitrnent for strict enforcernent of environmental laws will have
minimum credibility if sufficient resources are not committed and clear direction and

support given to officials to enable timely and effective enforcement action. Governrnents
all to fiequently enact laws without adequate attention to how they will h a n c e compliance.

While potential financial implications for private parties to achieve compliance is usually
scrutinized, in the major of cases, minimal attention is given to the net benefits of
compliance, govenunent costs in enforcing the law and long term public and environmental
cost of non-cornpliance. 13'

13' The federal governrnent and the province of British Columbia govemment held public
consultations on their policies prior to finalization and wide pubtic reIease.

13' For example, it has been estimated that the clean up cos& for the plastics fire at the
Plastirnet waste facility in Ontario ranges fiom $2 to $4 million, excluding health costs.
Prior to the fire, the regional budget for the Ministry of Environment and Energy was
reduced by more that $1 million coupled with significant reduction in enforcement staff.
The Gallon Environmental Letter, Canadian Institute for Business and the Environment,
Vol. No. 13, October 2, 1997, Montreal.

Full cost accounting for irnplementation of an environmental standard requires
consideration not only of socio-economic costs of implernenting or not implernenting the
proposed control but also the cost of ensuring compliance. This should include costs to
govemment, regulated industry and where appropriate, to the

13'

A thorough costing exercise for compliance should consider at a minimum the following

issues:
the costs of ensuring compliance, Le. permitting, inspection, and surveillance,
investigation and enforcement action, education/technology transfer;
the costs of non compliance or non enforcement, Le. potentid liability for darnages;
who will bear the cost, Le. governrnent or industry ;
what alternative mechanisms are available for M l or partial cost recovery of
enforcement, i.e. taxes, fees, charges, penalties, cost recovery proceedings; and
the most cost effective alternative to achieving compliance and deter violators.

The costing exercise should involve an exhaustive review of government needs and
programme costs. These include staffùig, training, equipment, supervision, drafting

139 The Crmadm Federd Reguloory Plan, for example, requires completion of a regulatory
impact analysis statements (RIAS) for each proposed regulation which is published in the
Canada Gazette for public review and comment. The RIAS is supposed to include costs to
each of the parties including enforcement coçts. For a review of this process see RL4S: A
Writer's Guide, (Regulatory Affairs Series, Number 1) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1992). In its training programs for enforcement and compliance, UNEP
recommends also giving consideration to reserving funds for enforcernent and cornpliance
through cost recovery or establishment of trust fùncis. üNEP, supra note 18 at p. 15.

enforceabie permit conditions, screening for edorceability, development and delivery of
inspection programs, review of self monitoring reports, spot checks, preparation of
compliance data bases, compliance promotion programs, and where appropriate caiculation
of lost revenues fiom incentive or grant programs.'40 The importance of technicd and legal
training to effective enforcement cannot be overstated.14'

It has also been recommended that in the process of imposing regdatory requirements
consideration also be given to the practicality and financial feasibility of enfor~ernent.~"

Failure to adequately consider the costs of enforcement can senously affect the credibility
of the program. Cost saving meamres found to be practicable have included targeted
inspections and enforcernent 143;interagency agreements to share equipment and facilities

140

J. Mayda, "Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Parameters and
Constraints", (1 985) 12 Ecotogy L. Q. 997 at p. 1019; L.F. Duncan, "The Rule of Law and
Sustainable Developrnent", supra, note 25 at p. 292-94; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa,
BAPEDAL Development P h , ReguIatory Cornpliance Programme (Jakarta, BAPEDAL:
1991), supra note 36.
141

See Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and
Recornmendarom, supra note 34 at p. 2 1; G. Rodland and A. Miller, "Nonvay's Experience
in Building an Inspecter Corps: Education and Financing", Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 66-68.
142

An example of the need to look ahead to enforcement costs is a lesson shared by the
Netherlands where they were required to rescind a waste management law which when
implemented was determined to require the hiring of 200-300 additional inspectors to enforce
the new requirements. See C. Wassennan, International Conference on Environmental Law,
supra, note 4 at p. 53.
143

For example Environment Canada prepares annual inspection plans in which prionty
inspections are identified; The USEPA has adopted a strategy of targeted enforcement
actions.

for example laboratones; institution of joint training programs;

144

cross appointment of

inspectors. Some jurisdictions fiaance thek enforcement programs fkom the proceeds of
any charge or penalty rather than the common practice of directing those revenues to a
consolidated revenue h d .'41

Decisioas about expenditures on enforcement should be premised on an understanding by
policy maken and legislaton of potential liability for non-enforcement.

146

The cost of

enforcemenf therefore, m u t also be weighed against the potentid costs (direct and indirect)
of non-enforcement. It has been suggested that the act of non-enforcement may itself attract
liability.'41

It wil1 aiso be important to decide whether to tramfer ail or part of the costs of enforcement

to the regdated party. Where a decision is made to transfer the costs, consideration shouid
-

'" For example in the United States, four regional associations of state (and in some cases
federal) enforcement agencies jointly design and deliver training programs. More recentiy,
Canadian agencies are now also collaborating in these cost shared initiatives.
145

See for example Gro Rodland, "Cornpliance Monitoring in Norway", in Vol. 1 of the
Proceedings of the International Cogerence an Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at
p. 3 19-323; G. Bandi, "Some Methodological Aspects of Designing Regulations and Setting
Priorities in Economics Under Transition", in Vol. 1 of the Proceedings of the infernafional
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 118; V. Mezricky,
"Environmental Inspection in Transition in the Czech Republic", ibid at p. 81: G. Rodland
and A. Miller, supra, note 141, Proceedings of the nird International Conference on
Environmenfa1 Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 66. E. Barr supra, note 34 at p.2 1 1
recomrnends using proceeds of fines to reduce enforcement deficits and to speed action to
reduce past h m .
14' For example Canadian courts have found govemments legally liable for damages arising
fiom inadequate inspection or enforcement responses, see comments, supra. note 47.
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J. Z. Swaigen, supra note 43 at p. 181.

be given to relative capacity of large or smali entities to bear the costs and ensuring
flexibility in the compliance regirne to d o w for flexibility. In some jurisdictions, specific
guidelines have been i n s t i ~ e dto guide administrators or courts in rnakuig detennination
about relegating enforcement costs to the regulated facility.'41

Cost recovery alternatives have included fees and charges, imposition of self monitoring

and reporting requirements, administrative or judiciai orders for recovery of costs of

cleanup, investigation, enfiorcement, penalties which consider economic gain boom non
compliance. Pnor to implementing any economic incentive or cost recovery initiatives,
countries wodd be wise to consider the experiences of other j~risdictions.~~~

2.

AN ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPL~ANCE
STRATEGY

A commonly held but none the less inaccurate presumption is that once environmental

IJ8

A study by the Law Refom Commission of Canada recommends that in sentencing
environmental offenders, the courts give consideration to among other factors, ability to pay,
size and wealth of the corporation, the social utility of the enterprise and tax consequences of
the fine. JZ. Swaigen et al, Senrencing in Environmental Cases, Protection of Life Series, a
Study Paper prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa, 1985). See also
Bara, supra, note 29 and R v. Norrhern Metdlic Sales, Reasons for Judgement, Judge Bany
Stuart, Temtorial Court of the Yukon, September 13, 1994.
149

For a review of experiences with economic or market measures see in Vol. 1 and II of the
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Emtironmentul Enforcement, supra.
note 4; Organization of Economic Development, Environment Cornmittee Group of
Econornic Experts, Economic Insimmentsfor Environmental Protection in the United States,
(Paris: OECD, 1 986); S. Webb, "Managing the Market to Achieve Ecologically Sustainable
Development" (Kew: 199 1 ); The Polhfer P q s Principe: Definition, Analysis,
Implemenration (Paris: OECD, 1975); "An Assessrnent of the Implementation of the Polluter
Pays Principlet', [unpublished] (OECD, 1982).

standards or objectives are impose4 compliance can be automaticaily anticipated.

Experience has shown that this is rarely the case. To enhance rates of compiiance in pardel

with processes for setting standards. attention shouid be given to the preparation of a

'"

cornpliance strategy.

As previously outlined, an enforcement and compliance policy is a public affirmation of
basic principles underlying the enforcement regime for any law or regulation. It espouses
officia1 - either political or administrative - cornmitment to enforce and ofien restates the
duty to comply. It clarifies roles of government officiais, covering the full spectnim of
playen nom Ministers to field uispectors, regulated industry and community. It often
specifies policies for responding to government violators. An enforcement policy specifies

the criteria for selection of enforcement responses and sanctions. Many policies also state
government positions on voluntaq compliance initiatives.

An enforcement strategy, on the other hand, represents the intemal bureaucratie framework

or work plan for implementing an enforcement policy and exercising related enforcement
powes and alternative mechanisms for fostering compliance, to respond to violations
including the exercise of alternative powen of intervention and sanction. A strategy
incorporates decisions about necessary m g , skills, training, inspection protocols and

I5O For example, since 1992 the Governrnent o f Canada has required preparation and
reporting in the Canadian Gazette of a compliance strategy as a component o f the regdatory
impact assessrnent o f any proposed regulation. See A Sharegic Approach to Devefoping
Cornpliunce Policies: A Guide,supra note 56.

procedures to institute enforcement policies. It refiects decisions to target specified sectoa
or regulatees. It clarifies mechanisms for evaluating the chosen strategy, inclusive of the
various indicators of success or failure. Most importantly, it enables an agency to

implement an enforcement program in a thoughtful, consistent manner.

A compliance strategy c m be used as both a preemptive and reactive tool. It can be used to

assist government agencies in scheduling necessary Iegislative and regulatory r e f o m to
provide more effective measures to deter offenden or to enable more timely response. It cm
assist agencies in their reactions to non-cornpliance by establishing protocols for response
to cornplex interagency or transboundary enforcernent problems.

''

Strategic choices are made by govemments in the selection of control insûuments

(regdation, permit, compliance conûact), the scope of powers, the nature of the regulated
Party, use of incentives, m o n i t o ~ gprograrns and sanctions and roles assigned to the
pblic. 'j2

In designing an enforcement sûategy, it has k e n suggested that it may be important to also
recognize banien, deficiencies and special influences on the potential success of various

"'

For example, in response to significant transborder illegal trade in hazardous wastes
and chloroflwocarbons (CFCs) the enforcernent agencies of the United States, Canada and
Mexico have been developing and implementing a strategy to improve their capacity to
detect and respond to violations.
152

Supra, note 149.

enforcement actions. These can include the capacity of the regulatee to comply; the ready
enforceability of the pdcular law; the capacity of the agency to enforce (training and
empowerment); societal and attitudinal

and, relative political priorities.'"

Decisions made in each case may be critical to the ultimate success and credibili~of an
enforcement program. It is therefore critical to the future success of individuai enforcement

actions that govemments give early attention to addressing major policy issues and adopt a
specific strategy towards ~om~liance.'*~
It must dso be recognized that while there rnay be
wide avenue for flexibility in individual enforcement respooses, ultimate credibility of the
strategy requires that boundÿries be placed on exercise of discretion including adherence to

'

statutorily imposed standards and procedures and officia1 compliance policies. 56
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The attitude of govemment is as important as the attitudes of the targeted parties. It has
been the experience of Dutch oficials that the " attitudes of the administration strongly
affects the success of enforcement. An administrator with a negative attitude wiIl be unwilling
to equip the enforcement department of his organization with the power it requires. He is also
likely to impose many administrative sanctions (recognizance, closure). In short, an
enforcement official may work as hard as he likes, but without the support of the
administration, he will achieve Me". J.A.M. Van Ekeren et al, "Information Campaigns
Benefit Enforcernent of Environmental Laws", Proceedings of the International Confe~ence
on Environmental Law, supra, note 4 at p. 287. See also D. Saxe, supra, note 7.
1 54

Supra, note 142.
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The USEPA for example have recently revised their compliance strategy to give pnority
to pollution prevention, and risk reduction, and to target " significant non-cornpliers". See R.
van Huevelen and P. Rosenburg "Successfbt Cornpliance and Enforcement Approaches",
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Errvironmental Enforcernent supra,
note 4 at p. 163. See also H.Versteeg, kamining the Cment und Proposed of the Canadim
Environmental Protection Act to Incorporate Pollution Prevention and Strategies, Final
Report, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1993).
156 AS pointed out by Canadian govemment strategies report, extra-legal responses rnay
ensure a cooperative working relationship between regulator and industry but if premised on
turning a blind eye to IegaIIy ùnposed standards they wiIl ultimately h m the credibility of
the agency, supra. note 142 at p. 9.

A compliance strategy has been found to assist government agencies in detemiining critical

questions about the uttirnate delivery of the intended environmental or developmental
control.ls7 Strategic choices must be made in the seiection of control instruments
(regdation, permit, compliance, contract), use of incentives, monitoring programs and
~i~11ctions.
Each decision is criticai to the success of a compliance program and each is
affiected by the other. It is therefore critical to the future success of individual enforcement
actions to address major policy issues and to adopt a specific strategy which remains
responsive to changing times and priorities.Is8 The following are arnong the criticai issues
agencies have found usehi to consider in formulating an enforcement and compliance
strategy.

A determination of the capacity to comply shouid be based on independent studies of the

157

A useful review of the purpose and method of preparing of a compliance strategy is
provided, in the report of the Canadian Regdatory Compliance Project, ibid; See also C.

Wasserman, supra, note 4.
158

The USEPA for exarnple have recently revised their enforcement and compliance
strategies to give greater priority to pollution prevention and risk reduction and to target
"significant noncornplien". See R. van Huevelen et al "Successfil Compliance and
Enforcement Approaches", Proceedings of the Third International Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163; USEPA, Enforcernent in the 1990%
Project: Recommendatium of the Analytical Workgroups (USEPA: Washington, 1 99 1); In the
NetherIands, the National Coordination Committee for Environmental Law Enforcement
(LCCM)prepares annual national enforcement programmes. See J. A. Peters, s q r 4 note 56,
at p. 274.

targeted group, research into the available control technologies and anticipated costs and
revenues. 159 Consultations with the regulated indwtry can improve the probability of
redistic controls and rimelines in ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e It
. ' ~can
~ help counter p s t regdatory
arguments by ind-

regarding the technical or £inancial viability of the control.

Enforcement costs can Vary for each particular statute or regdation. A full cost accounting

for irnplementation of an environmental standard or objective requires that consideration be
given to al1 necessary costs, not only those bom by the regulated party (Le. retrofitting,
training,). Cornpliance costs borne by govemment include personnel, training, equipment,
investigations, educational programs and matends as well as lost revenues through grants
or tax incentives. Costs of implementing and administering market measures are another
fkequentiy forgotten or underestimated COQ

l6

'

1 59

Pollution control obligations atso can be profitable to the regulated industry, for example
the sale of sulphur as a by product of sour gas processing. Pollution controls can mate an
economic opportunity. Legal requirements to properly treat and dispose of toxic wastes
support the growth and innovation in the waste management and control technology
indussies.
160
161

Supra, note 142 at p. 15.

S. A. Heman and P. Verkirt, "CIosing Remarks for the Third International Conference on
Environmental Enforcement", VOL II, Pmceedings of the nird International Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 256; E. Cowan (Rapporteur) "Enforcement of
Economic Instruments", Vol. Il, Proceedings of the Third Internaiional Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 197.

A compliance strategy can clan@ w h can
~ and should bear the costs of implementation.

Where the decision is made to impose al1 or part of the costs of compliance on the targeted
industry, the "polluter pays" principle can be manifested through a variety of mechanisms

including pollution fees and charges,lg requirements, or sentencing powers. 163 The strategy

may propose legislative reforms to implement these measures or recommend preferential
use.

A compliance strategy ensures that decisions about choice of coercive vernis econornic

measures are premised on full consideration of practical experiences with the alternative
instruments and anticipated costs to both govemment and the regulated parties (large and

srnail industries).164In this way care can be take to ensure incentives directed at reducing
impacts on one medium (e.g. water) do not resuit in increased impacts on another (e.g. land
or.),

lS5
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The Czech govemrnent has legislated a fee scale for waste disposition calculated
according to risk of harm and individual record of compliance, K. Velek, Tome Information
on Enforcernent concerning Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal in Czechoslovakia".
Proceedings of htemational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, szpru, note 4 at p.
5 17. Norway apparently charges back to regulated industry the costs of its inspection and
audit program. See G. Rodland and A. Miller et al, supra note 14 1, Proceedings of the ntird
Internutionaf Conference on Environmental Enfrcement, supra note 4 at p. 66. See also
Petea et al. "The Enforcement of Environmental Charges in the Netherlands", ibid at p. 487;
Rasnic, "Enforcement of Economic Instruments in The United States", ibid, p. 495 for a
detailed discussion of problems in effectiveness and costing of economic measures.
163

For example, the CEPA empowen the court to order an offender to post a bond or pay
money into court is an arnount necessary to ensure compliance; to cornpensate the
govemrnent for remedial or prevention action; to pay monies to research improved disposal
methods. Supra, note 1 17.
164
165

Supra, note 53.

For a discussion of the need for a multi media approach to regulation and enforcement see
R.B. Cheatham, J.R. Edward, W.H. Frank, R.J. Satterfield, "Innovative Multi-media

Where a variety of compliance measriles are proposeci, safeguards shodd be instituted to

prevent or avoid potential impacts on enforcement actions. A compliance strategy cm
incorporate consultative mechanisms between permitting and enforcement agencies to
ensure approaches are integrated and coordinated.

WHOARE THE TARGETEDPARTIES?

cl

A strategy for enforcement shouid address whether the targeted parties are public or private,

individual or corporate. Similarly it will be important to consider the efficacy of
surveillance for all regulated parties or only those with poor compliance records. It has k e n
recommended that these issues be addressed at the deveiopmental stage for any standard or
law. 166

In the standard-setting process a decision must be made about imposition of legal liability,
that is, will responsibility for operathg standards be imposed on both private and public

Cornpliance, Enforcement and Pollution Prevention Approaches to Environmental
Cornpliance at Federal Facilities in the United States of America", Proceedings of the n i r d
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 34 1 ; "Summary
of Workshop: Integrated Perrnitting and inspection", ibid, p. 335.
It should be noted that Parliament c m bind the provincial and federal orders of
government (e.g. s-4, CEPA, & s.3(2) of the Fisheries Act). This means that govemment
departments and agencies can be prosecuted. For example the USEPA focus their
IM

enforcement responses on "significant non-cornpliers". The USEPA have found this targeted
approach to be both more cost effective and to yield better results. They advise that the
existence of a list of "significant non-cornpliers" also has encouraged listed parties to be more
proactive in compliance. See van Huevelen and P. Rosenbrug et al, supra,note 154.

facilitie~.'~'Where public facilities are also subject to the regulations, it will be important
to consider the liability implications of failure to enforce the law against public violators
and the overall impact to the credibility of the enforcernent program.168A strategy which
involves potential enforcement actions against govenunent faciIities necessitates advance
review and consideration by senior policy officials, as it will most certainly attract

considerable controversy within the bureaucracy.

Whether the party targeted by the control is an individual, srnail family enterprise or major
corporation should be factored in the compliance strategies. A conscious decision should be
made at the t h e of development of a law or regdation whether targeting corporate
directors and officers will improve compliance rates.16' Similarly the choice of sanctions
and penalties should reflect the special character of potential offenders and legal or political
limitations to their exercise. For example, in some jurisdictions while criminal prosecution
cannot be commenced against corporations, directors and officen can be charged. "O Where

For a review of various approaches to seeking compliance by governrnent-owned and
operated facilities see E.F. Lowry, " Enforcement at Govemrnent Owned or Operated
Facilities, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement,
supra, note 4 at p. 476; A. Delong (Rapporteur) "Enforcement at Governrnent-owned orOperated Facilities", ibid, p. 1 89- 190.

'61

168

Environment Canada prepared a separate policy document and held special briefing
sessions for other federal departrnents in advance of the enactment of the CEPA.
169

It also should be recognized that in some instances flexibility in choice of target for
enforcement action may be Iimited by prevailing laws. For example in the Republic of
Indonesia, criminal proceedings, with the exception of economic crimes, may only be
initiated against real persons, not corporations. See Law no. 8. 1981, regmding the Criminal
Law of Procedure, Republic of Indonesia.

public facilites are also targeted, a more appropriate response may be control or cleanup
orders rather that imposition of monetary penalties.

Care should be taken in exercising inconsistent enforcement responses based solely on

effective path to compliance rnay be targeting educationai
hancial c q ~ a c i t ~ .A
' ~ more
'
programs to srnaller companies and encouraging self audit by major corporatims. On the
other hand, variances in response may be more appropriately at the time of sentencing or
order.' 72

Finally, while the standard may apply to a broad category of parties, it may be more cost
effective to target enforcement actions against a specific sector or a select group. For

example, the development of a compliance data base will enable officials to target
The same data
inspections and response to those with a known record of non ~ornpliance.'~~

base will enable better management of compliance incentives program.'74

'"
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E. Barr, s u p r a note 34.
See J. Swaigen, supra, note

supra note 57.
f74

For example, Czech officials reportedly factor compliance records into their calculation of
pollution charges See K. Velek, "Some Information on Enforcement Conceming Solid and
Hazardous Waste Disposed in Czechoslovakia", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the Internafional
Conference on Environmenfal Enfrcement, supra note 4 at p. 5 17. Poland rewards timely
response by polluters by allowing reduction in allotted fines where the offendea complete an
ecological investment within a prescribed time period. 2. Kamiefiski. "Pnxess of Upgrading
the Polish Environmental Procedures", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the W d Intemational
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supru, note 4 at p. 56.

WHAT 1sAN APPROPRIATE RULEFOR THE VAMOUSPUBLICS
OR DIRECT
BENEFICIARIES
OF THE CONTRUL?

d)

A compliance strategy should also address the intended role for the public in fostering

compliance or triggering enforcement action. A wide variety of non-govemment entities
can be identified as providing potentiaily beneficiai contributions to enforcement and
compliance programs including speciai interest organizations (environmentai, development)

indutrial associations, unions, professional societies (engineers, lawyers. auditos),
universities and private consultants.

"'

In some cases enforcernent agencies have expanded their capacity to deliver monitoring and
enforcement functions through a concerted strategy to facilitate public involvement. Private
legal action can supplement efforts of enforcement agencies where political or interjurisdictional problems constrain government response. This may require legislative
arnendments to extend private nghts of action and policy decisions regarding official
responses to private actions.

For some nations the enactment of citizen enforcement
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For a more thorough list see C. Wasserrnan ,"Principles of Environmental Enforcement",
international Conference on Erwironmentaf Enforcement, supra,note 4 at p. 1 17. The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation provides for the establishment of both
regional (Joint Public Advisory Cornmittee) and national advisory committees. The Parties of
the Agreement have appointed representatives of ENGOs, indusûy associations, municipal
and tribal govemments to advise them in the delivery of their obligations, including effective
enforcement. See articles 16, 17. See also S. Casey-Lefkowitz, et al, "The Evolving Role of
Citizens in Environmental Enforcement", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the Fowth International
Conference on Environmental Enjorement, supra note 4 at p. 22 1; Special Topic Workshop
H: Public Role in Enforcement: How to Go About Creating and Supporting Effective Citizen
Enforcement, ibid, pp. 509-528.
1 76

Many junsdictions have a policy of public intervention to stay private action or to

discourage cooperation in case preparation. For a review of issues involved in private
prosecutions see L. F. Duncan, Enforcing Emtironrnental L m A A i d e to Privale

rights is required by international law.'"

Community based organizations can provide a wful watch dog role supplementing limited
resources for goveniment surveillance. Strategies for facilitating comxnunity watch have
included legal requirements to submit monitoring reports to specified cornmunity
organizations, and public hotlines for cornplaints or incident reporting. In some instances
the establishment of comrnunity monitoring teams are made ternis of operatkg licence.

Constructive participation requires a conscious effort to lend support to community to build
effective linkages. Cornmitment to provide technical training and communication channels

Industnal associations can also provide a useful conduit for information to regulated parties
on regdatory and cornpliance initiatives as well as technology tramfer. In some instances
mentoring programs have been instituted to foster exchange of environmental management
and technological expertise between larger corporations and small to medium facilities.

Prosecution (Edmonton: Environmental Law Centre, I 990)
177

ibid, article 6 . The NAAEC requires the Parties to provide legal right to compel
investigations, and private right of access to administrative, civil, and cnminal proceedings
and remedies. supra. note 3.
178

For example, the Texas National Conservation Authority has given support to a
community-based monitoring program for sampling and reporting on potable water quality.
A training program was initiated by the Alberta Environmental Law Centre in 1997 to
support community involvement in monitoring and reporting on environmental offences.
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation, North American Environmental Fund
has provided grants to a series of community based projects throughout North Arnerica
establishing community monitoring programs.

Cooperation of workers, including govemment employees, can be encourageci through

"whistieblower" provisions.'79 The expanded use of environrne11tal and compliance audits

by industry and govemment has created a significant niche for private consultants in
directing voluntary cornpliance efforts. A number of govemments have adopted policies of
supporthg protection of information from private audits to help facilitate private efforts to
comply.180

The development and implementation of an effective enforcement and compliance program
also depends on a constructive relationship among govemment officials. Any strategy must
address the degree of independence to be accorded to enforcement officials as well as
measures for coordinating responses. This may be particularly cntical to avoid conflicts
between those managing incentive programs and those exercising enforcement responses. It
will be important to employ measures to ensure close coordination between regdators,
prosecutions, judiciary and politicians.18'

Any effective enforcement and cornpliance strategy will also address enforceability in the

179

See for example, Yukon Environment Act* S.Y.(1991) CS, S.20.

180

See CEPA Enforcement a d Compliance PoIicy*supra, note 15 at p. 29.

18 1

E. Barr,supra. note 34 at p. 63; L.F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, BAPEDAL D e v e l o p ~
P h , Regulctory and Compliance Program, supra note 36.

instrument which establishes standards, compliance promotional programs, compliance
monitoring, choice of sanction and program evaluation. The rernainder of the chapter will
discuss these components in greater detail.

The backbone of any effective enforcement regime is the implementation of clear measures
to determine compliance and to detect violati~ns.'~~
This requires the imposition of legally
binduig, precise, measurable and readily understood standards. It is equally important that
those standards be integrated and consistent Standards must be kposed in a timely fashion

and in consultation with the afTected

Contrary to a popular assumption that the

regdatory process is cost prohibitive, taking the effort to impose legally binding standards
c m provide a cost efficient route to compliance,
Environmental agencies c m increase compliance by developing regulations and
permïts that are enforceable. A system which combines enforceable regulations with
the promise that the governrnent will respond firmly to violations ultimately
encourages a high level of voluntary compliance. M e n industry is motivated to
control its own operations in order to achieve environmental standards, the need for
public expenditure on inspectoa and bureaucrats cm be reduced, thus, enforceable
standards contribute to efficiency as weil as achievement of environmentai goals.184
182

World Commission on Environment & Development, supra. note 7; Agenda 21, Chapter
8, supra, note 2; Fomdex Report, Environment und Devefopment, (International
Conciliation), January 1972 at p. 22.
1 83

C. Wasserman provides a detailed review of factors to consider in standard setting in C.
Wasserman, " Principles of Environmental Enforcement ", Vol. 1. Proceedings of the
Intentational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 67, at p. 43-63.
For a helpful reference to check lists for drafting enforceable regulûtions and permits, see S.F.
Fulton and E.J. Gilberg " Developing Enforceable Environmental Regulations and Permits ",
supra, note 4 at p. 253.
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S. F. Fulton, lbid at p. 253.

This section reviews lessons leamed about

the value of founding an enforcement and

compliance regime on a sound system of precise, legally binding environmental standards.

The enactment of clear, legally binding standards sets the stage for more effective
enforcement targeting.The imposition by iaw of pollution control standards and procedures

sends a clear message to regulated industry that compliance means compliance with the
law. The law should speciQ who is bound, the precise standards, deadlines for compliance,
self -monitoring or reporting obligations, assign enforce powers and prescribe sanctions for
noncornpliance. 185

The establishment of clear binding standards will be critical regardless of the choice of
compliance tool, that is, "command" and "control" or market instrument. Prescribed targets
provide the foundation for a fair and consistent inspection and enforcement regime. They
provide the minimum requirements for design and operation of facilities in a cornpliant
manner, targets for self motivated technological innovation and for the calculation of
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See C. Wasserman. Proceedings of International Conference on Environmentul
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 54-56 and 60-62 for a more detailed list of recommended
provisions of an enforceable law or permit. See also Environmental Protection and
Sustainable Development Legal Principles and Recommendutions. adopted b y the Expert
Group on Environmental Law of the Worid Commission on Environment And Developrnent,
Article 4, "General Principles conceming Natural Resources and Environment Interferences"
(London, June 1986) at p. 24.

effluent charges and taxes.'86 They also provide a measme of accountability.

While considerable effort is kquently expended on establishing ambient objectives and on
monitoring background contaminant levels, to be legdy enforceable, standards must set
clear targets for specified sources. Each jurisdiction explains its own unique means of
irnposing standards including legislation, regulations, licenses or perrnits and contracts or

agreements. l" In stiil other cases the standards evolve fkorn an intensive facility-wide audit
process. For example, Mexico, while establishing some standards through common means

such as statutes or pemiits, have also introduced a unique standard setting process through
intensive facility specific audits.

In most jurisdictions statutes are the selected instrument for imposing general rights and
prohibitions and duties for a standard setting process (including the right of affected parties
to participate in standard setthg or to appeal).188Similady, statutes have proven the
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Agenda 21, article 8.13 supports this position. "Laws and replation suited to countryspecific conditions are among the most important instruments for transforming environment
and development policies into action, not only through 'command and control' rnethods, but
also as a normative framework for economic planning and market instruments", as cited in G.
Bendi, supra, note 45, in the Proceedings of the Third international Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 15.
187

For a more detailed review of the use and relative advantages of each mechanism see C.
Wasserman, supra note 4 and the Report of the Auditor General of Cunada to the House of
Comrnons, Chpter I I , (Ottawa: Department of the Environment, Conservation and
Protection, 199 1).
188

See for example the CEPA, supra. note 122; Alberta Environmental Protection and

common instniment for imposing legal liability for non-cornpliance. Ig9 Where the greatest
variances occurs, is in the choice of instrument to impose more precise standards specified
pollutants or facilities.

A common pmctice where environmental regimes are newly established is to emct basic

umbrella statutes enshrining environmental principles such as the duty to protect the
environment or a general prohibition against
speedily enacted leading into the 1992 Rio UNCED

Many such umbreiia laws were

onf fer en ce.'^'

What is ofien missing

however are the parallel instruments to impose site specifïc operating standards. This has

led to failed and costly attempts at enfiorcement, with additional side effects of damage to
the credibility of enforcement agencieç.lg2

Enhancement Act, S.A. (1992) c. E- 13-3; Law No. 4, 1982, regarding Basic Provisionsfor
Mmagement of the Environment, [Republic of Indonesia] supra note 103.

It rnay be noted that enforcernent actions have floundered where governments have not
clearly prescnbed liability for damage from polluting activities. See for example S.
Haryanto," Environmental law enforcement needs improving", Jakarta Post, April23,
1991 , p.6 in which he identifies various inadequacies of the Indonesian Environmental
Management Act including failure to precisely define strict liability. It may be noted that the
new law enacted in 1997 purportedly addresses this gap (Interview with M. A. Santosa,
Montreal, October 1997).
IB9

Examples of this type of inaugural legislation include the Canadian Fisheries Act, supra
note 103, which enacted a general prohibition against the deposit of any substance into
waters fiequented by fish which may be deleterious to the fish or their habitat, or human
consumption; Indonesia Act no. 4 of 1982, supra, note 103, creates a right to a healthy
living environment and a general obligation on every person to prevent and abate pollution
(sections S(1) and (2)).
O'

19' For example, Indonesia's Environmental Mmagement Act, ibid; Mexico's General Law
of Ecological Equilibrium and Emironmental Protection, Diario oficial d e la Federacion,
28 January 1988, amended by decree published 13 December 1996.
192

For exarnple the Indonesia Case no. 122/Pid/B/I 988/PNSda ugainst Bambung Gunawan
a.R a Oei Ling Gwat and no. I42/Pen.Pi& 988/PNSda, Sidoarjo Disiricf Court.

One way to prevent this kind of scenario is to contain these broad obligations or
prohibitions by the creation of more precise standards through associated approvals,
authorizations, regulations or pexmits.'93This of course necessitates parallel action to
M t u t e the

necessary administrative systems for implementing these ancillary

instruments.lw

Also often disregarded is the propensity of legislation to ûigger a concomitant
responsibility to ensure cornpliance. The act of creating a legislated standard may not only
impose a duty on the p d e s specified to comply with the obligation and but also a duty on
govemment to enfor~e.'~'Consequently care rnust be taken by regdatory agencies in
enacting standards to ensure that they have given equal attention in program development
and budget processes to mechanisms for both detection and response.

Legislation is also an appropriate tool for prescribing a consistent standard-setting process,
and according participatory and appeals rights. It may also be worth restating the need to
pay similar heed to the binding nature of legislated procedural d e s , for example for
--

See for example, Yukon Environment Act, supra,note 179; Canadian Fisheries Act, supra,
note 103; Indonesia's Environmental Management Act, supra note 103.

'91

f 94

L. F. Duncan and P. Moestadji ,"Appendix: A Critical Path for Implementing Pollution

Control Legislation", in The Licensing System for Environmental Pollution Contrd in the
Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry o f Population and Environment, 1992)
(Studi Perizinan Pengendaliaw Pencemaran Ling Kungan di hdonesia, N i d 1 dan Jilid II).
195

For a review o f Canadian law on the duty to enforce see Swunson, supra, note 30;
Kamloops, supra, note 30; Tooke; supra. note 3 0; Swaigen, supra, note 43 at p. 148.

envkomnentai impact assessment, emergency response, or emissions trading d e s . Where
procedural d e s are prescribed in law, the need will arke to enforce. Expenence has shown
that it may be preferable to legislate o d y the minimum procedurai d e s dlowing for more
flexible response purniant to guidelines or iderior Iegd instruments. This can help agencies

in avoiding an otherwise unmanageable enforcement load.'"

ii)

REGULATIONS

As previously mentioned, regdations have generally been found useful for establishing

minimum national or regional standards for specified substances or for sources of pollutants
by sector. Regulations c m provide a consistent prescribed standard for negotiation of sitespecific licenses or permits. They can also be used to provide more detailed cntena for
review and approval of development applications. However, the regulation making process
can prove to be extremely costly and tirne consuming , resulting in unnecessary delays in
prescribing technical operating

çtandar~is.'~'

A more practicable alternative can be the

enactment by law or regulation of licensing or permitting requirernents and procedures
leaving the site-specific standard setthg process to the latter process .
196

For example, the Republic of Indonesia in its first enactment of an environmental
impact assessment process sstablished the legal obligation to conduct assessments of not
only proposed but existing facilities. This created what became an overwhelming and
basically impossible task of enforcing the impact assessment law against virtually hundreds
of thousands of parties. The Iaw has been since arnended to lirnit the application of the
requirement. See also C. Wasseman, supra, note 137.
197

The RepubIic of Indonesia for example, has faced considerable delays in attempts to
prescribe site specific standards through the regulatory process. See L. F. Duncan and P.
Moestadji, supra, note 194 and I. C.E.L. News Bulletin, June 1996, Jakarta.

LICENSEOR PERMIT

iii)

Once minimum standards are established, agencies have found that flexibility in site
specific standards can be accommodated through the licensing or permitting processes198.
This af5ords greater flexibility in determining site-specific standards such as sensitivity of
receiving environment, cumulative impacts from loading of other adjacent sources or age of
the facility. The imposition of these site-specific control standards,monitoring requirements

and inspection schedules also facilitates ready parameten for self-monitoring and
enforcement activities. As will be discussed later on, care should also be taken to integrate
licensing processes to ensure consistency in approvais and in later enforcement

responses.199

As a b a l consideration for the standard setang process, perhaps among the more hstmting

experiences for an enforcement officid is the discovery at the tirne of the attempted
enforcement action that the alleged violated "standards" are in fact not legally enforceable.
As a preemptive measure, some jurisdictions incorporate an enforceability screening
process

198

199

for draft regdations and pennits. Varied approaches have adopted including

See C. Wasseman, supra, note 137 at p. 59.

See "Special Topic Workshop C : Integrated Permitting and Inspection" and "Special
Topic Workshop L : Creating Enforceable Permit Programs and Requirernents: Discussion
Focus on Water Pollution and Contamination of Drinking Water Supplies". Pmceedings of
the Fourth International Conference on Environmental Cornphce and Enforcement,
supra, note 4 at p. 333 to 378;61 1 to 654.

establishment of drafting teams which combine technical and legal experts; preparation of
mode1 conditions; interna1 review processes enabling feedback among regdatory and
enforcement officiais including debriehgs following enforcement action. It will be equally
important to ensure that permïtting agencies have the necessary training and skills to ciraft
enforceable provisions?oo
NEGOTIATED S ~ L E M E N TAND
S COMPLIANCE
AGREEMENTS

iv)

In other instances, agencies have utilkd negotiated settlements or compliance agreements

as mechanisms to negotiate binding schedules for implementation of new standards.201 In

such cases the exercise of discretion to waive or defer enforcement action is replaced by a
process to superimpose tailor-rnade standards by way of contractual agreernent?02 Such
agreements have established site-specific or party specific standards with renegotiated
rnove to legally enshrine the use of compliance agreements
cornpliance d e a d l i n e ~ The
.~~~
200

See L. F. Duncan, et al, supra. note 181 ;C. Wasserman check list, supra. note 185.

20 1

Environment Canada has recently introduced upgraded standards for puIp and paper mi11
effluent through negotiated cornpliance agreements and has proposed amendments to its laws
to introduce the use of negotiated settlements in tandem with administrative penalties. Such
agreements imposed by adrninisbrttive order wouId purportedly enable the agency to revise
monitoring requirements, and impose pollution prevention or production processes
requirements. Pu@ and Paper Mill Defoarner and Wood Chip Regulations, SOR 192-268;
Pulp and Paper Mill Efluenr Chlorinated Dioxin and Furms Regulutiom, SOR 192-267.
See Response by Environment Canada, to the Pariiamentary Committee Report. For a more
lengthy discussion of these instruments see North American Report on Voluntary
Cornpliance, Commissionfor Environmenta2 Cooperation, supra, note 9.
In at least one jurisdiction, Alberta, special legislation has been enacted to facilitate
negotiations with regulatees for the opting out of otherwise binding standards of operation.

202

203

Canadian agencies have in many cases only recently replaced informai waivers with
legally binding compIiance targets and schedules: See for example the Pulp and the Paper
Regulations, supra, note 20 1. In other instances where the need for more fonnalized
variances is recognized, the current law does not enable the negotiation of these negotiated

has been triggered by concems raised about the legal veracity of the practice of waiving
compliance requirernents based on infornial underiakuigs by indu*.

Concem has b e n expressed that this process of renegotiating compliance schedules and
technical compliance targets belongs more appropriately in the more public process of
standard sections or regdation making.

204

Where the negotiated settlement approach is adopted public confidence in the process
would undoubtedly be enhanced by enabling greater public scruthy of the negotiation
process at a minimum for cornpetitors and or directly afTected cornmunities. A
disadvantage to this instrument may be the inability of persons who are not parties to the
contract or agreement to enforce the terms thereby precluding any right of recouse for

third parties.20s This type of "opting out" mechanism may also raise concerns about
regdatory fairne~s"~and usefulness as instruments for general deterren~e.'~'

compliance schernes. See response by Environment Canada to the Report of the
Parliamentary Cornmittee on the Reforrn of the Canadian Environmenta[ Protection Act.
For a discussion of public concerns about the deregdation process see Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, Proceedings of the North Arnerican Dialogue on
Environmental Law, (Montreal: CEC, 1997) and background papers.
For a discussion of this approach see Bany J. Barton et al, A Contract Modelfor Pollution
Control, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 1984).

*O5

For Canadian agencies this raises the specter of constitutional challenges relating to
rights of due process or discriminatory application of the law under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 42.
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7.

See "Canada Country Report", Commission for Environmental Cooperation, supra. note

AchieWig cornpliance requires that the standards be readiiy understood, measurable and
achie~able."~ Uncertainty can hamper voluntary efforts to cornply and effective
surveillance and e n f ~ r c e r n e n t .Standards
~~
of conduct therefore should be drafied in

language that is clear to both the operator and inspecter, including where appropriate,
methods for calculation of the concentration and loading of effluent and the timing and
location of effluent monitoring.

The standard setting process should include review processes which ensure that standards
and requirernents
feasible.

are scientifically defensible and technologically and economically

This is important for both the regulator and the reguiated sector. For example,

standards which require complex calculations on concentrations or loading may be

inappropriate for enforcement agencies with limited technicd or scientific capacity
including lirnited laboratory expertise.210Similady, where self-monitoring and reporting is
208

For example, in one case a penalty was set aside by the United States Federal Court when
they held the standard to be ambiguous and confusing. R o l h EnvironmentaI Services OV.1).
Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2nd 649 (D.C.Cir., 1991) as cited in S.F. Fulton and E.J. Gilberg, supra.
note 183 at p. 255.
209

S. F. Fulton, ibid at p. 254; J. E. Calfee and R. Crasweil, "Some Effects of Uncertainty or
Cornpliance with Legal Standards", (1984) 70 Virg. L. R 965.
210

As J. Mayda, supra, note 140 at p. 1019 points out,

"Pif standards are set that monitoring

requires overly complicated and costly equipment, they and their parent law will not be
implemented. Technically complicated statutes, may in fact be a ploy to avoid effective
environment regulation; there c m be Little doubt that this tactic has been used in sorne cases.
More fi-equently, however, complex laws represent an infatuation with technical gadgetry

required, the regulated sector must have the capacity to institute the controls and to perform
the monitoring tasks.

Consideration should also be &en to the relative compiexity of the standard.2'' This is
important both in achieving the prescrïbed objective and in detemiining compliance. For
example, enforcement of a general prohibition generally requires complex procedures
including costly laboratory analysis and use of experts to prove deposit, causation and harm.
This requires a high level of expertise and training in an inspectorate to cootdinate the

action and access to scientific, technical and legal experts. Consequently, where the capacity
and resources are not yet sufficient to mount highly technical enforcement actions,

governments may be wise to avoid prernising their enforcement strategy on legal

mechanisms which aigger a significant burden of technical proof by the governrnent.

*'*

In the altemative, where compliance is measured by adherence to operating or effluent
standards as conditions to a pemit, inspection and enforcement is more straight forward. It

rather than the more realistic principle that the simplest 'adequate' technique is probably the
best.
21 1

See L. F. Duncan, et a:, supra, notes 44 and 184. J.M. Tindemans, " Collaboration in
"Environmental Enforcement: Experiences with the Build-up of a Cwrdinated Enforcement
Structure", Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environmental
Enforcem, supra,note 4 at p. 2 15.
212

The Republic of Indonesia's Law no. 3 year 1982 regurding Management of the
Environment, for exarnple created offenses which required a burden of proof on the part of
the enforcement agency beyond its technicaI and resource capability. The govemment
consequentIy punued more practicable avenues for imposing standards which imposed a
lesser burden on the government to enforce, supra note 188. L. Duncan et al, ibid.

is similady m l e r for regulated sources to undertake self-monitoring and take precautions
to comply.

It has k e n the experïence of a number of enforcement agencies

that targeting single

pollutant medium (hazardous waste law or waste water standard) in inspection and
enforcement can resuit in increased enforcement and cornpliance costs and regdatory
confusion. As an alternative some agencies are adopting a multi - media approach to

standard setting and enf~rcernent.~"This integrated approach avoids the result of
transferring impacts fiom one medium (e.g. water) to another (e.g. land or air) through
regdation or control of a single medium (e.g. waste water effluent standards). It also
enables enforcernent agencies to adopt an integrated approach to enforcement and allows
regulated facilities to institute a more holistic environmental management system.

To enforce single medium laws, authorities naturally respond by developing a
system of single medium enforcement. Inevitably, this causes a situation where
those enforcing air pollution laws are at odds with those enforcing water pollution
laws. Cornpliance with air pollution standards, for example, might lead to reduced
air pollution emissions but increase effluent for water authorities to deal with. A
single medium approach also means that different agencies are inspecting the same
plant, requiring facilities to fil1 our forms and provide much of the s m e
information. This can cause confusion...added paper work, duplication of effort and
disregard for public authorities administrative complexity and incon~istenc~.~

'

213

UNEP provides a listing of 1 1 European nations who have instituted or propose to institute
an integrated permitting system. A number of jurisdictions are revising their laws and
procedures to implement this approach, supra note 22. For a review of these experiences see
supra, note 197.
41'

UNEP, ibid at p. 22.

ii)

INSTITUTIONAL
lNTEGRATION

To ensure enforceability of standards it will also be important to integrate standard setting

with other management and review processes. For example, recornmendations on standards
arising from an environmental assessrnent process should be integrated with pemiitting
processes to ensure that they are made legally enforceable as conditions to pennits or
binding agreements. In some cases it may be necessary to undergo institutional
reorganktion to facilitate this more integrated approach. An added benefit would be
economization of resources assigned to standard setting and enf~rcernent."~
iii)

CONSISTENT
STANDARDS

Effective enforcement requires consistent and compatible standards. Conflicting laws?
operating conditions or instructions or contradictory advice by inspectas or other Officials
c m al1 lead to failed enforcement

action^."^ It is therefore important that efforts be made to

implement and apply consistent, compatible standards.

Governments have utilized a number of mechanisms to improve interagency coordination.

One approach is to undertake rnulti jurisdiction consultation in standard setting (including
regdatory development and environmental screening and review processes) towards

215 G. Bendi, supro. note 45 in "Proceedings of the nird Internc~rionalConference on
Environmental Enforcernent and Cornpliance, supra, note 4.

This defence termed "oficially induced error" or "govemrnent induced error" has been
successful as a defence in Canadian courts. See J. Swaigen, supra, note 43 at p. 202-206.

216

harrnonized standards and processes.2'7 Another option is to uistitute a "one-window"

process for standard setting. Care should be taken however in attempting to consolidate
standards acrossjurisdictions to ensure that legislative obligations and constitutional powers

are king ob~erved.~'~

Improved consistency can also be furthered through technical assistance, training and

prescribed formats for permits, and administrative orden. In some instances processes
which require interagency consultation in standard setting may be legally required as a
means of avoiding later ~onflicts.~'~

It can be similarly problernatical if a conflict exists arnongst jurisdi~tions.~~
In çome
- -

-

--

-
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For example Canadian national, provincial and temtorial oficials have initiated processes
through the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) for the
harmonization environmental policy, pollution control standards and assessrnent review
processes, supra, note 103. In 1990 the Netherlands implemented a model for collaboration
among the provinces, rnunicipalities, and water boards, police, public prosecutions and
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Transport and Agriculture which indudes annual joint
programming, and the adoption of an integrated rnulti media approach. J. Peters, "The
Relationship between Centrai Governent and Provinciail Municipal Authorities with regard
to Enforcement", Proceedings of the Third hternationd Conference on Environmental
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 272.
21 8

Frienu5 of the OId M m River, supra, note 28.

219

For example, section 54 of the CEPA requires the Canadian Minister of Environment to
gain the concurrence of the Minister responsible for the administration of the federal works,
undertaking or lands intended to be regulated prior to imposing any standards for pollution
control or waste management afFecting those areas. Supra note 1 14.

no A prime example is the issuance by provincial agencies of licenses to pollute water
courses regardless of the paramount fderal law which prohibits the deposit of deletenous
substances into any waters fiequented by fish. Canadian Fisheries Act, supra. note 103.

couneies the national govemment is granted a power of pararnountcy or oversight which

can be exercised to ensure c o n ~ i s t e n c ~As
. ~ ~discussed
'
previously, to avoid regdatory
confusion and politically sensitive intervention by national governments, some
goverrunents have instituted processes for harmonization of standards uicluding
equivalency, harmonization, or minimum national

To be enforceable a standard m u t have a clearly prescribed deadline. Cornpliance deadlines

c m be imposed in the regulation, or on a site specific basis through pemits or by way of
compliance agreement. Where allowances are made for phasing in of new standards, target
dates should be specified for each stage of any necesçary upgrade or retrofit to provide
clear, binding rneasures of compliance .=This will be critical for rnaintaining credibility in
the regdatory process. It will also provide concise targets for monitoring and surveillance
and potential enforcement action.

It is afso important in setting timelines for achieving compliance to consider the tirne
necessary for regulated parties to comply and for officials to be able to effectively enforce.

='

For example as previously discussed, the USEPA holds a power o f oversight which
enables this national agency to both prescribe minimum standards for states and to intervene
where they fail to abide by these standards. In Canada, where powen overlap, for exampie for
the regulation of impacts to inland fsheries and waters, the federal law has paramountcy. See
Lucas, supra, note 5 1,

"See also J.A. Peten, supra, note 206.
See for example, Canadian Pu& and Paper Regulrfim, supra, note 20 1 ; S.F. Fulton.
supra, note 183 at p. 258.

Industry may need to acquire new technology and upgrade operating skills. Government

may require special skiils and equipment to inspect and enforce. In other instances there
may be legislated pmquisites to the +rtandardsening process."

[n addition to

considering compliance tirnelines it is also important that regulations should

be updated by amendments as new technologies are developed, to better reference standard
testing methods for lab analysis. This will take account of newly understood or discovered

environmental and health risks. In effect rather than implementing outdated regulations it is
more important to update the regulations.

A nurnber of alternative planning rnechanisms can be used for timing standard setting and

enforcement. Any planning ma& for standard settuig for example should also incorporate
timing of staffmg, training with phasing of compliance deadlines.-'

Sorne jurisdictions

establish tirnelines for standard setting on the b a i s of risk exposure or public ~oncern."~
Care should be taken in establishing unrealistic expectations through overzealous regdatory
or licensing activity unless similar attention c m be devoted to enfor~ernent.~'

224

For example, the Indonesian Regulation for water pollution control requires classification
of receiving water quality prior to the imposition of source specific waste water effluent
standards. See L.F. Cuncan et aI, supra, note 44.

"'See L.F. Duncan and P. Moestadji, supra, note 194 which provides a mode1 critical path.
226

For example the CEPA Pnority Substances List provided for in CEPA, supra. note 114; R.
van Heuvelen et al, supra, note 4.

227

See 1991 Report of the Audilor General of Cmada to the House of Commons. ch. 13,
supra note 187. The Netherlands allocated extra h d s in 1989 and 1990 to eliminate the
backlog in proper standard setting. J.A. Peters, "The Relationship between Central
Governrnent and ProvinciaVMunicipalAuthorities with Regard to Enforcement", Proceedings

The process of standard setting c m also be critical to compliance. Consultation with

regulated industry, technical and scientSc experts and environmental lawyers can ensure
that standards are technicaiiy and scientificdy defensible, economically feasible and legally
enforceable. Consultation with special interest groups and affkcted comrnunities can build
public awareness, involvement and comrnitment to the standards particularly where the

input is given serious consideration. A broad array of rights to participate have been granted

to facilitate public involvement including right to consultation in regdation making, and
permit review, opportunity to trigger standard reviews and dispute resolution processes.*8

There is little dispute that the most cost efficient route to compliance is voiuntary action.
With this in mind many jurisdictions have incorporated into their compliance strategies

mechanisms to promote cornpliance including information and education programs, self
audits, incentives and rewards for voluntary cornpliance and publicking voluntary efforts

and enforcement action (to encourage detenence). More recently, partnerships have been
forged between government and indu-

and in some instances non-governrnental

of the Thid Intemiionai Conference on Environmentai Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 269.
228

See for example Canadian Environmental Protection Act, supra. note 1 14, Yukon
Environment Act, supra. note 179, Alberta Errvironrnental Protection and Enhancernent Act,
supra, note t 88.

organizations to h d ~ programs
e
which foster investment in environmental protection
which have as their objective exceeding ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~

As with other components of the strategy, promotion of voluntary compliance should be
considered at the earliest stages of regdatory action. References to promotion programs
should be included in any policy or strategy document. In some instances it may be
necessary to include special powers in enabling statutes, for example the power to expend
resources on promotional programs or to institute h c i a l charges or in~mtives?~

It has been argued that there is a direct correlation between the record of compliance and the
level of understanding or awareness about the law2)' It is therefore important that any

infornation strategy target al1 aEected parties, including regulated industry, governrnent
(including enforcement Officials,senior mangers, and govemment facility operaton) and the

229

See for example B. Smart, supra note 15.
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For example, the Indonesian Environmentai Mmagement Act, supra, note 20 1 , Sections 810, imposes an obligation on the govemment to promote efforts to " sustain the capability of
the living environment to support continu& development", as well as to " cultivate and
develop the public's awareness of its responsibility in the management of the living
environment by means of information, guidance, education and research..."and the power to
regulate environmental taxes and retribution.
231
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B. Seigal, supra, note 104; D. Saxe, supra, note 7.

The Netherlands follows a triple-tracked strategy including infoming and motivating
enforcement oficials, motivathg administraton and informing companies. Recognition is

RecogniPng this need, many countries have instituted special programs within their
enforcement agencies mandated to promote c o r n p h c e through the introduction of speciai
incentive programs and the dissemination of information on the consequences of
n o n ~ o m ~ l i a n c eUseful
. ~ ~ ~ communication channels to industry and public have included
advance notice through regdatory c o d t a t i o n processes, information packages on new
laws, wide distribution of enforcement and compliance policies and use of existing
communication packages such as business or trade periodicals.234

From a strictly pragmatic perspective, it may be necessary to target resources to assisting
smailer businesses leaving large corporations with their normal coterie of in-house tecbnicd

also given to the need to inform legislators and judiciary. LM. Van Ekeren and M. Van De
Voet, "Information Campaigns Benefit Enforcement of Environmental Laws", Vol. 1.
Proceedings of international Conference on Environmental Law, supra. note 4 at p. 287.
233

For example in 1994 the United States Environmental Protection Agency created the
Office of Compliance specifically rnandated to promote voluntary compliance. (Interview
with USEPA April, 1995). In 1995 the Canadian Office of Enforcement, Environment
Canada was reorganized to create a separate office of Compliance Promotion. (Interview
with Dale Kirnmett, Director, Ofice of Enforcement and Compliance, June 1995).
234

For example, simultaneous to tabIing its Canadian Environmental Protection Act in
Parliament, Environment Canada also tabled an Enforcement and Compliance Policy
which incorporated voluntary compliance initiatives; United States President Bi 11 Clinton
in March 1995 launched a regulatory reform policy "Reinventing Environmental
Regdation" which included a 180 day enforcement grace period for small businesses and
reduced penalties for al1 those companies who voluntarily disclosed and corrected
violations as well as the establishment of a Small Business Cornpliance Assistance Centers.
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore in, "Cornmon Sense Compliance Policy"
in, the Press statement," Reinventing Environmental Regulations", March 16, 1995;
"Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for small Businesses", United States
Environmental Protection Agency, June 1995; USEPA "Fact Sheet on Compliance
Assistance Centers".

and legal experts to track regdatory and policy reforms. When those king regdated are
neither governments nor large corporations, the design of compüance and enforcement
measures developed by the govemment should be based on the premise that most lack
knowledge of their legal obligations and therefore will likely assign a low priority to
environmental compliance. Non-cornpliance should be assumed to be the nom. in iïght of
this assumption, when the cost of compliance is low and complex knowledge is not

required, regdators can lirnit promotion activities to wide dissemination of information
about the laws. However, when the cost of compliance is high and effective design requires
speciai expertise, then considerable invesûnent in educating regdatees and changing their
assumptions and priorities, is likely to be required?'

Some agencies have implemented programs dedicated to transmitting information about
technologies, training opportunities and technical assistance for pollution prevention."6
Among the more unique approaches for assisting small businesses is a mentoring program

in which companies with good compliance records serve as mentors for those in need of
technical a~sistance.~'

"'E. Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 208. Recognizing the special needs of small and medium
businesses (SMBs) the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in August 1996
established a fùnd to support the transfer of information on clean technologies to these
entities, the first phase concentrating on Mexico.
z6The USEPA issues an annual Refeeece Guides to Pollution Prevention Resomes and a
newsletter Pollution Prevention News. They have also cosponsored with Mexico and more
recently with Canada and the CEC, voluntary compliance information seminars targeted to
the US-Mexico border area industries (maquiladoras).
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Programme instituted by the USEPA Office of Compliance which also includes the
provision of gants to those States willing to institute a mentor program. (Interviews with
EPA Office of Compliance, August 1995).

Educating and motivating governent can be an even greater challenge. Yet inconsistent
enforcernent respooses for govemment violators can impact on the credibility of
enforcement actions against pnvate operaton who may validly cornplain about a double

standard.u8 As a preventative meanire some countries have enacted special laws or
adopted policies for ensuring consistency in response to public aad private r e g u l a t e e ~ . ~ ~

Effective means of promoting compliance by public facilitates have included briefings for
politicians and senior managers, information to public senrice unions (operaton may be
liable) and where necessary, special briefings on govemment compliance duties and
coilaboration between enforcement officiais and other departments in training."0

Infornation on technical cornpliance alternatives cm be facilitated through programs for
technology transfer. Care should be taken however to ensure clear separation between

United States has enacted the F e d d Faciiities Compliance Act of 1992,
Public Law 102-386 and Sovereignty WaNer 42 U.S.C. f 6961; Environment Canada oficials
have suggested that the Govemment of Canada has a moral obligation to show leadership in
environmental compliance. See Paul Cuillerier, "Enforcement of Canadian Laws of
Environmental Protection as App lied to Federal Faci lities"; Proceedings of the international
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 448. Towards this objective
Environment Canada in 1984 issued a separate Enforcement and Compliance Policy
D o m e n t for Government Operated Faciliries for the CEPA.
239 For example, the

AS an illustration of ingenuity in effectively comrnunicating the implications of
govemment noncornpliance with regulatory statutes (including environmental), a serninar
series sponsored by the Canadian Department of Justice on Crown liability for enforcement
reportedly had an appreciabie impact on raising the consciousness of the implications of
failing to enforce the law or to ensure compliance. (Interview with Lyle Fairbaim, Justice
Canada, June 1994).
240

information roles and enforcement responsibilities in addressing technologicai issues. Some
agencies have adopted more indirect cbannels to offer technid advice through indirect

means including hanciai support to private technical j o d s , training sessions and trade
shows.241Othe15 continue to prefer to limit official technical advice to conditions to officiai
directives.

Among the more effective tools for facilitating voluntary compliance is the use of self
audits for assessing compliance .242 Use of this form of audit is generally encouraged for

both private and govemment facilities and can be usefbi for identiwg compliance
problems, weaknesses in management systems and areas of significant ri~k."~In the case of
public facilities, identification of problems prior to an inspectors visit can dso help avoid
embarrassment Audits are also useful indicaton of potential liability and a measure of due

"'

One example of an indirect support to technological innovation is the substantial financial
support provided by the Canadian govemment to the annual clean technology transfer
conferences, the first called Globe 90.
For example. the Repvblic of Mexico's Environmental En forcement Agency
(PROFEPA) bases its enforcement and compliance strategy almost exclusively on a
program of comprehensive environmental audits which entail an official program for
certification of independent auditors, oficial approval of the audit program and some
degree of deferral of enforcement action pending cornpletion of the audit. Presentation by
Jose Luis Calderone, Subprocuradoria, ccEnvironmentalAudit Program, Seminar on
Voluntary Cornpliance and PoIlution Prevention", Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, June, 1995;
CEC, supra,note 9.
242

243

CEPA Enforcement and CompIiance Policy, supra, note 15 at p. 29.

diligence?

To promote the use of self-audits some jurisdictions have adopted audit

privilege policies which provide specified waivers or variances to enforcement action as

incentives for disclosure and correction of violations.245While there appears to be a fair
degree of consensus on the value of these self audits as incentive measures, considerable

difference of opinion remah on the degree to which self audits shodd replace or defer
enforcement action.246

4

TARGET~NG
DETERRENCE

Some jurisdictions also find value in a more direct approach to promoting compliance

244

Canadian case law now defines due diligence as including activities undertaken by a
regulated party to cornply with legal standards as well as recognized standards of practice
inclusive of efforts to train and educate employees and corporate directors, conduct of audits,
preparation and communication of compliance plans etc. See Bata, supra, note 29. For a
review of the American approach see C. Wassennan, Proceedings of Intemafional
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 77.

245

246

See for example the CEPA Enforcement and Compliance Policy, supra. note 15.

For example, in the United States the debate remains heated among regulatory
authorities over the subject of immunities. In June 1995 the USEPA issued an interirn
Nafional Policy on Environmental Azuiif Privilege with the express intent of countering the
effects of state level legislation which extended broad irnrnunity protection fiom civil and
criminal prosecution to companies who completed self audits. The EPA Policy offered
more limited immunities in the form of elimination or reduction in civil penalties,
limitations in criminal action referrals and more limited disclosure protection. See
"Voluntary Environmental Self-policing and Self-disclosure Interim Policy Statement".
Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 63, Monday April3, 1995, 16875. The U.S.government has
asserted its oversight power by launching legal actions against those state governments
refusing to follow the federal policy (conversation with International Enforcement Office,
USEPA, June 1996). See also E.S. Schaeffer, "Encouraging Voluntary Compliance
without Compromising Enforcement: EPA's 1995 Auditing Policy", Proceedings of the
F w t h International CoNerence on Environmental Cornpliance and Enforcement, supra,
note 4 at p. 45 1.

through targeted, high profile criminal prosecutions.247 It has k e n suggested that
enforcement responses, in pdcular prosecution, have "a statistically significant impact on

the behaviour of corporations".248 The level of deterrence is reportedly increased where
corporate directors and officers may be found (and have been found) perso~liy~ i a b l e . ~ ~ ~
Further, empirical studies indicate that corporate directon and officers premise their
compliance expenditures on the likelihood of enforcement action both against their
corporations and themselves

250

Whether or not deterrence plays a significant role

reportedly depends as much on the perceived possibility of apprehension as the liability and
severity of sanction or penalty.25*

Other jurisdictions attempt to foster voluntq compliance by wideiy publicking significant
or repeat offenders a s well as significant voiuntary compliance

effort^:'^'

247

The USEPA, consistent with its view that the publicity associated with successful criminal
prosecution of serious violations has a more significant deterrent effect than generally higher
penalties gained through administrative proceedings. in 1981 created a separate centralized
Office of Criminal Investigations. See C. G. Wills and D. C. Gripe, "US Experience and
Differences Between Civit and Criminal Investigations and Use of Centrai Elite Force to
Supplement Local Inspections", Vol. 1, Proceedings International Conference on
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 329; Lee Paddock, "Developing EfFective
Enforcement Programs at the State Lever, ibid, at p. 382.
248

D.Saxe supra note 7 at p. 46.

Results of an empirical study of corporate directors and officers indicates that both threat
and actual prosecution of those parties has a significant effect on their decision to initiate
voluntary action to comply with environmental laws. D. Saxe, supra. note 7 at p. 45-54.

249

250

Ibid.

251

B. Seigal, supra, note 104.

252

For exarnple the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Park; and Lands issues
annual reports of compliance with its environmental laws. The Indonesian Minister of
Environment reguiarly issues public statements to the media including the narnes of violators.

If deterrence is an important element of program strategy, the information cornmunicated
can include not only educatiod material but also reports of enforcement activities. This
helps create an " enforcement presence" and an atmosphere of deterrence. This atmosphere

wili help provide an incentive for sources to seek assistance and comply?"

INCENTIVE'
AND ~ W A R D S

d)

Strategic use of incentives and rewards c m aiso facilitate cornpliance. As discussed
previously in the section on Cornpliance Strategy. in deciding to use market-based
approaches consideration must be given to the close interrelationslip with cornmandcontrol mechanisrns. This necessitates at a minimum close consultation among officiais
delivering the respective programs and in some instances involvement by enforcement
Officials in surveillance and

enforcement of market rneasures.'"

Examples of the factoring of cornpliance in the application of market rneasures include
proportionai discounthg of ecological fees (charges for use of resources) where efforts are
made to use more enWonmentally benign technologies ("ecological inve~tments)~~',

253

C.Wassennan, supra, note 175 at p. 73.

254

G. Bendi, supra. note 45 at p. 117: See also D.R. Stewart et al, supra, note 70.

255

2. Kamieiiski: "Process of Upgrading the Polish Environmental Enforcement Procedures".
supra, note 45 at p. 56.

reduction in fines for timely ecological in~eshnents~~",
relaxation in waste deposition fees
for good compliance records 257 and offsets, that is, approvds for new facilities (pollution
sources) prernised on pollution control improvements at existing facilitie~."~ Other
compliance rewards have included reduced self monitoring requirements or reduced
govemment surveillance of facilities with a good compliance record and as previously
mentioned, specified periods of amnesty nom enforcement action where violations are selfidentified, disclosed and ~orrected.~*~.
In yet other instances, companies with good
compliance records are given the freedom nom the technological specifications of existing
regdatory systems to explore alternative environmental management systems which
provide superior environmental performance.260

256 Ibid
257

K. Velek, supra. note t 62 at p. 5 17.

C. Wasserman, supra. note 4. Vol. 1. Proceedings of the International Conference on
EnvironmentalEnforcement at p. 76; L.F. Duncan, supra, note 25 at p. 292-294.
259

ln June 1994, the USEPA Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) introduced
providing similar kinds of incentives to select industries who are considered environmental
leaders according to prescribed criteria, including a good compliance record and in place
environmental management and audit systems. The intent of the program is to encourage
innovative audit and compliance programs and to reduce the risk of non compliance
through pollution prevention. The incentives are prescribed in Memoranda of
Understanding with the Agency. As an added incentive the selected companies benefit
fiom public recognition of their participation. Federal RegisferNol. 60 No. 63/Monday,
April 3, 1995Motices "Voluntary Environmental Self-Policy and Self Disclosure Interirn
Policy Statement" and "Notice and Press Release" April7,1995 announcing the selected
participants (EPA).
160

See for example the description of the USEPA Project XL in Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, supra. note 7.

As previously stated, voluntary compliance efforts are directiy related to the risk of

dete~tion.~~'
In addition, if the objectives of an environmental regulatory and cornpliance
prograrn include reduced environmental risk and prevention of damage or harm then any
effective program must incorporate mechanisms to enable tirnely detection of incidents or
vi~lations?~ Without an effective strategy for monitoring compliance enforcement
decisions will be reliant on conjecture and credibility may slide when targets are not met.
Cornpliance monitoring ensures that those who fail or refuse to comply receive no unfair
competitive advantage (profit fiom pollution) over those who make the effort to comply.263

Failure to inspect or to determine compliance by some other means may dso trigger
liability. In some jurisdictions the act of legislating standards triggers an accompanying
duty to i n ~ ~ e c t . ~ ~

26 1

B. Seigal, supra. note 104 at p. 10.

362

This is, of course, premised on the presumption that standards are set at a level of accepted
risk. Embarrassment, for exarnple, experienced by the Canadian Fisheries Departrnent in loss
of one million salmon due to faulty monitoring equipment has dealt a major blow to the
credibility of their conservation and regulatory program. Toronto Globe and Mail September
16, 1994. Numerous other examples of failure to implement effective targeted inspection
programs as a factor in poor compliance results are docurnented in Seigal, supra, note 104:
See also Report of fiperts Group on Environmental Law,supra, note 34, which recommend
that States "establish systems for the collection and dissemination of data and requires
observative of natural resources and the environment in order to permit adequate planning of
the use natural resources and environment, to permit early detection of interferences with that
resource and the environment and ensure tirnely intervention, and to facilitate the evaluation
of conservation policy and rnethods" (at p. 26).
363

L.F. Duncan, supra, note 25 at p. 295.

264

Supra, note 27.

Options for deteaion include self monitoring or seif audit, govemment inspection,
investigation and surveillance and cornmunity watch. In designing a monitoring program
consideration must be given to the viability of the options (including relative technical and

financial capabilities) and distribution of c ~ s t s . * ~ '

Most jurisdictions have at least partiaily instituted a pduter pay mode1 through obligations
on regulated industry to rnonitor, record and report?" Self monitoring can have a dual
effect of facilitating voluntary cornpliance through self audit and consequent reduction of
govemment expenditures through minimized surveillance and enforcement. Self-audits can
also provide an effective rneasure of due diligence.267Where self-monitoring is utilized the
law, should aiso specify obligations including points and fkquency of monitoring and the
requirements for record keeping and reporting. As previously discussed, many jurisdictions
have aiso introduced policies and programs to encourage the practice of self-audits.
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UNEP,supra note 32.

266

For example Canada, USA, Norway, England, Poland. For a review of the Nonvegian
system of self-monitoring see Gro Rodland, supru, note 14 1 at p. 320.
267

See Bat4 supra, note 29.

Regardless of the wilhgness of companies to conduct self-monitoring and self-audits,
government involvement will remain necessary but may be reduced. Review of monitoring
reports, follow up inspections or compliance audits 268 to verify compliance or reliability of

the self reports and investigations in response to reports, incidents (e.g. ernergencies) or
cornplaints are d l necessary and unavoidable components of a compliance program.

Govemment programs can, however, be made more efficient and effective through adoption
of certain basic tools. These include development and maintenance of a compliance data
base, preparation and delivery of an inspection plan, issuance of an inspections and

investigations protocols and targeted technical and legal training.

Among the more useful tools for targeting enforcement action is a cornpliance data base?9
It generally contains information about regulated facilities, compliance profiles on owners
and operators drawn fiom inspection and investigation reports and any enforcement actions
It c m be differentiated
(wamings, directives, orders) and records cornpliance re~~onses."~
frorn other information bases in that it is directly tied to actions of individual parties and is
Norway supplements inspections and self reporthg with audits to determine the reason for
non-compliance including more detailed infornation about management and control systems.
This information helps to direct effective sanctions or orders. See Gro Rodland supra, note
141 at p. 321,

268

269

B. Seigal, supra, note 104 at p. 15; UNEP, supra,note 32 at p. 4 1.

Some jurisdictions refer to this as a management information system. A compliance data
base is often a part of a iarger information management system.

270

generally treated as confidentid data. The data base enables officiais to target inspections
and to ensure consistent and appropriate responses. A compliance data base is equaily

useful as a reference for incentive/ reward programs 271 and for assessing staffing needs to
rneet legal obligations.2R

A second important tool is an inspection plan, generally considered the "backbone of most

enforcement programs"?73 An inspection plan helps to focus enforcement activities by
providing a frame of reference for inspections instead of reliance on ad hoc responses not
triggered by objective, fair and consistent cnteria. A plan helps focus inspections on
regdatory requirements and compliance records. To reduce inspection costs many agencies
attempt to target inspections by focusing inspections on known or consistent violators, new
facilities and untested technologies, and in other cases on facilities posing the greatest
environmental riskO2"

Planning for inspections involves more than making a lists of sites to visit. It requires
for special training needs, acquisition of special equipment and

advance pl&g

-

27 1

For exarnple the North American Working Group on Environmental Enforcernent and
Cornpliance is exploring the potential for inter agency exchange o f cornpliance data to
determine qualifications for incentive or voluntary programs.
272

E. J. Swanson et al., The Price of Pollution: Erwironrnental Litigation in Canada
(Edmonton: Environment Law Centre, 1990).
273

C. Wasserman, Vol. 1, Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental

Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 79.
274

ïbid at p. 83-86; C. G. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 325.

development of laboratory protocols.27s It also involves coordination with technicd
experts, prosecutors and in some instances other enforcement z~~encies.~"

An inspection plan can bring major cost savings by integrating inspections. With advance
planning inspections c m be coordinated to cover multi media - air, waste, water Stream.
Cost savings across agencies and government levels c m be achieved through consolidated
inspection plans and sharing of inspection reports and data bases.277

A third, equally valuable tooi is an inspections manual which prescribes a consistent

methodology for the conduct of inspections including right of entry. search, seinue,
statements and enforcement responses. The manuai should clearly differentiate between
inspections and investigations and the respective powers and actions. Associated with this
procedural manual is an investigations protocol which clarifies roles of involved parties
(e.g., inspecter, prosecutor, manager, politician). It may also be important to include a basic

training programme in legal awareness for personnel such as scientists, lab employees and
other officiais who adrninister the programme but are not "enforcers" as such. This will
Uicrease awareness of the importance of enforcement and also rnay help avoid "officially
induced emor" problems.

275
276

C. G . Wills, ibid at p. 335.

For example, in some juridictions police assistance rnay be necessary for issuing

warrants, taking statements or gaining entry to facitities controolled by uncwperative owners.

"'R. van Heuvelen, supra, note 67 at p. 168.

While the process of inspection and investigation can be prohibitive, many jurisdictions
have instihrted emission or product charges, resources user fees, taxes and penalties to help
d e h y costs.

278

Some jinisdictions have h m c e d their inspection programs by assessrnent

of fees based on the class of polluting acti~ity.~'~

It will be important to differentiate between the fïnancing of inspections and investigations.
Greater public sensitivity generaily &ses nom any attempts to finance investigations
through penalty assessments although some jurisdictions empower the courts to consider
investigation costs in assessing penalties.

A useful parallel tool for instilling consistency in enforcement response is an investigations

protocol.280Protocols cm prove helpfd within an environmental agency to clan@ the
respective roles of field inspectors, regional program managers, senior po licy officials and
politicians. It can also provide a b d e r against extemal attempts to influence enforcement
action through contact with senior officials or politicians. A formaliy endorsed protocol can
serve as a valuable reference point for erforcement officials trying to keep enforcement on a
278

In France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and Poland fees are calculated to cover
inspection costs. See UNEP, supra, note 32 at p. 42.

279 See for example the fee structure irnposed by Norway in Gro Rodland, supra, note 14 1
at p. 320.
*'O 1991 Reporr of the AAudir General of Canada to the H o m of
supra note 187 at p. 270 -27 1,

Gommons. Chciper I I .

As discussed previously, resourcing for effective enforcement includes providing adequate

budgets to hire and train qualified staff. Protocols and procedural manuals are only a
supplement to an adequate complement of experienced and adequately resourced and
rnandated ~ b f f ?Failure
~'
to recognize these basics can seriously undennine the credibility
and effectiveness of any enforcement regirne.282

While most jurisdictions recognize the significant contribution made by the public in
reporting suspected violations, a limited few have actually revised their laws and programs
to facilitate this r01e.~" Some nations have encouraged public involvernent by enacting

legal rights to notice of incidents or spills and permit applications, and the right to report
and compel investigation of pollution ~orn~laints.'"In other instances the public watch dog

281 C.

Wassenan, supra,note 4 at p. 13 1.

282

fiid; L. Mastarova, supra. note 45 at p. 99. A September 2, 1994 Canadian Department of
Fisheries and Oceans memo also corroborates this view," [Clrackhg down on the flagrant,
wholesale poaching by ail user gmups was next to impossible for the enforcement oficers in
the Vancouver Island District. Since 1989, staff had been cut fiom eleven to four. Local
tishery officers are extremely fnstrated and demoralized with their inability to work
effectively due to severe rnanpower shortages." Toronto Globe & Mail, October 8, 1994.
283

For exarnple, in Poland citizen involvernent reportedly plays a key role in monitoring
environmental cornpliance despite the lack of official recognition or facilitation of their
involvement. J. Jendroska, supra, note 107, at p. 354 in International Conference on
EnvirontlfentaI Enforcement, supra, note 4.
2"

CEPA supra, note 114. ss. 108, 109; For a review of citizen rights in Canada see S. Elgie,

role is encouraged by providing access to monitoring data

285

and by communicating

reporthg charnels to the

ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSES
AND SANCTIONS

6.

Strict standards aione will not ensure pollution control. They must be enforced. There is
wide support for the view that one of the more effective means to foster voluntary
compliance is timely, effective and strategic enforce~nent.~~'
This requires attention to the

-

-

- -.

"Environmental Groups and The Courts: 1970- 1992" Environmental Law and Business in
Canada ed. G . Thompson, M. McConnell and L. Huestis (Aurora: Canada Law Book 1993);
For a review of citizen rights and their contribution to monitoring in USA see R. van
HeuveIen and L.K. Bregger "Citizen Participation in US. Environmental Enforcement",
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 574. and Paul
Keough and N. Willard "Use of Public Disclosure in Environrnental Protection Prograrns to
Enhance Cornpliance and Change Behaviour in the United States" id. p. 61 1 . See also L.F.
Duncan, supra, note 168.
285

S. Elgie, supra. note 284. For a review of the public watch dog role in the United States;
see E. Roberts and J. Dobbins "The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement", Op.
Cit, at p. 534, 550. For the Netherlands see R. Hallo, "Citizens Role in Enforcement: A Spur,
A Supplemenq and a Substitute", International Conference on Envimnmental L m , supra.
note 4 at p. 562 to 565. For Flanders, Belgium, see Rik de Baere, "Free Access to information
and the Licensing Procedures for Industnal Plants: the Flemish and Belgian Situation" Op.
Cit. at p. 605.
286

In the USA increased public awareness has resulted in greater willingness by the public to
provide "tips" concemirig environmental crimes. C. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 329.
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As stated by the European Council in a 1990 Bulletin of European Cornmunifies,
"Community Environmental Legislation Will Only Be Effective if it is Fully Implemented
and Enforced by Member States"; cited by Richard MacRory, in "Membership in the
European Economic Community: M a t it Means for Environmental Requirernents and
Enforcement". Proceedings of Second International Conference on Environmentai
Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 171; As stated by the then Canadian Minister of
Environment, Tom McMillan "A good law, however, is not itself enough. It must be enforced
-ruthlessly if need be. Accordingly, the new EnvironmentaI Protection Act will be
accompanied by a plan to reverse the country's appalling record of enforcement and
compliance," supra, note 10; C . Wasserman has posited that serious sanctions are critical

previously described strategic actions, that is, a clearly prescribed enforcement mandate and
clarified roles, legaiiy binding standards, mechanisrns to detect violations, and measures to
promote compliance. ERkctive enforcement, however, also requires an adequate anay of
enforcement responses and sanctions and the requisite powers to use thern.

Enforcement requires advance planning to ensure that the necessary specialized measures
are implemented well before standards become law. These measures include an adequate
array of responses and sanctions, delegated powen to exercise the sanctions, an

enforcement and compliance policy (as previously discussed), an investigations protocol,

and an enforcement strategy.288

As previously discussed, enforcement can be made more effective and cost efficient through

development and observation of an enforcernent and compliance strategy. While the
adopted strategies Vary arnongst jurisdictions, a nurnber of strategic tools and approaches
have been proven to heighten effective action as the environmental enforcement programs
289

evolve.

One common strategy for more effective, coordinated response has been the use

since 70% of regulated parties premise their compliance activities on how govemment
responds to the 5% who violate, supra, note 261. Regarding the reactions of corporate
directors to enforcement actions against peers, see van HeuveIen, Supra, note 277. For a
review of Canadian experience, see D. Saxe, supra, note 7.
288

It may be necessary to establish separate strategies to meet particular geographic,
hansboundacy circumstances or peculiarities associated with each regulation or industrial
sector.
289

See Section B.2 "An Enforcement and Cornpliance Strategy". See also Review Panel on
Environmental Enforcement, An Action Pian for Environmental Enforcement in Alberta
(Edmonton: Govemment of Alberta, 1988), supra note 58; British Columbias.' Emtironment:
Planning for the Fume, the Eninaing Eflective Enforcement, (Victoria: B.C. Environment,

of interdepartmental team building for planning and conducting investigations and for
selecting

Other strategies have rnaximized environmental benefit through

geographic targeting, risk based or facility targeting and comprehensive, integrated and
multi-media enforcement action?g1 And, as previously discussed, the selective use of
sanctions, for exarnple criminal prosecution, can have a substantial detenent effect. An
important aspect of any enforcement strategy is the choice of sanctions and mechanisms for

ensuring fair, consistent use.

Considerable variances exist across jurisdictions and among agencies in the use of
enforcement responses including informai responses, negotiated settlements, and
administrative, criminal, civil and economic sanctions. The most effective @me

has been

found to be one which has at its disposai a diverse package of responses and sanctions
enabling officiais to select the response appropriate to the nature of the vioiation, character

Many Canadian environmental protection agencies have developed a team process with
technical expertise in their agencies and with prosecuton for more effective investigation and
case preparation. See F. Gordon, "Peranan Saks Ahli Dalam Penuntutan Perkara Linkgmgan"
in Penindakmr pelangguran Hukum Lingkungan, prosiding Lokakmya. Semarang, Su~ubaya,
Medan, [Jakarta:BAPEDAL dan EMDI Proyek, 1991 .] [unpublished]
290

29' See L. Peterson, " The Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy: Using Enforcement Resources
to Maximize Risk Reduction and Environmental Restoration in the Great Lakes Basin", Third
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 8 1- 196; R. van
Heuvelen, supra, note 3 1.

of the offender and any other special circumstan~es.~*Many environmentai agencies are
now authorized to issue wamings and tickets, a variety of directives and orders and can, in
cooperation with justice officials, initiate criminal, administrative or civil proceediigs and,

in limitecl instances, rnay refer cornpliance issues to a dispute resolution process.293It is also
a common practice to impose a hierarchical use of penalties.

The choice of sanction will depend on the end objective(s) which may be singular or multifaceted. Prosecution and sentencing play an important role in both general and specific
deterrence. Responses and sanctions c m be used to create an atmosphere of deterrence
(significant &es or incarceration), to prevent impacts (stop order or injmction), to mitigate

damage (clean up order), to remove economic benefits gained from noncornpliance or to
compensate ~ i c t i m sThe
. ~ ~availability
~
of sanctions can also be limited by past govemment

292 For a detailed discussion of sentencing criteria see J Z . Swaigen at al, Supro note 148. For
exarnples of the application of similar criteria by Canadian courts see R v. Bat@ supra, note
29 and R v. Northern MetaZIic Sales, suprs note 26. See also the Canadian Agriculthîre and
Agri-Food Administrative M o n e t q Penalties Act. SC. 1995, ch. 40 which introduces
sanctioning criteria based on a classification of offences.

293

While the introduction of increasingly stringent penalties, inchding incarceration and
mil lion dollar fines has attracted public attention, within the pollution control agencies
concems tend to focus more on expanding the anay of administrative and economic
sanctions, particularly as preventative measures. See for example minutes of the Proceedings
of the Canadian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environmental SustainabIe
Development, Order of Reference regarding the CEPA (Ottawa, 1994); Alberta
Envirollmental Protection and Enhancement Act, supra, note 188, s.22 1; E. Barr
recommends hierarchical use and rapid escalation of both penalties and incentives, supra,
note 34 at p. 212. See also CEPA Enforcement unà Cornpliunce Policy, supra note 15; Yukon
Environment Act, Enforcement and Cornpliance Policy, supra, note 58; Canada's Agriculture
and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, S C . 1995, ch. 40.
294

J. Swaigen, Supra, note 276; C . Wasserman, Supra note 129.

action (or inaction) providing yet another reason for closely reguiated ~ s ~ o n s e . ~ ~ ~

Any practice of prefacing strict enforcement action with informal, negotiated responses, for

example warnings or technicd advice, should also be carefully managed to avoid later
codicts. Many jurisdictions attempt to control discretion in the use of verbal warnings and
waivers on cornpliance through prescribed criteria for use and format of these
administrative r e ~ p o n s e s . ~ ~ ~

DELEGA
TIONOF SANCTIONING
POWERS

b)

Enforcement action necessitates the designation of special powers beyond those activities

For example, in some instances the courts have acquitted an accused on the grounds that
standards were excessive or unreasonable or where oficials have k e n found to have mislead
the accused by past failure to enforce or by providing inaccurate or misleading information
about the law ("oficial1y" or "governrnent induced error"). See R v. Byron Creek Collieries
Limifed (1979) 8 C.E.L.R.3 1; R v. Cancoil 13rermaI Corparafionand Parkinson. supra n.
132. See Swaigen supra, note 148 at p. 36-37 where he cites the decision of Stuart, J. in R. v.
United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. (1 98O), 1 0 CELR 43 (Y.T. Terr. Ct.), p. 47. "If the responsible
government agency is not pressing for cornpliance, or is actually encouraging noncornpliance ttuough tacit or explicit agreements to permit non-cornpliant operations, the
corporations cannot be severdy faulted." As a result of past problems caused by broad power
of discretion in Iicensing or by granting waivers to cornpliance, a Government of Alberta
appointed Review Panel on Environmental Law Enforcement recornrnended reform of law
and practice to remove the practice, supra. note 58. See also, E.J. Swanson et al, The Price of
Pollution: Environmental Litigafion in Canada (Edmonton: Environment Law Centre, 1990)
at p. 168-176.
295

American, Canadian and European agencies use a number of verbal and written warnings
or notices. See C. Wassernan, supra, note 173 at p. 96; CEPA Enforcement and Complimce
Policy, supra, note 15 at p. 45; L. Paddock, "Civil Field Citations" in Proceedings, Third
intemational Conference on Envri-onmentul Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 401; S.A.
Sutton-Mendoza. " Field Citations: A T w l for Enforcing UST Regdations in New Mexico ",
id, at p. 409; 1.8. Ramic and J.M. Engbert, " United States' Clean Air Act Field Citation
Program: New Enforcement Authority to Address Minor Violations ", id. at p. 42 1.
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generdy associated with cornpliance activities, for exarnple, permitting and inspection.

One ready measure of the extent of political and bureaucratie cornmitment to tirnely
enforcement is the degree to which officiais have k e n given, expressly or irnplicitly, by
legislation the necessary powers to conduct investigations, to commence legai proceedings
or to issue orders or directives.

However, as a balancing measure, govemments must also implement mechanisms to fetter

and direct enforcement action

"'and where necessary to allow for direct intervention. It has

been the experience of many environmental agencies that inconsistent and in some cases
illegai or unconstitutional responses are taken if officiais are granted blanket, dettered

d i s c r e t i ~ n It. ~may
~ ~ also become necessary for an agency to directly intervene, for example
where other govemments or agencies fail to abide by enforcement agreements or
protoco~s.299

297

For example, while as previously mentioned, Environment Canada has issued an
Enforcemens and Compiiunce Policy which prescribes the appropriate enforcement response,
field inspectors report to regional directors, not the centra1 Ofice of Enforcement and
Compliance. This has resulted in considerable variance among regions in the nature and
intensity of enforcement activity and response to violations. supra, note 13.

Canadian governrnents have amended environmental laws to prescribe procedures for
inspection, search and seizure to ensure activities do not violate the Cmiadirm Churter of
Righrs and Freedom, supra note 42.
29R

299

For exarnple, in the United States the power of oversight granted to the EPA enables the
agency to intervene to initiate enforcement action, where a state agency has been found
wanting in its enforcement efforts. This includes the power of the federal agency to " overfile " where a state initiated enforcernent action has resulted in a lesser penalty. [Interview
with E. Devaney, Director of Criminal Enforcement, USEPA, Washington, April 19961. See
also C. Wasserrnan, supra, note 173 at p. 1 12.

Some jurisdictions have supplemented their environmental inspectorate with a specially
trallied oftencentrally located investigative team who directly investigate or provide special
expertise in cornplex cases?00 In others, environmentai enforcernent duties are distributed
among national, provincial and municipal

of fi ci al^^^'

and in still others, tribai or First

Nation govemments.302In some cases the police retah authority for investigation of
environmental crimes 'O3 and in others the military police play a key role?

In d l 1 others,

300

For example the US EPA has established the Ofice of Criminal Enforcernent empIoying
specialized, full-time, criminal investigatorç whose work is supplemented through an MOU
with the FBI, In recognition of the need to develop specialized skills for environmental
prosecutions the U.S. Department of Justice established a separate Environmental Crimes
Section to assist regional prosecutors. The result has been a steady increase in nurnber of
criminal referrals and the amount of penalties imposed. Earl Devaney "The Evolution of
Environmental Crimes Enforcement at the United States Environmental Protection Agency",
Thkd international Conference on Emàonmental Law, supra. note 4 at p. 457. The U.S.
National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC) also provides specialized expertise,
support and training for the EPA for complex investigations. See C. G. WilIs et al, supra
note 247 at p. 332-336.
For example, in the Netherlands, extensive powen are vested in municipalities to enforce
environmental laws. Drs. P.H.Dordregter, "Environmental Enforcernent by Municipalities in
the Netherlands", Third Iniernaiionaf Conference on Environmeniai Law, supra, note 4 at p.
391.
'O'

302

The USEPA has delegated enforcement authority to some tribal governments.
(Interview with R. Hardacher, International office, USEPA, April 1995 and U.S.
Govemment Advisory Cornmittee to EPA Administration, Washington, March 1995). In
Canada, pursuant to constitutionally entrenched First National final agreements, powers to
enact environmental protection laws have been incorporated, although direct powers of
enforcement are limited. See for example, C h p a g n e and Aishihik First Nations F M
Agreement, May 1993 and The Champagne and Aishihik Firsr Nations Selj-Government
Agreement, May 29, 1993.
303

For example, the Republic of Indonesia, See L.F. Duncan et al, supra. note 44. For a
discussion on the roIe of the police in The Netherlands, see J. Van Dijk, "The Interest of
Cooperation between Police, Public Prosecutors and Governmental Authorities in the Field of
Environmental Enforcement", in Proceedings Third International Conference on
Emkonmenial-Enforcement,supra, note 4 at p. 175; R. Hessing, "The Task of the Police", id
at p. 571-575. For the United States, see E. Neafsey, "The Role of Local, County, and State
Police Oficers in New Jersey in Environmental Enforcement, id 561-570. On the rote of
Interpol, see S. Klem, "Environmental Crime and the Role of ICPO-Interpol", id at p. 335341. In Hungary, see Sandor Fulop, "The miblic Prosecutor Office of Hungaq and its

prosecutors have b e n granted authority to initiate investigations.'05

As a general mie the power to prosecute is the sole prerogative of the Attorney ~eneral?'~

ln some counîries, however, the judiciary has chosen to directly intervene in the process of
bringing polluters before the courts?07 in yet others, the power to commence proceedings

may be assigned directly to environmentai inspectors. 308

-

Development" id at p. 373-377. In Argentina, T h e Ecological Police", see Judge Daniel
Hugo Llermanos, supra note 36 at p. 249.
304

For example in Guyana set J.G. Singh, Chief of Staff, Guyana Defence Force
Headquarters, "The Enforcement Experience in Guyana on Exploitation of Natural
Resources", supra, note 4 at p. 205.

305

While in the majority of cases powers vested in the prosecutor are limited to detemining
whether charges will proceed to trial, in some countries they have retained a more hands-on
role in environmental investigations. For example, in the Netherlands prosecutors have the
power to initiate an investigation. (Interview with Ham Fangman, and Gustaaf Biezeveld,
Departrnent of The Attorney General, Govemment of the Netherlands, Aprii 1991, The
Hague). In Hungary, it has been proposed that the power to investigate environmental
offenses be delegated to the Public Prosecutor Office due to complexity of the legal issues
and the need for special expertise. See, Sandor Fulop, supra, note 303 in Proceedings,
InternationaI Conference on Environmental Law. supra, note 4.
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For example, Canada, USA, Netherlands. For a discussion of the role of the Office of
Public Prosecutions in environmental enforcement, see G. Van Zeben, "Enforcement of
Environmental Legislation under Criminal Law by the Public Prosecutions Departrnent of the
Netherlands", in Proceedings Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement,
supra, note 4 at 45 1-456.
307

In Argentina, Judge D.H. Llermanos, hstrated by the lack of initiative of the governrnent,
acted ex-oficio in bringing a series of environmental cases before him arguing an ovemding
duty pursuant to the Constitution and the Penal Code to protect the public health. See Daniel
Hugo Llermanos, supra, note 36 at p. 247-25 1 and personal interview, April 1994 in Oaxaca,
Mexico).
308

Conversation with Jalaluddin Ismail, Director, Malacca & Sembilan Departrnent of
Environment, Oaxaca, April 1994.

Many countries empower environmental inspectors, senior managers (e.g ., Director of
Pollution control3? or elected officiais (including Ministers responsible for environment,
health, industry) to take administrative action to enforce the Iaw. Powen to sanction
environmental offenders through administrative action are generally prescribed in
environmentai laws. T h s e powers are generally assigned to inspecton to be exercised in

the course of their cornpliance activities with more heavy handed responses ( temporary

dosure or shutdown orders) reserved to mhisters.

''O

In some countnes administrative

penalties are issued by special courts established within the bureaucracy .31 1 It is important
that powers be delegated not ody to sanction pouuters afler the fact but also to effect
preventative action."

309

The Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act supra, note 188 at s. 1988
empowers a designated Director of Pollution Controi to issue orders to suspend approvals,
shut down activities, speciQ rneasures.
See for example the Yukon Environment Act provides more than 15 separate
administrative actions which an inspector or Minister may use to sanction a violator. Supra,
note 179. Sections 35 and 40 CEPA provide the Minister of the Environment with the power
to take preemptive action to prevent anticipatecf h m , supra, note 114. See also Agricuihre
and Agri-Food Adminisiration Monetary Penalries Act, supra note 292.
For example, the USEPA has established Administrative Coiid Judges. See C.
Wassennan, supra, note 129 at p. 97,

3"

312

By way of exarnple, powers granted to environmental inspectors under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act and federal Fisheries Act focus on responses afier the fact. Op.
cit. For an anaiysis of the limitations of inspector powers and need for anticipatory or
preventive powers, see L. F. Duncan, supra note 25; Envimnment Canada, I ~ ~ p c i o r s '
Powers and Provisions Governing m c i a l Analysrs in the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act (CEPA); Reviewing CEPA, The Issues (Paper #I5), Environrnent Canada,
(Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1994); and H. Versteeg, h m i n i n g the Cuvent and Proposed
Potenrial of the Canadian Environmental frotection Act to Incorporate Pollution Prevention
PrincipZes md Strategies, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1993).

As discussed earlier, an enforcement and compliance policy can be useful not o d y for

sending a clear message to regdated parties about the response which can be anticipated if
the law is violated, but also for tempering the exercise of discretion by enforcement officiais

in response to a suspected or reported offence. By prescribing national, or where deemed
appropriate, regionai criteria for the appropriate enforcement response or sanction, the
policy can help instiu accountability for fair and consistent enforcement action and Uiform
the community about the official action they should anticipate in response to their
comp~aints.)l 3

An enforcement and compliance policy is also a usefid rnechanism for clarifjbg roles for
inspectors, investigatoa. prosecutors, judiciary and the public. The policy should cl@
the respective powers and roles for the benefit of the regulated industry, public and
govemment regdators.

The relative effectiveness of the policy as a rnechanism to deter offenders or to ensure
consistency depends on adherence to the policy. This can be facilitated through wide
distribution of the policy (public watchdog), directed training, by mandating an
environmental agency to ensure adherence to the policy and by formal endorsement of an
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See for exarnple CEPA Enforcement and Cornpliance Policy, supra. note 15, Yukon
Enforcement and Cornpliance Poiiq, supra, note 58. Ontario Ministry of the Environment,
Urt~onnEnforcement Policy, May 1986.

enforcement protocol.

Private enforcement action can be important to spur government action, or as a supplement
or replacement for officia1 enf~rcement.~'~
Both direct and indirect roles have been found
constructive in increasing accountability and in spuning enforcement action. For example,

in some jurisdictions private individuais or organizations can compel the investigation of a
suspected offience and an official report on the response tal~en.~"The right of access to
monitoring data and cornpliance reports also facilitates a watchdog tole.)l6 Yet while public
cornplaints or reports are widely recognized as a significant trigger for enforcement action,
efforts are not always made to encourage or to access this s ~ u r c e". ~

An equally important stimulus to government enforcement has been the granting of the

R. Hallo, "Citizens Role in Enforcement: A Spur. a Supplement and a Substitute", supra in
Intemafional Conference on Environmental Law, supra, note 4 at p. 56 1-573. Public interest
environmentai suits have been initiated in many countries including Canada, the United
States, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Gerrnany, Columbia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Russia. See S. Elgie, supra. note 284, at p. 196. In the Philippines,
villages are empowered to directly enforce environmental laws. See ESCAP Report. Ch. N
Statutes of Environmental Legislation in the ESCAP Region, at p. 144.
315

CEPA supra note 1 14 ss. 108, 109; Yukon Emironment Act, supra, note 1 79 ss. 14- 18;
Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhcement Act, supra, note 188, S. 184.
316

F. Irwin et a1 "From Public Disclosure to Public Accountability: What Impact Will it have
on Cornpliance?", Proceedings International Confèreence on Environmental Law, supra. note
4 at p. 589-603; Paul Keough, et al, supra note 284 at p. 6 11-6 16.
3 17

C. G. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 329; S. Elgie, supra. note 284.

right to directly initiate criminal prosecutions or civil proceeduigs for injunction or
~iarnages.~'~
Successfid civil actions against government for damages caused by nonenforcement has provided significant stimulus for improved enforcement.

l9

It has been suggested that private enforcement rights shall be widely publicized so that

"citizens are able to take concrete action to compel enforcement rather than merely voicing
outrage and politicize the regdatory process".320Rivate legd action can be particularly
effective in forcing official action against government owned or operated facilities or in
enforcement d ~ t i e s ? ~In' sorne instances, liability is hposed on Ministers,

cla-g

govemment officiais where they have k e n found to have directed, authonzed or asserted to
or acquiesced in participation of an ~ f f e n c e . ) ~ ~

While many environmental enforcement agencies support giving a role to the public, they
also express concem about the impact of privately triggered investigations or enforcernent
on limited resources and any strategic plan for enforcement?* A logical path around this
318

CEPA. supra, note 1 14, ss 136; Yukon Environment Act, supra, note 179, ss. 8, 19; Alberta
Environmental Protection and Enhancernent Act, supra, note 188, ss. 204 and 205.

"'

See L.F. Duncan, "Crown Liability and Environmental Rights", Proceedings of the
Environmental Law Seminar, (Ottawa: National Judicial Institute, 1993) and supra. note 27.
320

E. Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 222.

321

Friendr of the OldMan River Society, supra. note 28; C . Wasserman, supra, note 4 at 1 18.

'"Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancernent Act, supra note 188. s.217.
For a discussion of these issues see L. F. Duncan, "The Implications of an Environmental
Bill of Rights for the Administration of an Enforcement program" an address to the 6th
Annual Environmental Conference of Canadian Enforcement W c i a l s , Victoria, June 1993.

dilemma is of course public c o d t a t i o n in the development of any enforcement strategy or
policy .

The dynamic nature of environmental regdation creates a scenario demanding constant
reevaluation and refom. ScientXc discovenes, technoiogical advances in detecting impacts

-

or causes, new industrial processes. changing social, economic and political climates the
mutual interrelationships of al1 of these factors combine to mate the need for an evaluation

process which enables review and revision of management and control strategies. The need
for ongoing assessrnent and change is equally critical for an enforcement and cornpliance
program to ensure that its policies, strategies and sanctions remain responsive to the
character and substance of the laws they are intended to a d d r e ~ s . 3 ~In~ addition,
governments may be accountable to reguiar extemal reporthg responsibilities and scrutiny
for their enforcement programs.325

Recognizing the fluidity of environmental regulation, many agencies have incorporated an
evaluatim process into their compliance £k~nework?~~
As laws and policies evolve and

324

UNEP, supra, note 32 at p. 1 9.

32s

For example the Parties (Mexico, United States and Canada) are obligated under the
NAAEC to report annually on their enforcement related obligations. Supra, note 3, article
12(2)(C). The CEC is working with the North American Working Group on Environmental
Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation to develop comrnon indicators for effective
enforcement.
326

C.Wasserman, supra,note 4 at p. 12 1.

prioîïties shift enforcement agencies must be capable of revising theu programs and
approaches?*' Aspects which ment regular review and assessrnent include compliance
strategies, inspection plans, incentive programs, sanction and penalty options and training

and resource needs.

It is also important to have mechanisms in place to enable the evaluation of enforcement

and compliance activities and strategies against overall environmental quality objecti~es.'~~
These objectives and performance standards should be reflected in the reguiations,
inspection plans, incentive programs and enforcement and compliance budgets329In this

way govemments cm better forecast resource and trainuig needs.

At the m e tirne it is important not to limit the evaiuation process to the enforcement and

compliance prograrn, automatically casting al1 blame on the enforcement end of the
spectnim. Failure to achieve objectives in the prescribed time fiame may not rest solely,

with the enforcement and compliance program or agency. Fault may lie with the

327

B. Seigal, supra, note 104 at p. 9- 10.

328

1991 Report of the Auditor General ofCrmada, supra, note 187 at p. 27 1;C. Wasseman,
international Conference on Environmental Enforcement, (Proceedings Vol. l), supra. note 4
at p. 121-123; RF. Duw, "Measuring the Success of Cornpliance and Enforcement
Programs", Proceedings Fourth International Conference on Environmental Enforcement,
supra. note 4 at p. 489; "Special Topic Workshop F: Measures of Success", id 479.
329

The Auditor General of Canada in the 1991 Audit of Environment Canada, ibid, criticized
them for failure to maintain sufficient data bases to demonstrate the effectiveness or
efficiency of its enforcement and comptiance activities and for failure to define perFormance
standards to enable evaluation of the effectiveness of its regulations, and enforcement and
compliance activities to ensure environmental quality.

environmental objectives, the laws enacted to meet those objectives or with barriers caused
by conflicting p i ~ r i t i e s ?It~may
~ simply be failure to lend sufficient political or financial

support to deliver an effective compliance program.

Consequently, any evaluation of an enforcement strategy should be conducted within a
broad contexk not merely focusing on the relative success and failures of individual
enforcement actions, for example the annual count of successful prosecutions~" Any
thorough review should also encompass roles played by non-enforcement officiais. the
impact of intergovemmental

and potential impacts of conflicting objectives or

compliance t o ~ l s .For
~ ~example,
~
it has been recommended that the use of incentives be
closely monitored and audited to identify enforcement deficits.'"

Consequently, any

evaluation of a compliance program or strategy must also hclude assessrnent of the impact

B. Seigal reports that evaluations of regdatory pmgrams indicate that factors which have a
detrimental effect on compliance activities include uncertain~about the relative priority of
enforcement, lack of policy direction, inadequate training, lack of adequate data, lack of
political commitment to use of Ministerial sanctions and lack of ability to estimate non detected violations. Seigai, supra, note 104 at p. 7-8.
"O

This is a comrnon tendency to lirnit the rneasure of commitment or success of
environmental enforcement on the number of successfd prosecutions. See for example "
Environmentalists decry lack of charges for pollution offences", Ottawa Citizen, July 10,
1994. It may be noted that the issue of "bean-counting" continued to be a significant matter
of dispute between the federal and state level agencies in the United States in the process of
instituting their oversight poiicy and grants program.
33'

For example policies initiatives towards harmonization of standards and processes and
regionalization of delivery can have a significant impact on an enforcement pmgram. See
previous discussion in Section B. 1 (b) "Clarified Roles and Responsibilities".
332

'"B. Seigal, suprcz, note 104 at p. 1 1 -1 2.
334

E. Barr,supra note 34 at p. 2 1 1-218; see also K. Webb, supra note 80.

of incentives on compliance records.

There are humerable sources of indicators for assessing whether the enforcement strategy,
policy or responses are effective. The regulatory and compliance process itself contains
many key indicators of problerns and directions for change. As discussed earlier, the
decision to enact of any new laws, including creating new standards, procedures, sanctions
or hcentives, should be treated as an automatic trigger for reassessing the institutional

database if properiy maintained can be a
capacity to achieve c o ~ n ~ l i a n cAe .compliance
~~~
useful tool for identi-g

problem individuals or secton and the need to redirect staff or

resources. Cornpliance statistics cm dso serve as valuable indicators of adherence to
alternative enforcement or control mechanism, whether regulatory or private.

Enforcement field experience can provide one of the more tangible sources of information
about the effectiveness of the enforcement tools and strategy. Careful documentation of any

technical or legal problems or resource deficiencies experienced in the course of on-going
inspection and enforcement work can provide the backbone of a pragmatic enforcement
strategy review and training program?36

335 C.Wasserrnan, supra,
336

note 323.

R.F. Du@, supra, note 328.

Other usefiii indicators can be found in ernpirical or policy studies conducted in-house or by
other departments

"' or

by extemal parties such as legal or policy institutes or

~niversities.'~~
Sorne agencies have incorporated this review and evaluative h c t i o n into
their institutional structure and mandate to enable effective strategic planning through
tracking of innovative strategies and approaches adopted by other agencies and

j~nsdictions?~

Other triggers which should not go UIlheeded include cornplaints by the public or regulated

parties or judicial de ci si on^.)^^ Surveys of regdatees also provide valuabte information

-

-
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For example, the 1988 Studies in Regulation and Compliance commissioned by the
Canadian Department of Justice including D. ChappeIl, supra 10 and D.Chappell, The Use of
Crimina!Penalties for Pollution of the Environment: A Seleetive und Annotateci Bibliography
ofthe Liferatzae (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada: 1988); see also the series of study
reports issued by the Compliance and Regulatory Remedies Project, Department of Justice
Canada, supra, note 36.
338

For exarnple, ongoing research and reform proposals by law reform commissions,
environmental law institutes, non governent organizations. See for exarnple the study series
by Protection of Life Project, The Law Reform Commission of Canada; studies sponsored by
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research including Sanctions and Rewmdr in the Legal
Sys~em:A Muhi disciplinmy Approach, M.L. Friedland ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press: 1989); and M.L. FriedIand, Securing Cornpliunce: Seven case Shrdies, (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press: 1990). See also Environmental EnfOreement: Proceedings of the
National Conference on the Enforcement of Environmental Law, ed. L. F. Duncan
(Edmonton: Environmental Law Center: 1985); CEC, supra, note 7.
339

Environment Canada's Office of Enforcement and CompIiance includes staff positions
dedicated to legal and policy research on alternative approaches to compliance. The USEPA
u n d e d e s intensive evaluations of in enforcement and compliance programs and strategies
in addition to the conduct of ongoing research into alternative approaches. See for exarnple
Enforcement in the 1990s Project: Recommendutions of the Analyrcal Workgroups, USEPA,
Office of Enforcement (LE- l33,22E-2OOO), (Washington,: EPA, 1991)
340

E. Swanson, Public Response Indicators for Meawing Eflective Enforcement, (Montreal:
CEC, 1997) (Unpublished manuscript).

about reasons for no~i-com~liance.~~'
It has k e n suggested that this infornation can be

in designing cornpliance strategies in response to underlying reasons for non-

us&

~om~liance."~To facilitate a public role in the evaluative process, cornpliance histories
should be made publicly acce~sible.~"

ALTERNA TIVE EVALUA
TZON PROCESSES

b)

Evaluation processes have taken a variety of forms including in-house reviews, reviews by

neutral parties (for example law reform commissions or Auditors ~eneral)~"or rnulti
stakeholder review~."~Empiricai studies by extemai parties can also provide valuable
-

34 1

B. SeigaI, supra, note 1 04 at p. 10.

E. Barr, supra note 34 at p. 214. For example, both Environment Canada Pacifie and
Yukon Region and the B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks publish reports on
cornp 1iance records. For example, Environment Canada, Complimce S t a m Summmy
Repork British Columbia. Fiscal Year 1993- 1994, Regional Program Report 94-04
(Vancouver: Environment Canada, 1994).
343

The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Protection of Life Project produced numerous
studies and working papers on key environmental regulatory and enforcernent issues and
alternatives including reports on crimes against the environment, sentencing in environmental
cases, workplace pollution and private prosecution; E. Barr recommends regular evaluation
by the office of the Conholler General, supra note 34 at p. 223. In 1996, the Parliament of
Canada established by statute the Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable
Development with a mandate to audit the policies and programs of federal agencies if
irnplementing strategies for sustainable development. An Act Respecting the (?#?ceof the
Auditor General of Canada and Sustuinable Development Monitoring and Reporting, S C .
1995 c.43. The Commissioner in the first report to Parliament identified environmental
m target for audit. See Report of the CommLrsioner of
enforcement programs as one of his f
the Emironmenî and Sutainable Development to the House of Comrnom, 1997.
344

345 In 1989 Canadatsfederd Department of Agiculture established an independent secretariat
and muIti stakeholder review cornmittee for the purpose of evaluating the existing regulatory
and enforcement regime for managing pesticides and making recommendations for reforxn.

information about cornpliance ~trate~ies."~ In some jurisdictions accountability and

evaluation processes have k e n legislated empowering a variety of parties to evaluate

adherence to law and policy including appointed cornmittees, legislators or the general

A UDITZNGTHE ENFORCER

C)

It is equally important that the decisions of enforcement officiais themselves be subjected to
scrutiny and assessrnent to remove any potential for perverse consideratiom. This has k e n

effected through statutorily hposed review processes, provision for private right of action

and multi-lateral agreements."* It has k e n suggested that there should be systematic
scrutiny of reasons for failure to require compliance to identify who may be exercising too

iitiIe or too great c o n t r o ~ . ~ ~ ~

For the resulting legislative and policy refonn, see supra, note 308.
346

D. Saxe, supra, note 7.

347

In the United States this " oversight" role is effected through legislative hearings, judicial
review of agency actions, accountability to the Executive, and private right of action. See W.
M. Eichbaum, "Alternative Organizational Structures for a Cornpliance and Enforcement
Program", Proceedings International Conference on Etmironmental Cornpliance, supra, note
4 at p. 298: Wasserman, ibid at p. 121. In Canada numerous processes are in place to effect
public review of compliance actions or inactions, see for example the Yukon Environment Act
empowers an independent Council to review al1 cornplaints regarding regulatory or
enforcement activities of the government and extends to any citizen the right to compel a
review of these programs. supra, note 179, ss. 24 and 23. Section 39 of the Act requires
regular audits of the efficiency and faimess in delivery of environmental programs. See also.
supra, note 34 1 .
348

Supra, note 341. See also Section 6 (d) "Private Enforcement".

349

E. Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 21 1.

INDICATORS
OF SUPPORT
FOR AN ENFORCEMENT
FRAMEWORK

IV.

Chapter III presented a framework within which law, policy and institutional would enable
effective enforcement of environmental laws. Numerous examples were given with the text
of individual components of the proposed m e w o r k .

This chapter conveys various

viewpoints of governments about the usefulness and efficacy in implementing an
enforcement fhmework including specinc assistance to support implementation. The
Chapter closes with observations on the potentiai special constraints or barriers which either
have or potentidy could be faced by emerging or economically developing nations in
creating more effective policies or programmes for effective environmental enforcement.

While action to i n s t i ~ emore effective enforcement may at times appear spotty, there is
evidence of global support, at least arnong enforcement agencies, for the concept of a
comprehensive fi.amework for implementation.'so

Wide recognition has been given for the adoption of a comrnon strategic fiamework against
which environmental compliance can be anticipated or measured.)" Support for a universal

350

NAAEC, supra. note 3. article 5 sets a cornmon frame for effective enforcement.

C. Wasçerman states that a positive response was given to the drafl strategic framework
for environmental enforcement and compliance presented for discussion at the 1990 meeting
of representatives fiom 13 countries and international organizations. Subsequent conferences

fiamework for implementing environmental enforcement, nonetheless, reflects an
understanding of necessary variances in instituting its componenis due to the unique sociopoliticai context and financial capacity of individual

Still, there is wide

agreement that the probability of compliance is related more to individual deterrence than
one of a cultrrral r e s p o ~ s (with
e ~ ~ ~the exception of course of corporate culture).3S4

in Canada, federal and some provincial and temtorial governments, enforcement and

compliance polices and strategies have k e n recognized as necessary corollaries to the
effective implementation of ~awç?*~
The Auditor General for Cana@ for example, has set

in 1992 and 1994 drew participation frorn over 80 countries and international organizations.
"The Pnnciples of Environmental Enforcement and Beyond: Building
Institutional Capacity", Third International Conference on Environrnentul Enforcement,
supra, note 4 at p.22.
See C. Wassertnan,
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As one example, whiie Canadian prosecutors have had mixed success in persuading

judges of the serious (sornetimes criminal) nature and consequences of environmental
offenses, the Indonesian judiciary have given enthusiastic endorsement to incarceration of
environmental violators. See Proceedings of 1992 Seminars on Environmenfal Enforcement.
ed. DunzadMoestadji (Jakarta: EMDVIndonesian Ministry of Population and Environment.
1992). Polish officials have emphasized the need to recognize the significant dificulties
assùciated with the massive privatization of economic activity and the consequent
inappropriateness of some enforcernent responses including both coercive and market
measures. See P. Syryczynski, "The 'Ecological Semaphores' for Fourteen Pattis of
Ownership Changes in Poland, International Conference of Environmenid Law,supra. note 4
at p. 453-463. In Bulgaria, implementation of an enforcement framework has been hindered
by a lack of necessary implementing regulations, and financial in capacity of both the
regulated industry and govenurient regdators. See L. Maslarova, supra, note 45 at p. 97-102.
Proceedhgs Third International Conference on Envkonrnental Law.
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It should be noted that the potential impact of cultural values has not been discounted by
the author and is listed as one possible factor affêcting the choice of enforcement response
and the relative probability of successfùl implementation. See next section, "Developing and
Emerging Nations: Barriers and Constraints".
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D. Saxe, supra, note 7.

See for example, A Strategic Approach to Developing Cornpliunce Policies: A Guide,

out a W e w o r k for implementation economical, efficient environmental compliance,
including clarification of enforcernent roles; appropnate working relationships with
provinces and other federal departments; establishing and following a set of policies,
priorities and plans including a balance of promotional and enforcement activities;
allocation and efficient use of resources in accordance with predetermined priorities; and
program evaluation based on predetermined objectives.3s6 Since the rnid- 19808s,
enforcement respomes by most Canadian jurisdictions have k e n dictated by official
enforcement and compliance policies and in some instances detailed procedurai

In at Ieast one jurisdiction these documents are required by I~w.~''

SÏmilar policy documents have been adopted by the USEPA and State environmental
agencies.359 in addition to detailed policies, procedural manuais, strategies and intensive

supra note 56; E. Barr,et al, szrpre note 34. S e e also the evaluative h e w o r k set out by the
Auditor General of Canada for assessing the performance of the federal Department of the
Environment in enforcing environmental Iaws. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to
the Home of Commom, Chapter 13. supra, note 1 87 at p. 268.
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For example the federal, Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Yukon Enforcement mrd
Compliance Policies, supra, note 58 and 129. The Canadian Department of Justice as already
issued a series of documents outlining the merits of an enforcement and compliance policy
and strategy and outlining the necessary steps. Supra, note 142. AI1 federal regdatory impact
statements now require that a compliance strategy be gazetted along with any new regdation.
See RLRS Writer's Guide, supra note 139. It may also be noted that the Canadian position in
negotiation of the NAAEC purportedly drew its foundation from the Cmadian
Environmental Protection Act Enforcement and Cornplicmce Policy. See H . Mann, "The
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Implications for the
Enforcement of Environmental Law", supra, note 63.
358

359

Yukon Environment Act, supra. note 179, section 150.

C. Wasserman, ccOverview of Compliance and Enforcement in the United States:
Philosophy, Strategies and Management Tools", Proceedings International Enforcement

training progmms, the USEPA has endorsed a Four Year Strateeic

Plan for improved

edorcement and compliance action?* The USEPA detailed framework for effective
environmental enforcement has k e n subjected to intensive international scmtiny as a
working h e w o r k for other nations.361

Support for a basic h e w o r k for measining progress on improved environmental

compliance has had a more mixed reception in Europe at Ieast by the individual members
countries of the European Economic Union EU).^" Nonetheless the European Council has
cailed for full implementation and enforcement of Community legislation and instnicted the
Commission to conduct and rnake public reguiar evaluations of progress in this

Community environmental legislation will only be effective if it is fully
implemented and enforced by Mernber states3@
.-

Workshop, supra, note 4 at p. 7-46; Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 1995
Amual Report, (Annex IIL Annual Reporî on Enforcement) (Montreal: C EC, 1996).

USEPA Office of Enforcement, Enforcanent in the 1990's Projecf, Recommendations
fiom the AnaiyticaI Workgroups, (Washington: EPA: 1991). For a more detailed discussion
of Amencan policies and sûategies see Proceedings of the second, third and fourth
International Conferences on Environmental Enforcement, supra note 4.
36 1

The f'ramework was the focus of international discussion and debate during the series of
international conferences on environmental enforcement held in Utrecht, Budapest, Oaxaca
and Chiang Mai, supra, note 4.
362

An overview of dificulties faceci in persuading Member states to institute consistent
enforcement responses for environmental laws is provided in R. MacRory, "Membenhip in
the Empean Community: What it means for Environmental Requirements and
Enforcementf*,Proceedings International Confrence on Emironmental Law. supra note 4 at
p. 17 1- 181 and L. Krarner, supra, note 66.
363

L. b e r , ibid at pp. 184 and 185. Member states are obligated to not only to incorporate
community environmental standards into their domestic laws but also to enforce them.
364

Statement of the European Council (Bulletin of the European Communities 6-1990) at p.
18-2 1, as cited in R. MacRory, supra, note 362.

The Netherlands cm be singled out among those counaies voicing strong support
for adoption of the basic f r a m e w ~ r k ? ~ ~
A 1985 OECD case study of American, Dutch and British approaches to implementing

environmental policy identified a common failure to give adequate attention to enforcement

and cornpliance?" These discussions precipitated a nurnber of international exchanges on
approaches to environmental enforcement and cornpliance culminating in three
international conferences, focused on the need for enforcement, building the necessary

fkmework and alternative approaches.'67 The dialogue initiated among Western European
and North Arnerican jurisdictions was later expanded to include enforcement practitioners

from eastem Europe, AfEca, Russia, Caribbean nations, central and southem Amenca and
Asia SUnilar exchanges on approaches to environmental enforcement were occuning
between the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands and

365

In 1990, for example, the Netherlands established the National Coordination Cornmittee
for Environmental Iaw Enforcement (LCCM)to monitor and promote the implernentation of
a more effective enforcement structure. See J. A. Peters, " The Relationship between Central
Govemment and ProvinciaVMunicipal Authorities with Regard to Enforcement", supra, note
4 at p. 273. The Netherlands Minisûy of Housing, Physical Planning, and the Environment
(VROM) has contributed generously to the series on international conferences of
environmental law, supra, note 4.
3'

C. Wassennan, supro. note 4 at p.22; F. Plate, supra note 40 at p. 239-24 1.
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Supra, note 4.

A series of enforcernent training seminan and conferences were held between 1989 and
1993 sponsored by the Environmental Development in Indonesia Project (EMDI) and the
Netherlands Minishty of Justice in cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Population

and Environment (KLH),Department of Justice and Environmental Impact Control Agency
(BAPEDa).

It was observed during the course of the these international dialogues, that discussion

quickly progressed fiom a debate of the relative merits of environmental enforcement to a

consensus on the need to build the capacity for compliance and enforcement as one of the
essentiai elements of environmental management.

369

While wide support has been

expressed for the basic W e w o r k for effective enforcement, many nations have voiced
reservations about their capability to implement the necessary refomis due to lunited
training and resources. Some have voiced the need to adapt the components of the
hmework to fit their own unique priorities and sit~ations."~These coIlStraints and
necessary variances to the basic framework are discussed in the next section.

DEVELOP~VG
AND EMERGING
NATIONS:
BARRIERS
AND CONSTRAINTS

B.

Regardless of

the wide support for the concept of a hmework for environmental

enforcement, certain additionai barriers and consûaints may be faced by lesser developed or
emerging nations in its implementation. Variances to the recomrnended framework may be
necessary to reflect diverse cultural, political and, in particda., economic differences.
Regardless of the view that the task of achieving compliance centers on a cornmon
challenge of afEecting individual behavior, including that of public, corporations and

369
370

C. Wasseman, supra,note 4 at p. 22.

This view was expressed by a number of delegates, particularly those fiom eastem
European, Asian and Afncan nations, at the series of International Environmental
Enforcement Conferences in Budapest, Oaxaca and Chiang Mai. Among the issues identified
as unique to newiy emerging or less developed nations is the ment privatization of economic
development activity and cntical lack of resources and expertise, supra note 4.

government officials, as opposed to distinct cultural values, noae the less, it is recognized
that some nations may face unique constraints and barriers in implementing a credible
working environmental enforcement regirne.

These variances may be most pronounced for developing or emerging

nation^.^"

In many

instances the differences rnay only be a matter of degree or delay. For example, basic
capacity building to establish a working bureaucracy (education, training) and institutional
reform (judicid and administrative systems), requires a greater investment at the fiont end
than may be necessary in nations with these systerns in place. There will be little value in
efforts to implement complex enforcement or cornpliance programs without this necessary
foundation.

Developing workable laws in itself is a triclq business. But haWig the right laws and
appropnate sanctions is only part of what is needed to successfidly transfer tested methods
of environmental protection to other corntries. Related legal hfhstructure must develop on
a parallel track and long-standiig cultural differences mut be recognized and assessed.
Econornic realities must be taken into account and resources (both human and monetary)

must be made available. Very possibly, the single most essential element of the successful
transfer of environmental solutions is the domestic will of the receiving country. Without
this, assistance is likely to be a one-sided endea~or?'~

37' Recognition for these very differences became a central focus of the Rio Conferme on
Environment and Development and the resulting Agenda 21, supra, notes 1 and 2.

'"R. Greenspan Bell and S.E. Brornm supra, note 107.

In recognition of these ciiffierences, a number of international agencies, have recommended
that lesser developed countries establish interim, achievabie goals thereby phasing in
improved standards over a longer t h e pexiod.373 This approach can help alleviate the
scenario of enacting laws which go unenforced due to lack of resources or expertise, with
the consequent loss of credibility or face by environmental agencies?4

Some nations have

adopted a strategy of phasing in controls, concentrating on significant polluters on a sectorai
or regional ba~is."~A third alternative may be to limit standard setting to new facilities to
avoid overly prohibitive costs to industry in retrofitting. This rnay also alleviate a
discoumghg backlog of non cornpliance for govemment en forcer^.^'^

'" For example the World

Health Organization as cited in F. Halter, "Towards more
Effective regdation in Developing Countries" (Paper presented to OECD Conference on
Environmental Management in Developing Countries) (Paris: October 3-5, 1990) at p. 19.
Evidence of the growing recognition by some international environmental and aid
organizations of the need to provide front end assistance to build an institutional foundation
supportive of environmental protection refonns include the recent environmental cornpliance
related and more general institutional capacity building programs of for example UNEP, the
World Bank, USAID, and CIDA. The latter example has provided over $30 million through
the Environmental Development in Indonesia Project <O the Republic of Indonesia directed at
environmental management capacity building in govemment, univenity institutions and the
private sector. This mode1 is now king duplicated by other aid programs. See for example
üNEP and World Bank,supra, note 18.

The Republic on Indonesia, for example, with the assistance of the Canadian International
Development Agency sponsored Environmental Management Development in Indonesia
(EMDI) Project in 1989 launched PROKASIH as a pilot program under which the Indonesian
Ministry of Population and Environment (KLH) and later the Indonesian Environmental
Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) would lay the foundation for standard setting,
ambient monitoring and enforcement for water quality. See N. Marakim. J. Nagendran, C.
Potter, C. S. Jardine, G. Adnan, "Water Pollution Contml in Indonesia: The Clean River
Program (PROKASIH)" (Jakarta: EMDVBAPEDAL, 199 1).
376

F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p.14. For example, the Republic of Indonesia is enacting
their environmental impact assessrnent process inboduced a significant enforcement and

From the perspective of many developing and emerging nations, establishing these basic
building blocks for effective environmental regulation and enforcement are viewed as a "
super-added" t a ~ k . ~If~ 'developing nations are to be expected to progress within a
reasonable tirne b

e towards implementing their respective international environmental

obligations, in tandem with building a strong economic foundation, recognition must be
given to the special constraints and barriers they face and target assistance to irnplement this
basic h n e w ~ r kThe
. ~ following
~~
discussion reviews some of the unique collstraints these
nations face in imthting effective enforcement.

In many instances before nations can contemplate implementuig an effective environmental
compliance strategy, concerted efforts will be required to establish an effective juridical
system. An effective compliance regime is premised on the enactrnent of enforceable laws.
evidentiary and procedural

capable legal officers and a skilled, independent

cornpliance headache by requiring the completion of assessrnent for facilities pre-dating the
law. In 1994, due to a significant (hundred of thousands) of backlog of incidents of noncompliance, the law was amended to resûict the requirements to proposed operations. See L.
F. Duncan, supra, note 34,
377 With deference to

Justice La Forest who first coined the phrase in his decision on FrienaS
of the Old Mm, supra, note 27.

Dr.Emil Salim, then Minister of State for Population and Environment, Republic of
Indonesi* " Towards a Sustainable Future", paper presented at preparatory meeting for
UNCED,(Geneva, July, 199 1).

378 Prof.

379 For example enforcement of environmental laws in Hungary is purportedly constrained by
the lack of clear definition of environmentai offences. A. Momannay, "Enforcing the Law at
Govenunent Owned or Operated Facilities", supra, note 4 at p. 467.

j ~ d i c i a r y ?Where
~ ~ a juridical system is not established, it cannot be presumed that illegal
or even hannful activities will be made subject to the "Rule of Law". The enactment of
environmental laws wili have minimal practical effect unless these systems are in place to

'

make them b i n d i r ~ ~ . ~ ~

A parallel reform process may be necessary to consolidate and update laws including
rescinding outdated or conflichg statutes and regulations?82 It may be necessary to enact
or revise administrative, civil and criminal procedural codes and evidentiary d e s . In
addition it may be necessary to prepare compilations of relevant laws to facilitate ready
access and reference by lawyers and j~diciary.)~~
It may aiso be necessary to improve basic
legislative cirafting skills and capabilities to screen laws for enf~rceability.~'~

380

See W. S. Bieblo, "Environrnental Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe in
Transition", International Conference on Environmenta2 L m , Supra, note 4 at p. 229-234; G.
Bandi, supra, note 45 at p. 237.

38 1

F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 19.

See L. Maslarova, supra, note 45; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra. note 36; T .
Panayotou, "Economic Incentives in Environrnental Management and their Relevance to
Developing Countries", (Paper prepared for the OECD meeting on Environmental
Management in the Developing Countries), (Paris: OECD, 1990) at p. 12; J. Mayda, supra,
note 140 at p. 1014-1015.

3"

383 This need was identified by prosecutors and judges participating in the 1991
environmental enforcement training seminars sponsored by EMDI in Indonesia. See L. F.
Duncan and P. Moestadji, Penindakan Pelanggaran Hukum Linghgan, (Batu) (Jakarta:
EMDI/KLH, 1990) and L. F. Duncan and P. Moestadji, "Penegakan Hukum Lingkzingan"
(Semarang, Surabaya, Medan) (Jakarta: EMDVBAPEDAL, 1992).

'" This

need was identified in the program analysis on institutional capacity for
environmental enforcernent and cornpliance for the Republic of Indonesia, L. F. Duncan and
M. A. Santosa, supra, note 36.

It has also been suggested that the orientation and skills of lawyers and judges in developing

corntries may constrain environmental enforcement, in particular the acceptance of more
innovative appmaches to ~ a n c t i o n i n ~ ?This
~ may however be more a question of degree

as there is evidence of a widespread failure in the legal cornmunity to recognize and admit
to the complex nature of environmentai

For many nations legal expertise is lacking

for legislative drafüng and its enforcement?*' in other cases a generai scarcity of skilled
govemment lawyers Limits oppomuiities to hone specialized ~kills.~~'
A related constraint is

the inability of government agencies to compete with private h

s in attracting quaiified

practitioners. in other instances, developing nations d e r the effects of the "brain drain"
where those fortunate enough to acquire advanced education, seek their fortunes elsewhere
where opportunities exist to use their special expertise.

Another significant barrier to timely reform of laws and procedures is the dearth of material
on environmentai law published in the languages of receiving nations:89 and al1 to rarely do
J. Mayda, supra. note 140 at p. 1008- 1014. The CIDA sponsored EMDI Project supported
development of an environmental law cumculum for the Republic of Indonesia as early as
1989.
386

In Canada, for example. many mernbers of the legal comrnunity, induding lawyers,

prosecutors and the judiciary remain sceptical of the idea that special training may be
necessary to practice environmental Iaw. Regardless, environmental courses in law schools
and seminars for practitioners have g o w n exponentially.
387

F. Halter, supra, note 373. "Towards More Effective Regulations in Developing
Countries" paper presented to OECD Conference on Environmental Management in
developing Countries (Paris: Oct. 3-5, 1990).

''*

Interviews with lawyers in the Indonesian Department of the Attomey General supports
this view with lawyers simultaneously responsible for civil and criminal cases. Interviews
with officiais in the Department of the Attorney General, 1990-1994.

'"J. Mayia, q r a . note 104 at p.

101O noteworthy exceptions includes the EMDI Project

legal materials or training programs address the unique needs and systems of the receiving

Consequently, environmental laws rnay be enacted which cannot be pmctically
implernented causing both discouragement and loss of face for newly established
environmental enforcement agencies.

Similarly, while many emerging nations have enacted basic enabling statutes for
environmental protection and pollution control, less progress has been made in the

necessary restructuring of govemment to improve the capacity to irnplement contr~ls.'~'A
1985 çhidy reported that few industnaluing and less industrialized nations had any
institutional capacity for rnanaging

Those experienced in efforts to assist

emerging nations in the irnplementation of environmental controls have suggested that
institution building rernains "among the most difficult and elusive of objectives just as it is

publishing legal texts, study reports, and conference proceedings in Bahasa, Indonesian and
the CEC North American Environmental Law Database available in English, Spanish and
French. The iUCN Environmental Law Centre has also collaborated with the iUCN
Commission on Environmental Law in support of the compiIation of environmental laws of
the ASEAN nations.
390

Programmes initiated by UNEP,the International Enforcement Office of EPA,
International Office of Enforcement, Fish and Wildiife Department, Environment Canada
and World Bank among others are beginning to address this gap: See note 18 at p. 362.
39'

"*

F. Halter, supra note 373 at p. 2-8.

2id. It rnay be noted that some progress has k e n made in providing enforcement training
since that date. See supra,note 387.

among the most important causes of program f a i ~ u r e " . ~ ~ ~

It has also k e n suggested that as environmental agencies in lesser developed nations may

lack the necessary clout to move their protection agendas, there may be a need to adjust
expectations?

This is ail the more important for enforcement programs. Again, this is a

constraint common to most nations who have yet to refomi their decision making structures
to better reflect the principles of sustainable d e ~ e l o ~ r n e n t ? ~ ~

There is also a propensity for lesser developed nations to employ officials with advanced
education 05t minimal practicd experience. This is often fostered by pay scales correlated

with scholarly achie~ernents.~~~
It is therefore important that govemments and donors be
encouraged to provide greater importance to study opportunities which will provide more
dkectly related skill development and capacity building programs, in particular for gaining
enforcement expertise. Another stmtegy may be to ensure involvement by local officials
and professionals in any foreign fhded studies or consultancies to foster the development
of in - country enforcement expertise and institutions building.)97

394

Ibid at p. 10; T. Panayoyou, supra, note 382 at p. 12.

E. Swanson, Put-

Surtainable Developrnent to Work: Implerrten~ationThrough Lmvrmd
Policy (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1994).
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For example, the pay s a l e for civil servants in the Republic of Indonesia is calculated on a
formula which among other factors gives significance to the level of scholastic achievement.

397

For an example, the EMDI Project included the participation of indonesian governent

officiais, legal practitioners and acadernics in al1 legal studies and training programs
sponsored by the Project. See also, L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra note 36.

Similar to other nations, developing nations often 3 S e r &om a lack of coordination
between respective development and protection initiatives by various departments and
agencies can conshaint development of effective enforcement programs, the problem ofien
exacerbated by donor aid. The necessary preoccupation by developing nations with
economic development is yet another h ~ r d l e . ' ~ ~

Another related constraint to implementing effective enforcement regimes common to

many lesser developed countries is lack of a basic " dernocratic" foundation to facilitate
public acco~ntabilit~.'" Entrenched systerns of corruption and influence and dearth of
citizen nghts to access environmental information or to participate in enforcement
processes, are prime examples.

The culture of corruption, or " rent seeking behavior", semes as a major barrier to the
implementation of pollution control programs. While one of the arguments for replacing a
"command and controi" regime with market measures has been the potential impact of

398

J. Mayda, supro, note 140 at p. 1016 - 1017.

399 M. A. Santosa provides a cogent argument for the impact of citizen participation and basic
dernocratic rights on environmental decision making through a comparative analysis of
respective rights in north Amerka and the Republic of Indonesia in Citben Pmiicipclion in
Emironmentat Adminishwtive Decision-making: A Case Shrdy of Indonesia, LLM thesis.
Osgoode Hall Law SchooI, Toronto, April 1990.

bribes on enforcement effortsgW it is arguable that this problem would be even more
significant for any system based on collection or waiver of taxes or fees can impact every
facet of the cornpliance regime fiom the processing of pennits to exercise of discretion to
inspect or enforce. The power of influence and direct financial gain associated with control
over these activities can dorninate decisions about the development of the whole regdatory
regime.40 1

Considered fiorn another viewpoint, where there is a high propensity for rent-seeking a
behavior, it may be all the more important that measures be instituted to establish channels
to ensure transparency and accountability. However, in many developing nations the
potential role for the public as a watch-dog for lack of enforcement is often limited by the
generally low level of education and awareness in the general populace.402

Even where an NGO community has established itself as an environmental watch-dog,
limited right of access to information and participatory rights may seriously limit their
effecti~eness.~'~
In other instances environmental nghts have been enacted without the

400

T. Panayotou, supra, note 382 at p. 13.

"'

While the culture of corruption can seriously constrain domestic efforts to ernploy
market measures, it is onIy logical that attempts to institute global emissions trading
programs would suffer from the same limitations, only on a grander scale.

'O2

M. A. Santosa, supra, note 399 at p. 282; T. Panayotou, supra. note 382 at p. 13.

By way of example. even in some European counhies the right of access to monitoring
data is limited in practical value by the m u e n t failure to implement efficient systems for
collating and accessing the information. Rik De Baere, "Free Access to Information and the
Licensing procedures for Industrial Plants: The Flemish and Belgian Situation" supra, note 4
at p. 605-609.

"3

neceçsary implementing regulations and procedures, and efforts at dispute resolution may

be hampered by laws which forbid community gatherings.404 Finaily, while it has been
suggested that a totalitarian government be advantageous, where it chooses to move an

environmental agenda, it can d s o increase reticence of officiais to acknowledge problems in
implementing their programs.40s

While debt repayment and economic development have captured the attention of dl
govemments, for lesser developed or emerging industriai nations the debt load and
consequent pressure for escaiated development can be counted among the most significant

barriers to environmentai enforcement. Emerging industriai States, including those who
have moved rapidly into an economy based on resource extraction are hard pressed to
implernent necessary parallel environmental c o n t r ~ l s . " ~ ~

The ail too fiequently perceived conflict between environmental directives and ability to

For example the Republic of Indonesia in 1982 enacted the right to a healthy environment
as welI as right of standing for citizen suits but have yet to promulgate the necessary
regulations to actualize these nghts. M. A. Santosa, supra. note 399 at p. 281-286. See also J.
Jendroska, supra. note 107 at p. 354 and L. Maslorova, supra, note 45 at p. 98.

404

'O5

F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p. 9.

L. Maslarova, Bulgarian Ministry of the Environment advises that for her country
"Environmental concerns, despite the declarations, are still not integrated into economic and
policy decisions and they are rapidly king pushed into the background by purely economic
priorities", supra, note 45.

406

have uniimiteci economic choices is ail the more exaggerated in emerging and
industriabhg nations-4o7It is also suggested that the propensity to adopt economic models
based on conventional econornics (i.e. growth model) rather than economic strategies which
reflect sustainable development principles has a paralle1 negative effect on the capacity to

achieve environmentai co~n~liance.~~*

Developing nations ofien lack associated inhstructure including communications and
transportation, have inadequate intelligence and information management systems and a
scarcity of scientific or technicd expertise for basic impact assessrnent and control
~ ~ s t e r n In
s . ~some
~ ~ countries limited budgets for field level eiiforcernent activities

including environmental monitoring and inspection have lefi vast areas virtuaüy
~nre~ulated.~'~

The siting of economic control may also constrain the effective operation of an

environmentai cornpliance regime. This may be particdarly cntical where the major
pollutiog industries are owned by governrnent, individual govemment officiais, or the

407

J. Mayda, supra, note 140 at p. 1007.

J. G. Sin& "The Enforcernent Experience in Guyana on Exploitation of Naturat
Resources", suprq note 4 at p. 205-209.

409

~nterviewswith oficials in Republic of Indonesia, Kalimantan during 1990 to 1992 and
State level agencies of Mexico, 1995 to 1997. This is also a problem for Canada's northern
lands.

4'0

~ditary.~"
The problem is exacerbated where the military hold the power to enforce
environmental Iaws.

Problerns have dso k e n identified in the process of privatinng activities under former
cornmunistic regimes including the minimal role afTorded to environmental agencies in the
process, limited impact audits and failure to adequately address liability for past
pollution."'2 Enforcement has been made difficult by requests by foreign investors to waive

emission charges, introducing inequities between domestic and foreign owned enterprises
and a general breakdown in accountability for payment of

The process of

privatization and major resûucturing of the economies, in particular ownership and control
of industrial facilities, introduces the need for whole new approaches to environmental
cornpliance.

Some have suggested that culture can play a role in either limiting or facilitating regdatory
activity414 Where it rnay have the rnost significant impact is in the generd attitude or value

towards accepting or controllkg fate with consequence for participatory demands. Clearly a

' F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 19.
'''P. Syrycmski, supra, note 106 at p. 103-1 18.
"

413 P.

Syrycmski, supra, note 352 at p. 455-456.

M. A. Santosa, supra, note 399. This view is also shared by Mtro. Antonio Azuela,
Attorney General Cprocurador), for PROFEPA,Mexico (Interview, 1995, Mexico).

414

society which argues against any fom of human intewention to protect the environment
may give littie support to a guardianship role of the state over the environment through any
form of surveillance or enforcement.

On the other hanci, a highly lineal society may place great reliance on senior officiais or
decision-rnakers to protect their interests. Public expression of support by respected officiais
for involvement of citizens can encourage their participation.4'5 Similady, mores about the
relationship between humans and nature will determine attitudes about the relative necessity
to exploit or respect nature (air, water, wildlife). F k d y the relative significance given to
processes involving contlict versus harmony or equanimity will influence the choice of
mechanisrns for resolving problems or

For example, it may innuence the

relative effectiveness of mediation and litigation as instrument. for achieving

''

c~rn~liance.~

-

ibid at p. 283. By way of example, the practice by Prof. Dr. Ernil Salim, former
Indonesian Minister of Population and Environment, of expressing public support for the
rights of citizens and environmental organizations in participating in environmental decisionmaking has had a significant influence on willingness of citizens to express their views in that
country.
."6

ibid at p. 8 1-82.

"'Prof. Dr. Koesnadi has frequently argued for the use of mediation rather than litigation to
resolve environmental disputes in Indonesia because of the general cultural rejection of
conflict. Achmad Santosa, ibid, however suggests that where the traditional rights and values
individuals and communities are violated through expropriation of their lands and loss of
traditional livelihoods through industrial pollution there is evidence of increased willingness
to express opposition through demonstrations and litigation; the difference in litigation
between USA and Canada is often cited as an argument against according standing for citizen
suits.

6.

THENATURE
AND SCALE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS

It has k e n suggested that the ciifference in the nature and scale of environmentai problems

in developed and less developed nations rnay affect c o ~ n ~ l i a n c W
e . ~l e~ ~in developed
nations, it is development which is the key cause of environmental degradation, in less
developed countries in many insiances pollution is fostered because of poverty and lack of
development (at least appropriate d e v e l ~ ~ r n e n t )For
~ ' ~ernerging
.
industrializing nations the
problems are exacerbated by the infusion of industrial poUutants into cornmunities
incapable of mitigating the impacts due to lack of resources, technology or institutional
structures.

In addition, in lesser developed countries pollution sources are often small, widely
dispersed cottage or small scale industries, unregulated housing settlements and widespread
uncontrolled pesticide use and d i ~ ~ o s a lWhile
? ~ ~ sorne have argued for use of economic
measures rather than regulation to control these disparate sources

'",it is suggested the

poor are the least likely to be able to pay and the administrative cost would be prohibitive.
Alternative strategies have focused on regulation of major industrial sources targeting
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J. Mayda, supra. note 140 at p. 10 10- 16.

419

J. Mayda, ibid; T. O'Riordan, "The Politics of Sustainability", R. Kerry Turn, ed. in
Sustainable Environmental Management: PrincIpIes di Practice (London: Bellhaven: 1988)
at p. 38-42.
420

F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 10; T.Panayotou, supro. note 3 82 at p. 13.

domestic and other non point sources through education and awareness programs.4"

TARGE~ING
ASSISTANCE
FOR EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT

C.

While the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development did not
dedicate significant attention to the issue of environmental enforcement and compliance,
one of the key action documents fkom the conference, Agenda 21, endorses a strategy for

maximiPng cornphance with laws and regdations relating to sustainable development
which includes enforceable, effective laws, appropriate sanctions, mechanisms to promote
compliance, institutional capacity and mechanisms for public involvement in the making
and enforcing of laws on environment and d e v e ~ o ~ r n e n t . ~ ~

The necessary legislative, policy and institutional reforms, including those prescribed by
multi-lateral agreements, will be beyond the reach of rnost developing nations without the
infusion of significant and targeted aid. The alternative mechanisms to provide this
assistance were exposed intensively during the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development and the follow-up meeting of the Parties to the Rio

Declmation in 1997. A number of significant new institutions and prograrns have
evolved to address the issue of financing the implementation of sustainable

-

4"

-

-

For example, the approach adopted by the Republic of Indonesia.

'"Agenda 21, chapter 8, s q m a note 2.

de~elo~rnent.~"
Less attention has been paid to targeting hancial and technical
assistance for effective e n f o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~ ~

It will be important that any technical assistance recognize the political realities in the
receiving counûies, in other words, assistance programs should be planned for the long
duration. Part of the process of implementing environmental cornpliance regirnes is the
processing of legislative, policies and institutional reforms through senior decision makers.

In any government this takes more tirne than is ever anticipated; for developing nations
there may be substantially greater delays unless paralle1 assistance is dso king provided to
improve institutional structures and general administrative ~ o r n p e t e n c e . ~ ~ ~

The longevity of an enforcement program will be substantially increased if technicd
assistance or aid involves direct involvement and benefit by local officials and
organizations, and it has been suggested, "missions should provide 'state of the art'

424

For exarnple the creation of the Global Environment Facility (G.E.F.) and numerous
other programs within the United Nations institutions, international banks (e-g., World
Bank, Asian Development Bank), and in some cases new international capacity building
programs in national governments, (USAID, CIDA). An example of a specific institution
created to deliver this mandate is the CEC, supra, note 3.

Under the NAAEC, the Parties specifkally commit to promoting education in
environmental law and further commit to ensure their respective laws not only provide for
high levels of environmental protection, but also to continue to improve them. The CEC is
mandated to M e r cooperation in the development and improvement of these laws through
exchange of expertise. Supra note 3, articles 3, lO(3). F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p. 22; L.
F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, Third international Conference on Emtironrnenlal
Enforcement, Theme 6: Establishing International Networks, supra, note 4 at p. 32 1-37 1.
425

426

J. Mayda, ibid at p. 998.

information, tailored to the needs and capabilities of the recipient naîion, in a manner that

builds the recipient nation's ability to solve its own environmental problems.'427 This
includes sponsoring or fostering in-country nidies, data collection, training, information
and response networks. For this to occur it has been suggested that it may also be necessary

to educate the donon and to improve coordination of assistance programs to ensure critical
needs are targeted, for example, to avoid concentrating assistance only to one component of
the enforcement framework or the financing of programs which may conflict with the

overail enforcement ~ t r a t e g y .Sorne
~ ~ ~ bilateral and muhilateral aid programs have
redirected technical assistance to support lesser developed countries in the design and
implementation of more effective environmental enforcement and compliance regirnes. For
example, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), $30 million
Environmentai Management in Indonesia Project (EMDI) has since 1989 provided
technicd assistance directed at building the institutional capacity for environmental
~ ~ ~EMDI project also facilitated a process for
enforcement and ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e .The
coordinating the involvement of other foreign assistance programs in providing assistance
for regulatory and cornpliance programs.430

427

J. Mayda, ibid at p. 1024.

F. Halter, supra note 373 at p. 26. Efforts have been made in North Arnerica to
coordinate enforcement capacity building programs sponsored by the CEC, Border XXI
program and domestic assistance.

423

The EMDI project has provided advice on institutional development, legislative,
regulatory and policy development, as well as staff development and training. The Regdatory
and Cornpliance component provided expertise in environmental law and procedure,
enforcement and compliance alternatives and program development and integration as welI as
education and training.
429

"O

A donor coordinator was facilitated through and funded by Canada and the World Bank.

Since 1991 the USEPA has b e n delivering a capacity building prograrn for other nations
focused on the development and implementation of a h e w o r k for enforcement and
c o ~ n ~ l i a n c e .Canada
~ ~ ' and several European nations, most notably the Netherlands, have
also contributed substantially to programs for enhanced capacity to enforce environmentai
Iaws.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1990 organized a meeting of
international experts on environmental enforcement cuiminating in a fiamework document
for building institutional capabilities to achieve environmentai ~ o r n ~ l i a n c eThe
. ~ ~ 'focus of
the UNEP prograrn is the provision of assistance to developing or newly emerging nations

who have identified the need to initiate a enforcement and compliance program. This has
been particularly helpfid for those countries who had enacted laws without giving adequate
attention to necessary conho1 mechanisms or hf&struct~re:"~~
The UNEP training prograrn
was developed to provide assistance to nations in the process of identification of the basic
components of an effective regulatory and compliance regime and to identi@ alternatives
appropriate to their unique political and institutional and economic situation. The program
is also a direct response to Agenda 21.~"

43 1

C.Wasserman, supra, note 4 at p. 2 1-26.

432

R. Glaser, Ministry of Housing, Spacial Planning and the Environment, the Netherlands.

Opening speech to the Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra,
note 4 at p. 2.

The World Bank has also endorsed the need to direct attention and resources towards
improved capacity in Iesser developed nations for environmental enforcement and
compliance and is working with donors and recipient countries in the development of
~~~
country environmental action plans which incorporate a compliance f k ~ n e w o r k .The
agenda adopted for preparation of the country plans reflects an appreciation for the
fkmeworks proposed in Chapter III :

Experience with the plans has shown that there are five main requirements for
successful policy implementation: a clear legislative fhmework, an appropriate
administrative structure, technical skills, adequate money, and decentraiized
re~~onsibility."~
Consistent with this strategy, the Bank has extended fuianciai assistance for the
irnplementation of environmental regdatory and compliance regimes for a number of
countries.437

Finally, a nurnber of international and regional networks have been established for the
purpose of facilitating the exchange of expertise in alternative approaches to enforcement

434

LMEP,supra,note 2 at p. 8.

"'The International Bank for Reconstruction and

DeveloprnenVThe World Bank, World
Developrnent Report 1992. Developrnent and the Environmen& (Oxford: University Press,
1992) at p. 90.

437

L.F. Duncan and M.A. Santosa, supra, note 36.

and c ~ r n ~ l i a n c These
e . ~ ~ ~networks have also entianced the capacity for timely response
to environmental offenses involving transborder activities and impacts.

438

For example, the International Network of Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance
(MECE), the European Network of Enforcement Agencies (IMPEL)and the North
American Working Group on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation.

The nations of the world wiil continue to confkont the task of h d i n g common solutions
to issues of global concern. Global warming, ozone depletion, desertification, lost
biodiversity, are al1 problerns which command major political coumitment to address. Ln
the process of seeking solutions, pressure will mount to fmd increasingly more innovative
means to ensure that environment remains an inherent factor in trade expansion and
development agendas. It will be important in designing new tools not to lose sight of the
need to put in place and maintain the basic building blocks which will guarantee that
environmental protection and sustainable development are not forgotten (and that the race

to the top does not become the race to the bottom.) One of the critical building blocks is
enforcement.

Regardless of the issue confronted (e-g., protection of endangered species, ensuring safe

drinking water) or the mechanism chosen to implement the protection measure (e.g.,
regulations, emissions trading), the same basic underlying issues will be c o h n t e d . Does
the political will exist to institute the agreed agenda, and, secondly, how do we measure
the depth of cornmitment? While many nations continue to espouse support for adherence
to the "Rule of Law" in the exploitation of the world's resources, in far too many
instances the means to institute those democratic principles have been found senously

lacking.439

439

Observe for example the massive environmental and health impacts fiom raging forest fires
161

In Chapter II a series of arguments were made for the indispensable role of enforcement
in achieving sustainable developrnent, including its inexhicable link to the " Rule of
Law". If one accepts that precept, it then foilows that a test of tme cornmitment to this
underlying dernocratic principle is the enactrnent of the necessary powers and
mechanisms and dedication of the necessary resources to ensure compliance with
environmental standards, regardless of the instrument chosen to implement them. As was
previously outlined, this requires the implementation of a basic framework for effective
enforcement, including the enactment of binding standards. institution of mechanisms for

promoting and monitoring compliance and the creation of tools and a strategy to respond
to non-compliance. Implementation of this framework will be necessary regardless of the
innovative mechanisms adopted for triggering and enhancing compliance. As has been
outiined, the ultimate effectiveness of alternative mesures, inclusive of the widely touted
emissions trading regimes, environmental management systems, or

green taxes, is

premised on a solid regulatory foundation. It will be equally important in devising new
environmental management tools to maintain the processes enswing transparency and
participation, in many cases legislated in tandem with regulatory and enforcement

caused by the failure of the Republic of Indonesia( by their own admission) to enforce forest
practice laws and the resulting strain behveen the trading nations of ASEAN. See for example"
The smoke in Asia's eyes", The Economisf as reprinted in the Toronto Globe and Mail, Monday
October 6, 1997, at p. A21 and "Malaysian forest fires straining relations with ASEAN", Toronto
GIobe and Mail, Tuesday October 7, 1997 at A 1 1 B in which information is provided to the effect
that 176 logging companies were under investigation for violation forestry protection laws. A
November 2, 1997 report found an even greater problem in Brazil with reported 28 % increase in
burning in the Amazon region. " Arnazon ablaze; Forest fires up despite world pressure",
Montreal Gazette, November 2, 1997 p. A6.

processes.

It is well recognized that investment is attracted to a jurisdiction with a proven record of
regulatory consistency . The intent of many recent multi-lateral trade agreements is not
only the expansion of economic opportunities, but concurrent with that the assurance of a
level playing-field. As has been presented, one means of establishing that arena is an
effective domestic environmental regulatory and enforcement regime for setting and
meeting

standard^."^

In evaluating the contribution of enforcement to the process of achieving sustainable
development, it will be important to first Mly comprehend what enforcement actually
entails. Enforcement must be recognized as more than an end result. Enforceability can
provide a measuring stick for the viability of any system for implementing environmentai
protection or sustainable development. It provides the test for consistency and faKness in
any system of standards or procedures. The sarne issues apply regardless of the intended
target whether it is ensuring conservation and biodiversity are respected in allotting
timber concessions, the Iicensing of transport and disposal of hazardous wastes, or an
approval process for construction of an irrigation dam. Are there consistent and binding
d e s ? Are procedures for transparency and participation prescnbed? Where there are

-

440

-

As previously discussed, the NAAEC,impIemented as a side agreement to the NAFTA, not
only subjects the Parties thereto to the possibility of imposition of monetary penalties or trade
sanctions for persistent pattern of failed enforcement of their respective environmental laws, but
also introduces a forum for the review of any abrogation's of environmental commitments for
the purpose of gaining an economic advantage. Supra note 3, article 5, 10(6) and Part Five.

opportunities for the non-cornpliant (i.e. fiee-riders) to gain an &air

advantage over

those who do comply, are processes in place for detection and response ?

There is nothing mysterious about an effective environmental enforcement regime.

Perhaps it is this Iack of mystique which fails to evoke substantive interest or support. For
the rnost part, enforcement involves the basic technical tasks of standard- seniog,
monitoring, information management, and institutional responses. Market rneasures and
complex trading schemes and the urgent substantive issues like global warming or rapidly
disappearing species understandably capture the public attention. Yet without the basic
foundation of a working enforcement and compliance regime, little red progress c m be
made in addressing these bigger problems.

In the framework presented for instituthg an effective enforcernent regime, it is
important to recognize that each component is munially reliant. Enforcement action will
not be possible without legaily-binding standards and mechanisms in place to detect
violations. The credibility of an enforcernent and compliance regime will be put at nsk
unless parallel attention is given to the necessary institutional mechanisrns to mitigate
against conflicting messages and responses. Voluntary compliance and enforcement
actions demand ptecise and binding standards and clearly delineated roles for regulated
industry, government and the Sected community. Still, con-

to the views of some

detractors, this "recipe for success" does make allowances for considerable flexibility and
innovation. Enforcement is not oniy synonymous with "command and control''.
encompasses a broad spectrum of regulatory, market and voluntary initiatives.

It

Fuially, in propounding any formula for successful enforcement, allowances must be
made for the particular coIlStraints confionting developing nations. Nonetheless, a
cornmon cornmitment to the principle of effective enforcement will be necessary if we
hope to effect real change.
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